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ABSTRACT	  	  
This paper explores the role that social movements play in weakening the racial 
hierarchies that continue to persist in contemporary United States and South Africa. A 
theoretical analysis of the function of social movements is followed by an historical 
survey of the racial hierarchies within these two countries, with particular attention paid 
to the countries’ respective eras of institutionalized racism characterized by the Jim Crow 
and Apartheid periods. After which, police brutality and service delivery are used to 
exemplify the structural racism that endures in each of these societies. These two issues 
also serve as the most galvanizing issues for provoking social movements in the United 
States and South Africa. 
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I.	  Introduction	  
 The contemporary racial hierarchies that persist in South Africa and the United 
States are the enduring legacies of these two states’ racially imbued pasts, which 
developed out of colonializer relations, economic trends, and state mapping. The 
development of this social construct was politicized and mandated through the 
institutionalization of racially discriminatory practices during the United States’ Jim 
Crow era, and South Africa’s Apartheid era. Today many of the racially biased 
tendencies that were once widely accepted and legally mandated during the two 
aforementioned eras are still evident in the both countries’ societal cleavages, which are 
articulated in the social, political, and economic relations of each country. 
 My project aims to determine if social movements can be a force in weakening 
racial hierarchies, and if so, what needs to transpire in order for the movement to have a 
positive effect on the level of hierarchy that persists in contemporary U.S. and South 
African societies. I have defined a social movement as the collective effort put forth by 
the public that aims to change a function of society that affects the way in which it 
operates, or is operated (by elites). The social movement will seek this change by 
garnering policy elite’s attention and support for their frustration. Generally, the 
movement seeks a policy response, either the enactment of new policies or the improved 
implementation and widespread publication of previously existing (but insufficiently 
executed) policies. A movement’s ability to successfully incite a change in the level of 
hierarchy within a society will be twofold; it must be able to alter the public’s perception 
of the problem as well as lead to a positive policy response. Racism currently exists 
amongst both social interactions and policy processes (although less explicitly now than 
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in previous eras) and the two spheres are deeply connected. Social movements function at 
the intermediary point of these two spheres and thus may be a force in weakening the 
hierarchy. 
 In order to address this relationship and thus my research question completely, I 
must examine the functions of both social movements and racial hierarchies. I will first 
provide a comprehensive understanding of social movement conventions by 
demonstrating the arena in which social movements exist; what leads to social 
movements; whom social movements impact; what potential effects they may have, and 
the function they serve in society. This discussion will be provided in a review of the 
theories put forth by a sample of the most influential social movement theorists (some of 
whom also focused on the role of race in particular). Then, in my discussion of the 
practices, the functions, and the nuances surrounding the racial hierarchies within the two 
countries that I aim to compare, I will first put forth an in-depth historical analysis of how 
the racial systems have evolved, how the function of each hierarchy has evolved 
throughout history, as well as the various influences that have historically gained 
leverage to weaken the respective hierarchies. Provided this understanding, I will then 
delve into contemporary race relations, post-institutionalized racism, in order to apply my 
theory to modern day situations. In order to accurately depict the role of race in 
contemporary U.S. and South Africa, I chose to interrogate an aspect of each society that 
remains disproportionately racialized. 
 For the United States, I examined police-minority relations, and in particular, the 
police brutality that occurred in the Rodney King case of 1992. For South Africa, I 
examined service delivery, and in particular, poor service delivery to the townships in the 
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Western Cape, with an emphasis on the unenclosed toilets that led to protest in 2011. 
These two cases depict especially galvanizing events and maintain the criterion that is 
necessary to test my theory: issues that are generating protest and are also racially 
charged. 
 This project is a reflection of the past four years of academic training I have 
received at the College of Wooster. It is the convergence of the passion and intellect that 
I have developed throughout my academic career, thus far. As such, social science 
techniques have been employed to provide an in-depth analysis of my primary research 
question. Each section has been intentionally crafted to provide a truly comprehensive 
take on the issues related to racism as it has evolved to exist in the U.S. and South Africa, 
and to inform my inquiry regarding the role that social movements may play in working 
against said racism. 
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II.	  LITERATURE	  REVIEW	  	  INTRODUCTION	  
 Contemporary social movement theorists have recently begun to apply their 
ideologies to historical social movements’ effectiveness in procuring social change. 
Previously, most theorists had focused primarily on understanding the conditions that 
simply prompt social movements. In the late 1970s, starting with William A. Gamson in 
The Strategy of Social Protest, and followed soon after by Frances Fox Piven in Poor 
People’s Movements, a group of social movement theorists began to probe a little deeper 
to develop an appreciation for the conditions and circumstances that would lead to a 
successful social movement. This approach was initially coined by Social Movement 
Impact Theory (or outcome theory), which addresses the actual impact of a social 
movement as well as what led to this impact and social movement action in the first 
place. Today, academic sources widely use the term “success” when referring to a 
positive outcome for various social movements. However, the meaning of success and the 
variables used to define success within the social movement literature are still widely 
contested. Today, questions regarding how to maintain commitment to collective action 
while avoiding fracturing, and how to “exploit the vulnerabilities and schisms of 
antagonists” have taken the forefront of academia for analyzing how social movements 
may be successful (Gamson and Schmeidler 1984, 568). 
 I will review the social movement literature that focuses on the conditions that 
prompt social movement action, but my interest for this project primarily lies with the 
literature that addresses the necessary conditions for procuring an effective social 
movement. In this review, I will introduce each theorist by mentioning the field of 
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academia in which they base their theory and how that field may inform their theory.1 
Each theorist will be analyzed by regarding their dependent variable as effective or 
ineffective social movements, and their independent variable[s] as the circumstances and 
occurrences that influence this dependent variable (i.e. social movement actions, or 
timing, or organization). Note that the literature review is organized by the individual 
theorists. Within each theorist’s subsection the analysis provided is in direct reference to 
the work produced by said theorist, unless otherwise noted. For example, if a separate 
author agrees or makes a similar point to the primary theorist at hand, I will explicitly 
reference that other author. Otherwise, it should be understood that the review provided 
in each subsection is based on the work of the author noted in the heading of that section. 	  TOP-­‐DOWN	  VS.	  BOTTOM-­‐UP	  
 I have categorized each of my primary theorists into either a top-down, or a 
bottom-up field of thought. Ultimately, the difference between the top-down authors, and 
the bottom-up authors rests in two questions: (1) whose movement will mend the system, 
and (2) who initiates the change; the political elites, or the marginalized peoples. Top-
down theorists would argue that the elite movements will fix the system and elites must 
initiate the change, while bottom-up theorists would argue that the marginalized peoples’ 
movements can fix the system and these people must initiate the change. The basis for 
change however (i.e. policy change or change in social consciousness) may be agreed 
upon or find overlap between the two groups of theorists, but whom the movement must 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For most theorists, conclusions and core concepts can be drawn from understanding 
their respective academic fields.  
 	  
14 
mobilize to be successful, the masses or the elite is where these people diverge.2 They 
may agree that the root cause of the social hierarchy is state mapping, or White 
nationalism, or White supremacy, or slavery. By highlighting and apprehending these two 
conflicting approaches, my work aims to be self-critical. 
 First, I will introduce Frances Fox Piven, William A. Gamson and Emilie 
Shmeidler, and Michael Omi and Howard Winant (and their influencers) as the key 
theorists who promote a bottom-up approach to social activism. Then, I will survey 
Anthony Marx, Desmond S. King and Rogers M. Smith, and John D. Skrentny (and their 
influencers) to provide an understanding of the key top-down explanations for social 
movement success. I will conclude with an analysis of the commonalities and differences 
between each of the theorists. My research is ultimately focused on social movements to 
overturn the post-racial hierarchy. Although not all of the aforementioned theorists focus 
on racially charged and/or social inclusion-focused movements in particular, their 
theories may still inform my thesis regarding the conditions necessary to create effective 
movements. Those surveyed are considered the leading social movement theorists and 
have put forth the most significant social movement theories of our time. Based on their 
work I hypothesize, (1) Bottom-up social movements are more likely to lead to a 
weakening of the racial hierarchy than are top-down movements. (2) Social movements 
are more likely to lead to a weakening of the racial hierarchy when there are preexisting 
divisions within the ruling elites. (3) Social movements will be more likely to have an 
impact when the hierarchy is formal and grievances are made visible. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The theorists may also agree upon what led to the contemporary system (specifically the 
racial hierarchy, in my study) and the historical processes and events that have caused 
modern-day inequalities.  
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BOTTOM-­‐UP:	  	  FRANCES	  FOX	  PIVEN:	  THE	  SOCIAL	  STRUCTURING	  OF	  POLITICAL	  PROTEST	  
 Piven is a professor of political science and sociology; she is a political activist 
and intellectual and has played an important role in promoting policy change that focuses 
on poverty alleviation (namely welfare), voter registration, and the point at which these 
two issues converge. Her work primarily analyzes social movements and electoral 
processes as well as the necessary conditions for a successful social movement. Power 
dynamics therein serve as her primary concentration; both the power held by the poor and 
the power held by the elites, and the ways in which to capitalize in order to create more 
effective movements. Piven (1976) argues that elites have created socially exclusionary 
systems and that the power structure within these systems is problematic. She claims that 
mass protest can shift this structure and ultimately alter the poor’s (or marginalized’s) 
situation.3 
 Piven pioneered one of the primary questions that I wish to interrogate in my 
research: why some movements are able to be more successful than others. As previously 
stated, academics before her endeavored to understand which conditions will lead to 
social movements in general. While this is still an important point of interrogation, 
understanding the ability to create change through social mobilization and action serves 
as the next step for providing more power to those who have traditionally been left out of 
social, political, and economic spheres. She finds disruption through defiance to be the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 She uses four case studies to bolster her claims: the movement led by the unemployed 
during the Great Depression, the Workers’ Alliance of America; the industrial strike that 
led to the Congress of Industrial Organizations; the Southern civil rights movements in 
the 1950s and 1960s; and the 1960s National Welfare Rights Organization’s protests for 
welfare recipients (1976).  
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most potent tool that serves the poor in their effort to transform their own political 
positioning. However, she concedes that poor people’s (or in my study, marginalized 
people’s) uprisings will only occur during certain moments of socioeconomic 
interruption. 
Creating a Defiant Poor 
 Piven (1976) delineated three key conditions under which social protest will be 
effective: (1) a loss of legitimacy of the system, (2) a resurgence of individual power, and 
(3) a newfound defiance that is the basis for collective action; the third being the 
determining action in a social movement’s success (300). The poor (marginalized) who 
are being negatively affected by the system must demonstrate defiance and collective 
defiance will lead to the greatest success. In order to act defiantly, the poor must see their 
condition as not divinely ordained nor based on personal qualities and/or talent (310). 
They must understand that their social standing has been prescribed by the social system, 
and that they as individuals, are not the reason for their disadvantaged positioning. These 
surges of defiance, and realizations about the system, however, will only take place given 
certain conditions, when the poor become informed about their rights and feel 
compounding discontent in their everyday situations. 
Timing and Electoral Instability 
 Piven (1976) argues that the success of a protest is not based on rallying a defiant 
poor alone, but is also influenced by the timing of a protest related to the level of 
electoral stability when the elites must respond to the protests’ pleas. She claims that 
timing is crucial for determining how to political leaders will respond, because their 
response often depends on whether or not they are working to maintain a particular sect 
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of constituent support. If a leader is unsure of his or her constituents’ support, or is 
making decisions at a time when such support is especially necessary to his or her 
personal success, disturbances will not be ignored (319). She also claims “under 
conditions of electoral instability, the alliance of public and private power is sometimes 
weakened, if only briefly, and at these moments a defiant poor may make gains” (320). 
The extent to which these conditions will affect the outcome of a protest, in particular, is 
still unknown, but acts of defiance (on any level) that occur during these periods are 
shown to have an impact on political decisions that regard the poor.  
Sustaining Impact 
 Piven (1976) also claims that after a protest has subsided, in order for the 
movement to sustain an impact, the ideals and objectives that the poor put forth as the 
basis for their uprising must align with the ideals and goals held by the sitting political 
elites. Otherwise, “when protest subsides, concessions may be withdrawn,” (325) so even 
though the timing may have been right, and/or officials may have been seeking public 
support, and thus were initially willing to make concessions, once the protest calms down 
these officials may no longer be willing to help. Piven claims however, that if the 
innovations (that result from social movements) are compatible with the interests of the 
power holders, the changes made will persist. For example, “labor unions constituted a 
useful mechanism to regulate the labor force” (325) and have thus survived post-uprising 
because the goals of the movement also satisfied the elites goals. In sum, Piven’s 
overarching argument for that factors that will lead to a successful social movement are, 
when a mass of ordinary citizens (or more specifically the poor) are able to rise up with 
feelings of defiance to use disruption tactics, which again is their most potent mechanism, 
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they will be able affect political elites. However, this is only possible when the uprising is 
pursued at a time of electoral instability. Also, the movement will lead to durable policy 
changes, only if its innovations are compatible with the power holders’ goals. 	  WILLIAM	  A.	  GAMSON	  AND	  EMILIE	  SHMEIDLER:	  COMMENTARY	  ON	  POOR	  PEOPLE’S	  MOVEMENT	  
 Gamson and Shmeidler (1984) were the first to theorize what factors may lead to 
a successful social movement. They have thus responded to Piven’s (1977) work and 
underscored how her theory is both analogous to and also dissimilar from the notions 
they put forth a few years prior. Gamson and Shmeidler especially draw into question the 
assertions Piven makes against overly “organized” social movements. By organized, 
Piven (as well as Gamson and Shmeidler) is referring a reliance on elites who will 
maintain an underlying hierarchical role to coordinate activities and help accumulate 
resources. 
 Piven fears co-option of the movement by elites will consequently strip the voice 
from the poor. Instead she advocates for a more “chaotic” form of social movement, 
where all voices are more equally represented. Gamson and Shmeidler maintain that 
proper leadership can be a tool for mobilization, whereas Piven prefers chaos because it 
is more democratic. In The Strategy of Social Protest, Gamson (1975) claims that a 
bureaucratically organized movement might ultimately be more successful, but that this 
type of organization also leaves room for political elites to take over the movement 
itself;4 that movements geared toward replacing specific political elites are not likely to 
be successful; and that the timing of a movement will impact its success such that, a 
movement that emerges in a time without political chaos will be more successful.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 In which case it would no longer fully represent the needs of the marginalized. 
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Resource mobilization theory and organization 
 Gamson and Shmeidler (1984) compare Piven’s claims to those of the prevailing 
resource mobilization theorists that predominated the social movement theories of the 
late 1960s and 1970s. They highlight Tilly who, in his work From Mobilization to 
Revolution (1978), claims that there are four main tenets to achieving collective action: 
organization (which may appear in a myriad of ways), common interests, mobilization, 
and opportunity. Tilly argues that collective action is “a function, in part, of the intensity 
of the organization” (Gamson and Shmeidler 1984 569). The intensity of organization 
Tilly regards to is regarding the strength of the common identity and the unifying 
structure within a movement (Gamson and Shmeidler 1984, 569). Gamson and Shmeidler 
also present Oberschall’s interpretation of organization. Oberschall says that in order for 
protest to be sustainable, an organizational base as well as a strong sense of leadership is 
necessary (569). In this instance, too, the type of leadership may vary, but Oberschall 
states that the leader must nonetheless be agreed upon by all of the activists. McCarthy 
and Zald emphasize resource aggregation as the main component to collective action and 
protest, but in order to aggregate adequate resources, there must be sufficient underlying 
organizational means. Comparatively, Piven finds that organization is not important to 
the success of the movement, and in fact could hinder the movement itself. Piven argues 
that the most vital aspect of a social movement is its ability to garner support from the 
masses. Therefore when a movement relies too heavily on its leaders to maintain 
organization it strips some of the power from ordinary people and reduces the 
organization’s efforts to a bureaucratic level, where changes is harder to achieve. 
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 Resource mobilization theorists and Piven both “write from the same vantage 
point of movement participants” seeing the movement from the bottom up. Both also 
claim that activists cannot control the political climate, but that they will benefit from 
timing their revolutions to take advantage of the vulnerabilities that arise in the political 
sphere. Both fields of thought agree that when an opportunity arises to rebel in the 
political sphere, it is important for the movement to act (Gamson and Schmeilder 1984, 
572).  
 There is an agreement amongst the aforementioned theorists that a bottom-up 
approach that capitalizes on disruption must be taken in order to understand the realities 
of the powerless’ situation, and that this view will lead to more representative political 
contestation and change. Piven and Cloward claim “the most useful way to think about 
the effectiveness of protest is to examine the disruptive effects on institutions of different 
forms of mass defiance, and then to examine the political reverberations of those 
disruptions,” and thus Piven and Cloward’s argument for mass defiance and disruption 
clearly unites with the main tenets of resource mobilization theory (Piven and Cloward 
24, via Gamson and Shmeidler 1984, 572). 
 However, Piven maintains her position against how resource mobilization theory 
promotes organization. Whereas other resource-mobilization theorists would argue that 
some form of organization is necessary to gain and maintain collective action. Gamson 
and Shmeidler state that Piven does not offer any alternative to the organization that 
resource-mobilization theory alleges is necessary. They insist that Piven never looks 
beyond the claims she makes in terms of timing, whereby she argues there must be a 
breakdown in the political system, which is not entirely within of the protestors’ control, 
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in order to achieve momentum.5 However, by carefully analyzing the preceding actions 
that lead to Piven and Cloward’s various examples of spontaneous mass-movements, 
such as The Industrial Workers Movement, Gamson and Shmeidler debunk the claim that 
organization was completely unnecessary or ineffective in promoting the movement’s 
goals. Gamson and Schmeilder (1984) state that Piven and Cloward (1977) simply forego 
many of the details that actually led to their examples of poor people’s movements, and 
that the utilization of elites actually contributed to the success of many of the examples 
they provided to show the opposite. Ultimately the disagreement rests in the fact that  
Piven and Cloward acknowledge the extensive planning involved 
in some mass movements, [such as the Birmingham campaign,] 
but they do little to illuminate the contribution of movement 
organization and infrastructure to mobilizing and sustaining mass 
defiance and the role of careful planning in making protest more 
effective, 
 
which are key components to the success and effectiveness of social movements 
(Gamson and Schmeilder 1984, 580). Gamson and Schmeilder (1984) generally argue 
that organization helps promote the sustainability and legitimacy of social movements, 
which is at odds with Piven and Cloward’s understanding that organization may actually 
undermine mass movement of peoples. 
 In 2003, Piven responded to many of the claims made against Poor People’s 
Movement and said that “the organizer model did not lead to power; in fact, it often led 
organizers to act in ways that diminished the disruptive mobilizations that sometimes did 
yield power” (Piven 2003, 708). Piven is focused on determining whether the disruptive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Piven and Cloward uphold this argument by demonstrating that “unorganized 
disruptions of industrial workers in the 1930s produced some political gains, but the 
organized electoral activities of the unions could not sustain them” (Piven and Cloward 
via Gamson and Schmeilder 1984, 575).  
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forces, which the poor people were capable of instigating, were able to promote  
sustainable change. She argues that organizers are more focused on organizing the 
movement and mobilizing resources than dealing with the most productive force at the 
hands of poor people, their disruptive power. This disruption is a more potent tool than 
organization, and so Piven still continued to refuse claims that organizing forces will lead 
to a more proactive movement 
 OMI	  AND	  WINANT:	  RACIAL	  FORMATIONS	  IN	  THE	  UNITED	  STATES	  
 Omi and Winant (1994) also promote a bottom-up approach to social movements; 
their work deals directly with racially charged social movements. They claim that there 
are three key themes that have shaped their theory: The first being their assessment of the 
significance of new social movements, whereby the Black movement in particular has 
created new political subjects, expanded the terrain of political struggle beyond ‘normal 
politics,’ and has inspired and galvanized a range of other ‘new social movements.’ This 
was accomplished by “the Black movement’s ability to rearticulate traditional political 
and cultural themes and in doing so mobilize a mass base of adherents” (4). The second 
theme is their location of race at the center of American political history (without 
displacing other important minority movements), whereby the social nature of race, the 
absence of essential racial characteristics, the historical flexibility of racial meanings and 
categories, and the political aspect of race have all been accounted for in America’s 
political history. And the third is their suggestion for an expanded model of the state and 
state activity, which would place socially based movements, rather than traditionally 
defined, economically based interest groups at the center of contemporary political 
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processes; specifically how the state shapes and is shaped by the racial contours of 
society and how movements have played a role in their reshaping. 
Paradigm shift and new social movements 
 Omi and Winant claim that social movements are affected by, and can have an 
effect on paradigm shifts. In the 1950s and 1960s, to have an effect on the racial system 
was to create a paradigm shift (95). For example, the civil rights movement, in order to 
become a national movement against racism, had to create a paradigm shift. They also 
argue that new social movements, post the civil rights movement, have been inspired by 
and led by the Black movement for its influence in shifting the paradigm. The Black 
movement has “irreversibly expanded the terrain of political contest, and set the stage for 
the general reorganization of U.S. politics” (96). The ethnicity framework, which aimed 
to save ethnic integrity while assimilating into modern American culture, first helped to 
provide a framework for Blacks to shape their political agenda. Then, new social 
movements in the 1950s we able to facilitate conversation around differing views on the 
social meaning of race in a decade coined the great transformation. “Racial awareness, 
racial meaning, and racial subjectivity” were all reinterpreted, revealing that race affects 
all levels of social, economic, and political life (97). Racial minority movements were the 
first new social movements to shift beyond the macro-political sphere, and into the 
everyday lives of individuals. These movements have influenced subsequent movements 
for other racial minorities who have experienced similar problems. Omi and Winant 
claim that in the 1960s, society transformed how it understood and defined race, which 
has continued to influence racial movements today. 
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 Enduring collective racial identities of the 1950s and 1960s have affected 
contemporary movements by instilling a deep self-awareness that has been maintained, 
even during decades of depressed and repressed movements. However, this shift has still 
not been able to fully transform the racial order. The rearticulation of Black subjectivity, 
which has facilitated an understanding of race as a subject, has also played a role in the 
politicizing of Black identity and has intervened on a cultural and ideological level. This 
was pertinent during the civil rights movement in addition to achieving “collective 
behavior” and “resource mobilization”, which were two other important facets used by 
the movement to politicize Black identity as well (98). Previous to the “modern Black 
movement’s appearance on the political stage” most race-related changes made in the 
political system were economically based, rather than socially or politically charged. Omi 
and Winant (2005) claim that it was crucial for the movement to expand from its 
economically based efforts (but not to abandon these endeavors) to political and social 
ploys. They seek to include racial issues in what they refer to as “common sense” and 
“normal” politics in order to push these issues higher up the political agenda.  
Black Power 
 Omi and Winant argue that creating a “culture of resistance” that moves beyond 
merely surviving and toward prospering is another variable that will impact the 
effectiveness of a social movement by restructuring the political system. It is out of this 
culture of resistance that Black power was born (100). Black power is the radicalization 
of the Black Movement, which was borne from an epiphany regarding the political 
changes that resulted from the civil rights movement; the positive alterations were only 
able to help a small sect of middle class Black people. Black power therefore led to an 
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overall rejection of the integrationist and assimilationist goals introduced by the civil 
rights movement (102). The Black power movement also promoted a sense of 
nationalism for the Black community. By encouraging a separation from the White-
dominated American nation and creating a national pride and unity amongst the Black 
community, this movement allowed minority populations to develop a “genuine culture 
separate from assimilationist practices” (103). The agendas of Booker T. Washington, 
Garvey, and Du Bois encouraged Black and minority communities to write their own 
history, make their own choices and act on their own agenda as a strategy to achieve 
social change. 
Targeting the State 
 Omi and Winant (2005) posit the state itself as a key target for racially focused 
social movements. The state is seen as the “factor of cohesion in society” and has 
organized racial practices throughout history” (105). The state is comprised of people 
whose mindsets have come from these past organizations, and thus, movements must 
seek “to make use of the state’s internal racial contradictions.” There have been small but 
significant success in addressing these contradictions (including the expansion of voting 
rights, desegregating buses, broadened social services, etc.). Omi and Winant (1994) 
claim that these contradictions provide openings for social movements’ actions to make 
gains (105). In order to promote a Black voice in the mainstream political sphere, they 
state that, on the one hand, electoral and institutional entrism may serve as a means. This 
effort in particular was able to “buil[d] political organizations that could win elections, 
penetrate and influence state bureaucracies, and either exercise power in the Democratic 
Party or openly compete with it” (110), but ultimately, it failed to promote entrance into 
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the “normal” political sphere for the Black community, which is a key component of the 
racial transformation theory they have put forth. 
 Some racial and social movement theorists hone in on class-related claims as a 
mobilizing tool for dismantling the racial hierarchy and contributing to “normal” or 
“common sense” politics. Socialist tradition provides an avenue to examine class as an 
element in anti-racist struggles. The Marxist-Leninist view posits racism as an essential 
facet to the capitalist structure. This view includes internal colonialist claims that race is 
used to economically and culturally exploit minority populations in the U.S. These fields 
of thought have helped educate individuals about the role that their repression plays in the 
broader social and class issues, such that Piven (1976) claims is a necessary juncture in 
empowering the powerlessness to fight against their socially prescribed standings. 
Theories related to internal colonialism, (which are often put forth alongside classist 
theories) according to Omi and Winant (1994) however, fail to account for the nuances of 
revolutions and colonialism that are taking place internationally, and even more so fail to 
account for the nuances and particularities of the U.S. racial system.  
 Omi and Winant (1994) contend that considered critically, none of political 
projects related to Black power, class, or internal colonization have succeeded, even 
remotely, “in forging an oppositional racial ideology or movement [that is] capable of 
radically transforming the racial order” because all have failed to address race in a social 
sphere, and “all reduced race: to interest group, class fraction, nationality or cultural 
identity” (111). However, the racial movements between 1950 and 1970, Omi and 
Winant concede, laid the foundation for future successes in changing America’s racial 
order.  
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 The key, then to allowing minority populations access to political processes 
today, is in transforming American politics, rearticulating traditional and cultural themes, 
and transforming the meaning of race in the political sphere. Political mobilization with 
regard to race has led to a restructuring of the racial order, reorganization of state 
institutions, and in some regard entirely new realms of state activity (138). Still notably, 
however, Omi and Winant (1994) claim that the racial movement will remain unable to 
reach the next level of paradigm shift within the political culture writ large due to the 
movement’s internal and external fragmentation. The aforementioned efforts (Black 
power, economic foci, and class-based strategies) have often been “outmaneuvered by the 
new racial state which had responded to moderate demands and marginalized radical 
ones,” little action has been taken to quiet louder cries, and political concessions tend to 
focus on equality of opportunity instead of equality of result, which has ultimately hurt 
the extension of race into a national “common sense” (141).  
 TOP-­‐DOWN:	  	  SKRENTNY:	  POLICY-ELITE	  PERCEPTIONS	  AND	  SOCIAL	  MOVEMENT	  SUCCESS:	  UNDERSTANDING	  VARIATIONS	  IN	  GROUP	  INCLUSION	  IN	  AFFIRMATIVE	  ACTION	  
 Like Omi and Winant, John D. Skrentny is a political sociologist who examines 
policy problems related to inequality. Skrentny (2006), however, takes a top-down 
approach and claims that in order for a social movement to be effective, policy elites 
must personally agree with the movement’s goals, and also perceive that their 
constituents will also agree with the movement’s goals. Ultimately, elites may accept 
social movements as a means of promoting their own power and legitimacy. Skrentny 
(2006) examines “how much a social movement must struggle for success” (1764) and 
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says that a movement’s success depends on how elites perceive the marginalized group’s 
definition, morality, and threat. 
 Skrentny (2006) claims that a social movement will be successful if the 
perception of the movement’s goals fit within the government’s motivations (also see 
McAdam at al. 1996 and Tarrow 1998 for political process theory which makes a similar 
argument). The movement therefore must fit within the structure of the institution that it 
wants to change. Decision-making and peer mobilization to promote the movement must 
be catalyzed on the elite level. Bottom-up theorists who posit the resource mobilization 
theory (McCarthy and Zald 1997) and disruptive impact theory (Piven and Cloward 
1997) would argue, conversely, that elites’ perceptions can be altered by the masses, even 
though the policy decisions must still be made at the elite level. Skrentny (2006), 
however, challenges the bottom-up authors’ emphasis on the masses by demonstrating 
that some groups (African Americans for example) had to struggle more than others 
(“American Indians, Asian Americans and Latinos”) in order to achieve the same 
political impact and policy outcomes as their counterparts (1765). This is because the 
elites, who are at the center of the movement’s effectiveness, perceive the inclusion of 
other minority groups to be in line with the government’s mission. Thus, policy outcomes 
are decided by the perception elites hold for various groups. Unlike the aforementioned 
theorists, Skrentny defines the success of a social movement to be whether or not the 
movement specifically leads to changes in policy and also notes, in a timely manner, 
Skrentny therefore clearly illustrates a top-down approach; policy changes are ultimately 
determined and catalyzed by elites. 
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 The first term Skrentny introduces, definition, refers to how a group is defined 
with regard to elites’ perception of their characteristics including, “physical, historical, 
and behavioral underpinnings” (1766). This definition may also be informed by what the 
elites perceive the public’s view of the group to be. Access to statistics may help depict 
the group’s unfavorable social realities in order to craft a definition that policy elites can 
sympathize with. The second term, morality refers to the perceived deservingness of the 
group and the contribution they may potentially make to greater society; this is where 
elites may clump minority groups together to make sweeping changes (1766-1767). For 
example, various minority groups were able to attach their movement to the African 
American struggle for inclusive policies. The third term, threat, Skrentny claims may be 
the most important variable—it may effect both the definition and morality of a group. 
When the claims of social movements lead elites to perceive their power-positions or the 
society that they represent is at risk, they are more likely to accelerate policy changes 
(1767-1768). Changes in the way a group’s framed may also result from these threats; 
this frame will determine the effectiveness of that group’s movement. Policy elites’ 
perceptions of or framing of a particular group determine whether or not policy changes 
will be made in their favor. Wilson (1980) is cited by Skrentny to reinforce the idea that 
policy changes will be pursued if the costs of the policy are dispersed by its benefits 
(1807); reinforcing the notion that policy changes and consequently social changes are 
outcomes of policy-elites’ perception of whether or not said change will benefit the 
elites’ position. 
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KING	  AND	  SMITH:	  RACIAL	  ORDERS	  IN	  AMERICAN	  POLITICAL	  DEVELOPMENT	  
 King and Smith (2005) also focus on racial inequalities in their top-down 
approach to social movement success. They claim that social movements are effective 
when the racial institutional order is able to shift from a White supremacist order to an 
egalitarian order (even for individual policy outcomes). King and Smith (2005) argue that 
there are two racial orders evolving in American political science: the White supremacist 
order and the transformative egalitarian order. They claim that race is used to gain 
political power for power’s sake and notably, not necessarily for economic gains alone. 
Racial institutions are thus used to serve the interests of “their architects” and to bind 
certain groups together. King and Smith take a top-down approach by explaining that the 
change must come from the architect.  
 The authors claim that the primary actors in a social movement’s success are the 
political entrepreneurs and the institutions in which they operate (76). Two other 
variables that determine the success of a social movement are politicians’ ideological 
goals and their efforts to vie for profit and power that extend beyond purely economic 
profit. The U.S. is comprised of many different institutional orders including conflicting 
ideological racial orders. Change occurs when these conflicting orders and actors come 
together at various levels and when power dynamics shift between the two orders. The 
orders do not change, but an individual may shift allegiances. There is also an 
understanding that one order may be favored over another, until “exceptional 
circumstances have opened up new coalition options and policy directions” as those that 
Skrentny (2006) describes as threats. 
 King and Smith (2011) claim that sociologists, such as Omi and Winant, 
inaccurately see racial change as “the product of the interaction of racially based social 
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movements and the state,” and they also undermine the bottom-up approach by claiming 
that the institutions themselves interact to create change. Thus, they think that political 
leadership must initiate change in order for it to transpire. They also explain that the 
White supremacist order has resulted from various reasonings and impulses related to 
racism, ranging from institutional protections to genocidal impulses. Elites may be 
against White supremacy for reasons such as “economic equity, equal political status, and 
cultural recognition” and may have various modes for achieving this equal status from 
pluralism to integration (76). There have been forces throughout history that demonstrate 
it is politically more viable to ally with the anti-segregationists than it is to ally with 
Southern White supremacists, as was the case with President Truman, which have also 
impacted elite response to social movement pleas. 
 King and Smith claim that neither political nor economic orders could have been 
the sole driving force for the racial order, seeing as racial hierarchy has not been 
inherently economically viable for White people nor were there always political 
motivations to rule over Black people. Instead, there has occasionally been a fear of 
Black people and a will to “get shut of the Negro” (77). Actors who favor a 
transformative egalitarian order however made the greatest strides when they “gained 
executive, judicial and finally legislative support,” but their positions have always 
remained somewhat contested (77). 
 King and Smith (2005) claim that in order to pursue a more egalitarian order, the 
racial hierarchy needs to be understood as ubiquitous in all forms of political and social 
life, beyond Black versus White and through all interactions. They claim that this is 
where American political science has failed thus far: “racial orders have been 
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constitutively interwoven with many other highly significant institutional orders, 
including gender and class hierarchies.” However, they also recognize that minority 
populations’ concerns often rest at the intersection of many social vulnerabilities, and 
may be best addressed by “their membership in other such orders, not their racial 
positioning” (Reed 2004 via King and Smith 2005, 78). 
 King and Smith argue that the institutional orders, which are a coalition of 
governing institutions and political actors bound together by common goals, must be 
addressed. More specifically and pertinently, racial institutional orders, which affect 
people’s statuses and access to resources by placing individuals in racial categories, also 
need to be analyzed. These racial categories have shifted over time, and continue to shift. 
White supremacy has been maintained through these racial institutional orders, which is 
reflected in policy passage and representatives’ personal opinions. Having a saturation of 
political representatives who stand for White supremacy may cause this mindset to 
appear socially normal, and thus more difficult to combat. It is therefore necessary for 
social movements to dismantle the notion of White supremacy on the political leadership 
level and to lead to more egalitarian social realties. Historically, in the U.S. White 
supremacist ideologies were repudiated by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, who 
claimed that “national and partisan interests could be served” without racial segregation 
(82).  
 However, King and Smith (2005) also illustrate that de facto racial discrimination 
has remained a pertinent aspect of contemporary American life. Some norms have helped 
the U.S. move toward a transformative order. “Egalitarian norms now bar the deployment 
of overtly White supremacist language, but when it comes to concrete policies, the 
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modern racially egalitarian order often lacks the power to overcome antitransformative 
opposition” and has not positively impacted the struggle to bar de facto segregation. King 
and Smith (2011) suggest that to address the modern racial order, we must place it in 
terms of other progressive equal rights efforts (84). They claim that the gap in American 
political science rests with foregoing a conversation of racial orders when discussing 
other orders that exist within the U.S. In fact, they claim that race should be considered in 
all other aspects of American life in order to move toward a more egalitarian order. 
Framing the issue as it relates to healthcare, the environment, public schooling, 
incarceration, etc. will help achieve this. 
 MARX:	  RACE-­‐MAKING	  AND	  THE	  NATION-­‐STATE	  
 Marx (1996) also takes a top-down approach to analyzing social movement 
success, and looks specifically at race-related social movements as well. He claims that 
social movements can be effective when economic costs, international pressures, and 
protest are all at play and hinder the nation’s ability to maintain a socially exclusionary 
society— when exclusion is no longer understood to benefit the state. Marx is a political 
scientist who is involved in the anti-Apartheid movement of South Africa and U.S. 
racially charged movements; he largely focuses on race and nation building. He argues 
that elites have formed the racial hierarchy and will be the primary actors in the attempt 
to change it; if elites want to see change, then change will occur. Marx (1996) says that 
formal exclusion is more likely to lead to collective action than de facto exclusion, and 
thus the fight against formal exclusion is more likely to lead to policy change, whereas 
modern colorblind policies are more difficult to mobilize against.  
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 Marx (1996) says that when the national economy is being undermined by 
exclusionary policies, change is likely to transpire. The basis for exclusion is often linked 
to economic success and superiority for the White race, but if success is no longer 
predicted exclusion will not need to be upheld. In fact, dismantling exclusion may lead to 
even greater economic prosperity. The capitalist society initially benefitted from 
discrimination by mandating cheap Black labor, which led to the further 
institutionalization of segregation. An understanding that White racial unity could be 
more pervasive for nation building than class unity, Marx (1996) argues, led to Jim Crow 
laws, which served as a direct effort to achieve this White racial unity. This was borne 
out of a claim made by political elites that inter-White competition would hurt the 
nation’s stability and growth (191). Seeing as the state’s main goals are to support 
efficiency and to decrease conflict, it is necessary for social movements to demonstrate 
that racially discriminatory policies will not positively promote these two goals. 
 Marx (1996) also claims that historically, an increase in centralized power has led 
to a decrease in discriminatory policies.6 Localized pockets of elites were no longer 
allowed to promote discrimination in a system where the centralized power was making 
efforts to promote the good of the nation as a whole including all people. Marx also says 
that policies have been successfully changed as a result of the economic disruption put 
forth by Black protest such that Piven (1976) also points out, but he claims that pervasive 
social issues have prevailed despite these bottom-up approaches. However, because 
Whites had become economically dependent on Blacks, Black protests were able to 
promote divisions within the elite, and also led to opportunities for economic growth. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 This claim is highly contested by other race theorists (See Miller 2010 on federalism). 
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Change transpired when the elite decided that these costs were unbearable, and moved to 
concessions in favor of the Black population. 
 Marx also demonstrates however that these protests resulted in the increasing 
unification of ordinary Whites. But large amounts of Black protest also led their 
disruptions to become as salient of an issue for nation-building (if not more so) than 
inter-White conflict was for nation-building. The unity of non-White groups has led to 
increased and collective resistance.  
 Despite these positive shift, Marx (1996) maintains that policy elites will continue 
to promote policies that reflect personal motivations. They will try to form institutional 
accommodations to quiet the Black protests, but socially and even politically the actual 
accommodations will usually not satisfy the protesting community’s pleas. Marx claims 
that White unity as well as Black unity will lead to protests by the Black community 
against the White community, but White and Black unity could lead to policy changes in 
favor of the Black community.  
 COMMON	  THEMES	  
 Amongst the bottom-up theorists, there is a general understanding (which is 
explicitly stated by Piven and Gamson and Shmeidler, and implicitly stated by Omi and 
Winant) that bottom-up social movements are necessary in order to make changes that 
address the masses’ grievances, whether or not the actual change comes from the elites 
response and their ability to make and change policy. If the inspiration for change comes 
directly from those who are unhappy with the current situation, then that movement 
should be considered effective by the bottom-up theorists’ definition.  
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 Piven as well as most of the resource mobilization theorists that Gamson and 
Shmeidler introduce argue that disruption is the primary means for inciting political and 
social change by the underrepresented (Piven extends this notion include defiance as 
well). This argument maintains that the poor, without access to the traditional political 
outlets that are traditionally promised to constituents in a democracy, are able to act 
outside their prescribed roles to disrupt and defy the system. However, in order to 
promote these individuals’ voices, the movement must also be timed correctly. Piven 
argues that movements ought to be pursued during periods of electoral instability. The 
timing of the poor people’s movement will add weight to the disturbances that they are 
making in the social and economic spheres, and make it so elected officials cannot ignore 
their cries (Piven 1976). Gamson and Shmeidler also dote on timing as a necessary 
precondition for a successful movement, by arguing that timing is key to taking 
advantage of vulnerabilities in the political sphere. Piven and Gamson and Shmeidler 
diverge on their conceptions of organization and its ability to help or inhibit social 
movement’s success. Piven argues that organization will undermine the poor people’s 
power and hurt their ability to take advantage of their “defiant” strategies. Gamson and 
Shmeidler, on the other hand, argue that organization is necessary for resource 
mobilization, and will help create a common identity amongst the movement’s 
participants, and purse collective action. 
 Framing is a key concern amongst both the bottom-up and the top-down theorists 
I have discussed; most argue that the way a movement is framed will determine its 
capacity for social change. Omi and Winant, who are proponents of bottom-up 
movements claim that change will transpire if we are able to transform how the public 
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sees race. This shift in perception of race may lead to a new political system that includes 
racial issues and minority groups, themselves, in “normal” politics. Racial issues must be 
promoted within “common sense” politics, without forcing Black issues to assimilate into 
the political institutions that do not represent them wholly, and have also historically 
repressed them. There must be a paradigm shift that puts social movements and racial 
issues at the center of the political process (Omi and Winant 1994). This shift will also 
potentially lead to what Skrentny (2005) argues as a necessary condition for promoting 
social change: reframing how a group is perceived in the minds of the political elite. 
Skrentny argues that in the process of reframing a group’s perception, there are three key 
tenets that must be addressed: how the group is defined, how their morality is perceived, 
and the level of threat that they pose on the elites’ maintenance of power. The policy 
elites’ perception or frame of a group in these three categories will determine how 
successful their movement will be. Marx claims that if the issue is framed in a way that 
aligns to the goals of the nation, especially its economic goals, it will become clearer that 
the nation does not benefit from the exclusion of certain groups. Omi and Winant argue 
that we need to move beyond this economic frame when addressing exclusion, and focus 
more on the social and political consequences of discrimination. Marx argues that it is 
necessary to appeal to elites to create social change by demonstrating that racial 
exclusion does not actually benefit the nation’s agenda, but that co-existence across racial 
boundaries will; inter-racial unity may stem from this, which would lead to more 
opportunities for positive policy shifts in favor of minority communities. 
 The final theme that transcends all other themes throughout the theories that I 
have put forth is a change in order. This is similar to the paradigm shift that Omi and 
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Winant (1996) claim is necessary for instilling social change from social movements. 
King and Smith (2011) assert that a change in order will transpire when the architects of 
the system are ready for it; those who created the exclusionary system must ultimately be 
the ones to change it, no matter mass protestors’ efforts, and that this change will happen 
with the onset of policy changes. Skrentny also uses policy-change to measure success 
and argues that policies will only change when the institutions themselves are able to 
shift away from a racially hierarchy. Elites and institutions, he argues, are thus main 
actors, and so we must attempt to change the institutions by appealing to their architects. 
King and Smith (2011) claim there are two types of orders in American politics that have 
been created by architects across time: the egalitarian order and the White supremacist 
order. The orders themselves will not change, but which one the elites prescribe to (and 
thus society prescribes to) will. 
 It is now clear that the key themes in addressing social change through 
movements are: mass appeals from the bottom-up, appeals from the top-down, timing, 
organization, disruption, framing, and the order (and paradigm) with which society 
functions. Mobilization is the most fundamental concern for social movements and their 
ability to gain momentum. Most of the aforementioned theorists will agree that formal 
exclusion (institutionalized discrimination) is far easier to mobilize against than the 
contemporary de facto (persisting) exclusion that plagues U.S. and South African 
societies today. 
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II.	  THEORY	  	  INTRODUCTION	  
 Based on the understanding I developed in my literature review, I have created a 
theory, which I argue, will elucidate how a social movement may be a force in weakening 
the racial hierarchy. Each variable within my theory is deeply interconnected and 
although the process is fairly linear, the steps throughout the process may overlap and 
continue to influence one another in a less linear progression. PROPOSED	  OUTCOME	  
 My theory proposes that social movements may be a force in weakening the racial 
hierarchy when particular intervening variables play a role in garnering and affecting 
political elites’ response. As such, my theory states that when there is an increased 
understanding (heightened perception of grievance) that the success of certain 
marginalized communities, particularly the Black community, is inhibited by structural 
impediments, social movement actions are more likely to transpire, which can be further 
explicated by Marx (1996) who states, “subordinated racial identity [may be] a potential 
basis for resistance” and may result in collective action, but notably, “even when race 
becomes a salient identity, it does not necessarily lead to mobilization” and other 
conditions must also be present. These other conditions will vary depending on the 
uprising (200).7 Political elites will then respond to the social movement’s actions (which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7They may materialize as extended media coverage, appreciable ally communities who 
prescribe to the movement’s cause, or charismatic leaders who build the movement’s 
membership and boost the individual’s willingness to rise up. These extraneous 
circumstances are not directly referenced in my theory because they vary so widely and 
are not necessarily crucial to the outcome of the movement, but in some cases will impact 
the process. 
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are typically tactics for disruption). The level of elite instability within the electoral 
system at the time of the movement will condition the elite’s response. My theory also 
accounts for the fact that oftentimes, when the elites respond with positively racial 
actions, some semblance of White backlash against said actions will generally occur. 
However, if the positive racial revisions (usually in the form of policy changes) can 
sustain beyond this backlash, a level of change in the hierarchy will follow. 
 
	  
Figure	  1:	  My	  argument 	  ANTECEDENT	  VARIABLE:	  PERCEPTION	  OF	  LEVEL	  OF	  GRIEVANCE	  
Change in Consciousness 
 I argue that marginalized people must perceive the system to be unjust (as a 
necessary precondition) for social movements by these groups to form (based on Piven 
1976). These marginalized groups must feel and consequently act on their discontent with 
the understanding that their social rank is not a result of being personally inadequate, but 
rather is because of larger systemic issues that have created inequity. Protest behavior 
will then emerge with this change in consciousness. Piven (1976) expresses this shift in 
consciousness as individuals perceiving a loss of legitimacy within the system (or more 
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specifically individual’s perceiving the state as illegitimate), which will then lead to 
demands for change and a resurgence of individual power. Uprisings may take place 
when marginalized people no longer feel shame and begin to question the sensibility of 
their societal standing; “redefin[ing] their travails as the fault of the rules and not of 
themselves” (310) will fuel their will to rise up. 
Rebellious Attitudes 
 Protest behavior is expressed after there has been a newfound “sense of defiance,” 
which serves as the basis for the collective action. Thus, this “sense of defiance” is the 
precondition for the protest; the newfound sense can be interpreted as a heightened 
perception of grievance. Piven illustrates how jobs and societal positions in which people 
are organized in groups are more prone to protests and also collective action; labor unions 
are an example of this (see Piven 1976 325). Discontent is molded when individuals have 
undergone oppression through tangible experiences, not necessarily “as the end product 
of large abstract processes,” and the rebellion will take place against direct overseers, not 
the system, but this rebellion will lead to systemic changes. 
 Unfortunately, however, oppression is more frequent than rebellion; “most of the 
time people conform to the intuitional arrangements that enmesh them, which regulate 
the rewards and penalties of daily life and which appear to be the only possible reality” 
(Piven 1976 302). Lack of rebellion can be attributed to the belief that one’s position in 
the class structure is deserved. However when the oppressed replace this sense of shame 
with a newfound perception of grievance, they do “become defiant” and this defiance, 
which leads to “uprising, reflects profound changes in the larger society” (Piven 1976 
303). 
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Racial Consciousness  
 Race is inextricably linked to class issues, and thus many theorists use similar 
justifications for racial and class-based uprisings. When race is seen as a social 
prescription with inequality as its outcome, social actors can mobilize against it: “Racial 
inequality is an outcome not a cause; its roots lie elsewhere: in market imperfections, 
political power structures, or the search for secure means of labor control” (Omi and 
Winant 1994 48, also see Marx 1996). Marx (1996) argues that the “social construction 
of explicit racial domination and social movements by the victims of such domination 
should logically be connected” and asks, “whether mobilization and conflict ‘from 
below’ can be explained according to policies of domination imposed ‘from 
above’”(200). The movements that I will examine have been borne out of frustration with 
certain outcomes of this explicit racial domination (such as Omi and Winant (1994 48) 
show)—outcomes or consequences such as police brutality that have unequally affected 
individuals and communities because on their race. Also, in order to resolve these 
problems, the issues must be addressed by social powers on multiple levels, especially 
the political elite, whose decisions could alter aspects of the system. The outcomes of 
explicit racial domination must be understood to have a direct impact on individuals and 
also further perpetuate inequality. 
 In order to recognize racial oppression as a social problem, racially based actions 
must no longer be accepted as a standard for society, individuals must be able to call out 
the injustices within our social structure as they are; wrong (King and Smith 2005). 
However, this is becoming increasingly difficult because the outcomes of racial 
domination that continue to emerge today have largely been maintained informally 
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through the hierarchical orders, laws, and representatives of modern day society 
(especially in the United States and South Africa). Unequivocal discriminatory policies 
have largely been dismantled, but a saturation of political representatives who advocate 
for racial biases (even inadvertently) cause this belief system to appear normal, which 
makes it even more difficult to combat. It is therefore necessary for liberating social 
movements to dismantle the notion that White supremacy is normal, and to expose other 
legitimate social realities (such as unequal political representation). 
 In the past, the Civil Rights movement was able to take hold because both 
collective behavior and resource mobilization were played on, and explicit legislation 
could be brought to attention. However, Omi and Winant (1994) also posit a third, often 
neglected factor that led to many of the successes in the Civil Rights era. They claim that 
this facet may have been the most pertinent then and is also key for today’s movements: 
the rearticulation of Black collective subjectivity, which is a means of politicizing Black 
identity and intervening on a cultural and ideological level (Omi and Winant 1994 98). 
They claim that through this rearticulation, racially oppressed peoples were able to 
produce new subjectivity by  “making use of information and knowledge already present 
in the subject’s mind. The individuals would take elements and from their culture and 
traditions and infuse them with new meaning” (Omi and Winant 1994 99). This helped 
the masses believe that their standing is not divinely ordained (Piven 1976) and in turn 
allowed them to create a “culture of resistance” (Omi and Winant 1994). 
 INDEPENDENT	  VARIABLE:	  SOCIAL	  MOVEMENT	  ACTIONS	  
 Social movement actions must be instigated by the masses in order to adequately 
respond to marginalized peoples’ grievances (Gamson and Shmeidler 1984; Piven, 1976). 
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I concede that top-down actions may also be able to impact the racial hierarchy, but I 
maintain that oppressed peoples’ main concerns and grievances will only be addressed 
adequately through bottom-up strategies—those who are negatively affected by the 
system will strategize based on how they understand of their own circumstances, and 
what must change to improve their circumstances. Furthermore, these actions are more 
likely to lead to an effective movement when they are able to disrupt the hierarchical 
system (Piven 1976 and Gamson and Shmeidler 1984). This disruption can take the form 
of strikes, protests, violence, or even massive shifts in voting trends (or other electoral 
strategies). According to Marx (1996), in the past, social movements have been the most 
effective when their disruption is able to “replace intrawhite conflict as the most pressing 
threat to the nation-state” (183). Marx also claims that ameliorative racial policies were 
brought about when the state realized that oppressing a racial community might lead to 
fragmentation and instability within the nation-state. The state’s main goal is to support 
efficiency and to decrease conflict, thus if uprisings can either compromise efficiency or 
create conflict, then officials will be more likely to respond. 
Organization and Types of Actions 
 Piven is in favor of unorganized collective action, she thinks that instilling an 
organizational structure in a movement will actually inhibit the disruption process and 
will also replace effective bottom-up strategies with bureaucratic plans that are less likely 
to achieve social change. I however, align with Gamson and Shmeidler who claim that 
some level of organization can be helpful in maintaining unity within a movement, 
increase the movement’s longevity, and will help mobilize more resources. However, I 
recognize that the organizer must also be representative of the activists or else Piven’s 
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predictions regarding bureaucracy will come to fruition. Regardless of the level of 
organization, it is also crucial for the social movement actions to indicate the 
marginalized community’s newfound perception of grievance. 
 Both electoral and non-electoral actions may ultimately lead to my dependent 
variable, a level of change in racial hierarchy. Electoral movements may seek an 
independent party or rally a massive group of people to join an existing political party to 
alter the voting trends. According to Piven (1976) “ordinary defiance is first expressed in 
the voting booth simply because, whether defiant or not, people have been socialized 
within a political culture that defines voting as the mechanism through which political 
change can and should properly occur” (306). This will result in sharp shifts in voting 
patterns, which serve as a good indicator of discontent in the social system.  Non-
electoral movements, on the other hand, may result in protests or strikes or various 
actions that could be categorized as both violent and nonviolent.  
 My theoretical approach will emphasize non-electoral strategies because I have 
come to the conclusion that electoral movements are the less effective strategy, of the 
two, for marginalized groups in a post-racial era. However, it is still necessary to 
recognize the former as a tactic in order to appreciate why my model is only considering 
the latter, and to offer a more informed critique as to whether or not my choice to exclude 
this tactic was well suited. In the United States there are two main sources of power: 
economic power and political power. Political power, Piven (1976) argues, is “based on 
votes,” but that “wealth and its concomitants [have] engulfed electoral-representative 
procedures,” and have led to unequal representation (298; 299). Even electoral power, 
and the freedom to vote for political choices, has been tainted by the class structure; 
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Piven insists that the lower your class, the less influence you will have in the electoral 
process and thus non-electoral strategies are the superior mechanism. Either way, through 
electoral or non-electoral strategies, the marginalized peoples’ power lies in their ability 
to disrupt the system that controls their social rank (Piven uses the term disruption to 
refer to non-electoral strategies, specifically). 
Obstacles for social movement actions to achieve success 
 Social movements, especially those that are racially charged can be negatively 
affected by numerous factors. I assert (based on Skrentny 2006) that the hierarchical 
structure will shift more readily if power holders are willing to accept the movement’s 
innovations as they are presented through social movement actions—when the 
innovations align with the power holders’ goals. It is therefore also important for the 
marginalized people to find ways to demonstrate how their goals may align with the 
elites’ goals, or for the elites to somehow perceive the parallel. Furthermore, a movement 
may suffer from both internal and external issues. Internal fragmentation will hamper a 
movement. And externally, movements have historically been “out maneuvered by the 
new racial state which responded to moderate demands and marginalized radical ones” by 
dismissing them and taking little action to alleviate more pressing pleas (Omi and Winant 
1994 141). In order to avoid internal and external problems, I think (based on Gamson 
and Schmeidler’s (1984) argument) that a strong semblance of organization must be 
present to maintain cohesion and devise a scheme for navigating the new racial state. 
Strategies to Convince Policy Elites 
 In order to promote a successful social movement that will elicit a positive 
response from elite policy makers, there are a number of key factors, which serve as 
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necessary preconditions for promoting successful social movement actions and which are 
all inextricably linked: common interests, an organizational base, timing, and framing. 
Firstly, there must be collective action whereby the oppressed are able to join forces in 
pursuit of a common goal.8 This group must rally around a common interest (oftentimes 
groups that can find a common enemy feel the closest bond (Marx 1996)).  
 Oberschall states that in order for a protest to be sustainable, an organizational 
base with a strong sense of leadership is necessary (Gamson and Schmeidler 1984 569). 
A strong sense of leadership can be useful for providing the movement participants with a 
feeling of security and for promoting a common mission. This leader is necessary to help 
activists develop a sense of trust in the movement and in their actions, especially when 
they are asked to disrupt the system via strikes or other tactics that may run a high risk for 
the individual and their social and economic security. 
 McCarthy and Zald, as well as a slew of other resource mobilization theorists 
have commented that resource aggregation is a key component to collective action and 
protest, and that in order to aggregate these resources, there must be an underlying sense 
of organization to help amass these resources (Gamson and Schmeidler 1984).9 Timing 
and framing are the final two components crucial for eliciting a positive response from 
elites. Uprisings must be timed to take advantage of the vulnerabilities that may arise in 
the political sphere, and the issue (in my case, race) must be framed as it relates to issues 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 I find that this is where an organizing force may be a useful technique, to not only unite 
a collective group, but to also ensure the sustainability of that group by maintaining a 
common focus. 
9Comparatively, Piven claims that the movement’s organization may hinder it by 
removing efforts from the streets where there is potential to create change, and pushing 
them towards the “offices” (Piven 1976).  
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of healthcare, the environment, public schooling, incarceration, etc., depending on the 
political agenda of that time, in order to increase the likelihood that elites will respond 
positively to the movement’s pleas. 
 CONDITIONAL	  VARIABLE:	  LEVEL	  OF	  ELITE	  INSTABILITY	  
 When elite power is compromised, usually because of electoral instability, or in 
the face of dramatic economic shifts, uprisings are more likely to be successful (Piven 
1976 reference 304 and 305). Elite instability can be categorized in three primarily 
subgroups: electoral instability, federalism, and coalition change. Electoral instability can 
be seen when an elite group’s confidence in their supporting coalitions is challenged or 
when the dominant coalition is no longer sure of their power. For example, when Blacks 
moved North during the Jim Crow era, and could suddenly vote the Democrats, having 
added numerous constituents to their party, experienced forceful shifts in the political 
sphere. On the other hand, there is electoral stability when there is a clear, long-term, 
partisan winner. I will primarily focus on electoral instability as a means for affecting 
social movements’ ability to make gains. The two other factors of elite instability, 
federalism and coalition change, directly inform electoral instability and are necessary 
facets for understanding Piven’s theory as it demonstrates how elite responses are 
determined. 
 Historically, federalism has affected a separation in elites between the North and 
South in the United States. The federal system separates power between the central elites 
and the state elites. There may be gaps in perception of the social movement amongst 
these two groups, or within the elites that reside in different regions or at different levels. 
This separation of power also leads to inconsistencies in law and its implementation 
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depending on geographic location and the elites therein. Coalition changes and/or 
variation will also affect social movement outcomes. Coalition changes refer to what 
King and Smith (2005) describe as membership in different orders, such as the White 
supremacist order to the transformative egalitarian orders. They argue that these orders 
do not change, but elite’s membership to one over another may shift. For example, a 
specific elite may participate in a racial order promoting racially-biased policies in 
education, while that specific elite may later shift to another racial order promoting 
egalitarian policies in education. This variation in membership can lead to destabilization 
and disintegration in the elite sphere, which social movements may be able to take 
advantage of.  
 Omi and Winant (1994) claim that movements often seek “to make use of the 
state’s internal racial contradictions” and have found small, but significant success 
(including voting rights, desegregated buses, social service agencies, etc.) by utilizing 
these openings (these openings are usually a result of the federal system, but may also 
refer to coalition changes).10 Timing is the final key for garnering support from elites. 
Timing refers to the temporal closeness of the social movement to an election; “when 
political leadership becomes unsure of its support even disturbances that are isolated 
within peripheral institutions cannot be safely ignored” since officials could run the risk 
of losing constituent support, which in a democracy is the basis for their political power 
(Piven 1976 319). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 “The idea was to force the federal government to defend civil rights from infringement 
by racist local and state agencies” (Omi and Winant 1994 105). 
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INTERVENING	  VARIABLE:	  ELITE	  RESPONSE	  
 Elites will respond to the demands of a social movement to maintain their own 
power, and level of threat, which may be influenced by timing of a movement in 
reference to the election cycle, will largely determine the type and level of their response. 
Elites tend to respond once a movement has effectively disrupted the system. At this 
point, they can may repress the movement, ignore it, or offer concessions. “When protest 
subsides, concessions may be withdrawn” however, so even though the uprising may 
have been thoughtfully executed, and/or the elite were in need of public support to 
remain in office, once the protests calms down, the officials are often no longer eager to 
conciliate and may retract their concessions or begin to once again ignore the 
movement’s requests (Piven 1976 325).  
However, sometimes social movements do lead to durable policy changes. Piven 
(1976) argues that the innovations (that result from social movements) that are 
compatible with the power holders’ interests will be more likely to sustain. For example, 
“labor unions constituted a useful mechanism to regulate the labor force” (325), and thus 
this non-electoral social movement was able to garner enduring political and social shifts. 
Omi and Winant argue that throughout history, elites have responded more positively to 
activists that express their grievances beyond just the economic sphere and also 
demonstrate how they experience discrimination in the social and political spheres. 
Skrentny (2006) claims that movement success is dependent on whether or not policy-
elites appreciate and/or want the movement to succeed (regardless of which sphere they 
are appealing to). Skrentny also claims, that depending on the way a group is perceived, 
the amount they must struggle for success will also vary. 
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 Skrentny downplays threat level that Marx (1996) emphasizes (to the nation-state) 
by arguing, “it is state officials who decide whether and when to accede to social 
movement demands, what to give, and whether the movement should be ignored or even 
repressed” (2006 1763). Along these lines, the political process theory (see McAdam et 
al. 1996 and Tarrow 2011) posits that the movement will be successful if it is perceived 
by the political elites to fit within the government’s mission (Skrentny 2006). If the 
movement fits within the structure of the institution, state actors will be more likely to 
respond to its requests because the requests will be situated within their purview to act. 
He also notes that the morality of the group, which encompasses a perception of 
deservingness and includes the group’s “contributions to the nation or the world,” will 
also play a role.11 
 According to Skrentny (2006), responses are also based on the elites’ perception 
of the level of threat (using the term threat in a different way than Marx 1996) that a 
marginalized groups’ movement imposes to the elite’s agenda. The threat expressed here, 
“may at least in the short term trump negative definitional or moral perceptions and force 
policy makers into action” (Skrentny 2006). These resulting policies may also help to 
redefine a group’s morality, which could help spur future “morally worthy” policy 
changes as well. 
 I find Skrentny’s claims, that elite perceptions’ will play a role in their responses 
to oppressed people, to be convincing. However, I would like to emphasize that social 
movements can be a strong force in a group’s “defining process” and can likely affect 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 It is impossible to objectively observe an oppressed group’s contribution to the nation 
or to the world because they have been institutionally held back from fulfilling their 
contribution to their fullest extent.  
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elites’ perceptions. I contend that social movements are valuable means for garnering 
public support around a group’s grievances (for the marginalized group’s allies and for 
political elites). Skrentny illustrates how policy makers’ perceptions are influenced by 
public perceptions and with this, social movements are a strong force for promoting a 
group’s moral worth.  
 The way a group is perceived (as morally worthy or not) will also play a role in 
determining whether or not elites are willing to change policy outcomes in their favor. 
After the Civil Rights movement, groups that were perceived to suffer the same hardships 
as African Americans were soon added to new civil rights policies (Skrentny 2006). Marx 
(1996) claims that elite’s policy decisions solely reflect their personal opinions. However, 
I maintain that, despite the notion that elites will act in reference to their personally held 
beliefs, they are also influenced by public opinion in their effort to maintain their power, 
and social movements may impact public opinion.  
  INTERVENING	  VARIABLE:	  BACKLASH	  
 Throughout history there have been numerous cases of White backlash in reaction 
to racially positive responses that have been put forth by elites. When White power is 
drawn into question the White community or the dissenting political elites will often 
stage a counterattack. These counterattacks may lead to shifts back to the previous 
racially biased policies, or may materialize as attempts to pass policy that would 
essentially make the egalitarian progress null. Backlash has also led to claims of 
unfairness, reverse discrimination, invalid group rights, and the promotion of other minor 
or symbolic concessions to detract from future greater concessions. Backlash may also 
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affect future elite responses. It can be presented by political elites within the same party, 
or more likely, within the opposition party and also by citizens or groups. 
 DEPENDENT	  VARIABLE:	  LEVEL	  OF	  CHANGES	  IN	  HIERARCHY	  
 Changes in the racial hierarchy will be seen through both racially positive policy 
changes as well as overall greater racial inclusiveness in society; policy shifts will be 
more durable when there is an overarching paradigm shift. According to Omi and Winant 
(1994) the predominant paradigm must accept race as a key aspect of society and of 
American politics. This acceptance of race as a feature of society will help individuals 
understand that their hierarchical standing may be arbitrarily dependent on their race and 
not necessarily based solely on personal aptitude. It is also necessary to recognize race as 
a key factor in society in order to move beyond the stagnation that we are experiencing in 
racial categorization, which is related to the social exclusion that was introduced in 
decades past. In this new paradigm, race must be seen as a social construct, an arbitrary 
delineation produced through political processes (Omi and Winant 1994).12 
 Omi and Winant (1994) posit the liberal racial project as a means for achieving 
this paradigm shift, which focuses on accepting race as it exists, including the social 
function it serves, in order to move past it. They find that a primary obstacle for changing 
the hierarchy is the “New Right’s” claims that policies are colorblind, while still 
“covertly manipulate[ing] racial fears in order to achieve political gains” (58). Omi & 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Notably, a key differentiation between my theory and Skrentny’s is our respective 
definitions of success. He claims that a social movement is successful only when it is able 
to achieve rapid and substantive policy changes, whereas I define success as a change in 
the hierarchy, which can be expressed in both policy changes and in the social 
inclusiveness of society (and does not delineate a particular timeline).  
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Winant also claim that it is utopian to think that we can go beyond race, “we should think 
of race as an element of the social structure rather than as an irregularity within it; we 
should see race as a dimension of human representation rather than an illusion” (55). 
King and Smith (2005) claim that sociologists see racial change as “the product of the 
interaction of racially based social movements and the state” (76). And although they 
place more emphasis on elites rather than bottom up social movements, I argue that in 
order to shift the paradigm we must use social movements as a mechanism to garner elite 
response; the elite response may then affect the inclusiveness put forth by the state. 
 Past racial inclusion movements have been hindered by focusing too heavily on 
equality of opportunity instead of equality of result “as the national common sense” (Omi 
and Winant 141). This is especially problematic given the contemporary colorblind 
systems that we are fighting against. De facto racial discrimination has remained a 
pertinent aspect of contemporary American life, and contemporary norms have had an 
affect on the “transformative order”, “egalitarian norms now bar the deployment of 
overtly White supremacist language, but when it comes to concrete policies, the modern 
racially egalitarian order often lacks the power to overcome anti-transformative 
opposition” (King and Smith 2005 84). It is thus important to find other tangible issues 
that are racially-biased (such as police brutality) to rally around in order to mobilize the 
masses for a fight against the de facto segregation that is still pertinent today in order 
achieve a shift in the level of hierarchy. 
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III.	  METHODOLOGY	  	  RESTATEMENT	  OF	  MY	  RESEARCH	  QUESTION	  
 My project ultimately aims to determine if social movements can be a force for 
weakening racial hierarchies, and if so, what needs to happen in order for them to have a 
positive effect on a society’s hierarchy. I will be testing this broad-based question by 
specifically examining the racial bias of police brutality in the U.S. and of basic service 
delivery in South Africa and the social movements cultivated in response to these 
structural issues. In each country I have chosen a galvanizing case to explore these issues 
and my theory therein. 
 WHY	  CASE	  STUDIES	  
 Case studies are an excellent means for exploring my topic in great detail, for 
recognizing emerging patterns and for linking variables. However by nature, case studies 
often fail to provide proof of causation. This may pose an issue for my study because in 
order to determine which circumstances must be present in order for social movements to 
lead to a weakening of the racial hierarchy, I must demonstrate which happenings will 
lead to a particular outcome. However, I have addressed this by linking many different 
variables, that I argue must all be in place in order to produce my expected outcome. The 
complexity of my theory lends to more direct evidence that my independent variable will 
lead to my dependent variable.  
 I am conducting a comparative case study analysis of two particular social 
movements and the role they each played in weakening the racial hierarchy within their 
respective countries. I am using this non-experimental research design (case studies) in 
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particular because it provides the most effective framework to examine the complex 
social and political phenomena I intend to analyze” (Kaarbo and Beasley 1999). “The 
comparative case study is the systematic comparison of two or more data points (‘cases’) 
obtained through use of the case study method” which looks at “real-world phenomenon 
within its naturally occurring context, without directly manipulating either the 
phenomenon or the context” (Kaarbo and Beasley 1999 372). This is crucial for my 
research because I am attempting to study informal and systemic discrimination in the 
United States and South Africa. I aim to thematize and ascertain the patterns that exist 
between the numerous contexts that unfold in my research and analysis. In this study, I 
am attempting to do that which aligns exactly with the mechanisms to produce a high 
quality case study. By choosing to use case studies, I am also allowing my interpretation 
of the phenomena to evolve as the project unfolds. This is crucial for my two cases in 
particular because I will inevitably confront the research with certain biases that should 
be tested throughout the process in order to produce more impartial work. 
 I will be looking at two social movements that both took bottom-up approaches 
(while maintaining an awareness of the benefits of top-down social movements in order 
to preserve a semblance of critique of my own theory).13 My focus thus still converges on 
the inquiry: how can hierarchies be weakened, and not how can I prove that bottom-up 
movements are stronger than top-down movements. I am attempting to understand which 
circumstances are necessary for a movement to be effective. Hancock and Algozzine 
(2006) state, “when information that is collected defines new questions, the case study 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 My work is not necessarily attempting to argue that one process, top-down or bottom-
up is superior—I am simply trying to determine how social movements, overall, can be 
effective. 
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researcher adjusts ongoing and subsequent methods and procedures” (57). With my 
design, I will be free to continually refine my research question as I develop a more 
nuanced understanding of the situation. The case study design allows the deepest probing 
into why and how social movements transpired, and their aftereffects.  
 PROCESS	  EXPLICATION	  
 The United States and South Africa have both experienced periods of 
government-mandated racism in their past, but have since outlawed those formal systems. 
Each country also still currently faces systemic discrimination in their respective post-
formal hierarchy eras. In order to understand how these two states experienced 
institutionalized racism and how that has in turn led to contemporary racial dynamics, I 
will start my research with an historical analysis of the racial systems in each of the two 
states. “Historical case study research produces more than a chronological listing of 
events; it results in a researcher’s descriptive interpretation of factors that result from 
events” (Hancock and Algozzine 2006 32). My historical narratives and analyses will 
focus on the evolution of race in the political, economic, and social spheres of my two 
countries of inquiry. An understanding of the implications that race has had in these two 
countries throughout history is imperative to appreciate the hierarchies’ current nuances. 
Furthermore, this conversation is necessary to develop an understanding of what must 
happen in order for social movements to actually be a force in weakening contemporary 
racial hierarchies. In this discussion, I will also highlight past efforts that have led to 
changes in the hierarchy in order to inform my theory and its application in contemporary 
society. 
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 My study aligns with the parameters for conducting a collective case study. I have 
drawn from several of the leading social movement theorists and synthesized many of 
their claims in order to craft my own theory. I will be applying my theory to two cases 
that have yet to be addressed in this manner. The understanding that I developed in my 
historical narrative will also play an important role in my analysis by causing me to more 
sensibly research and theorize on contemporary issues. This deep historical 
understanding will provide me with a starting point for looking at social movements’ 
effects on racial hierarchies and allow me to determine if the methods from previous eras 
that were used to achieve racial progress can be similarly pursued today. In addition to 
providing an evolution of the racial systems in the U.S. and South Africa, the historical 
background chapter will also look at array of social movements geared toward 
undermining institutionalized racism. This will help determine the role that social 
movements played in weakening formal racial hierarchies so I can then determine if 
contemporary racial movements in a colorblind era are also capable of changing society’s 
racial order. 
 CASE	  SELECTION	  
 Then, after establishing the relevant histories of these two societies, I will move to 
an explication of social movements in the United States and South Africa by providing a 
narrative account of the Rodney King case and police brutality (for the U.S.) and the 
Toilet Wars case and basic service delivery (for South Africa), both of which were social 
movements that erupted out of galvanizing events related to structural inequalities. 
 These two cases draw important parallels for informing my primary question of 
how social movements may be a force in weakening racial hierarchies and together 
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elucidate impactful explanations for what must happen in order for my dependent 
variable to transpire. Both cases also fit within my model whereby a galvanizing event 
led to a heightened perception of grievance (which both happened to be acutely 
influenced by the media).14 This in turn generated social movements that endeavored to 
attain elite response at a time of severe electoral instability. 
 Protests tend to erupt when citizens feel like they have no other option, and in 
both cases the people felt that social movement actions were necessary to finally capture 
political (and specifically elite) attention around their compounding grievances. In other 
words, in the Rodney King case and in the Toilet Wars case, both issues addressed 
concerns that were not otherwise being tended to by the political system, and thus 
necessitated social movement actions. 
 Police brutality and service delivery are also excellent cases for comparison 
because both are localized issues that reflect systemic racialized problems that must be 
addressed and resolved on the national level. For example, police brutality incidents are 
made up of individual cases all across the country, which are primarily addressed by local 
officials on a case-by-case basis. Poor service delivery is also an issue that takes place on 
the individual as well as community level, across the entire country and thus must also be 
tackled by the central government. Police brutality and service delivery are the two most 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 The media in both cases galvanized a significant uproar that attracted new followers to 
each of the movements and also helped to solidify new marginalized subjectivity. It also 
played a role in demonstrating to those who are typically marginalized by the system, that 
they were the rule and not the exception to these state-related issues. It helped develop in 
these people an understanding that are a part of a community of people who may suffer 
from the same inequalities and thus it is not personal inaptitude that has led to their social 
positioning, rather it is a societal matter that can be mobilized against and ultimately 
changed. 
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galvanizing issues to initiate social movement actions in my two case countries. Both 
issues at hand are deeply entrenched in past and present political processes related to the 
racial hierarchy and are also both affected by policies, mindsets, and structural 
frameworks. 
 Surprisingly, police brutality is actually a statistically more prevalent issue in 
South Africa than it is in the United States: “Reports of police brutality in South 
Africa have soared by 313% in a decade, experts warn, yet only one in 100 cases against 
officers results in a conviction” (Smith 2013). Unfortunately, however, (even though 
South Africa has been coined a protest state) this issue is not being scrutinized to the 
same extent in this country; it has not yet mobilized any sort of movement.15  
  However, because my theory aims to determine the role that social movements 
can play in weakening racial hierarchies, and not the role they may play in mitigating 
police brutality, this variation in the two society’s response to police brutality will not 
jeopardize my study. However, it does make conducting a comparative analysis on social 
movements against police brutality impossible.   
 OPERATIONALIZATION	  
 I have determined how to operationalize my variables by primarily using the 
themes and examples provided by Piven (1976 and 1979), Omi and Winant (1994), and 
King and Smith (2005). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 This would be an interesting topic to research as well, why police brutality is not 
leading to social movements, even though the circumstances seem to suggest it would. 
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PERCEPTION	  OF	  GRIEVANCE	  
I will use the following to indicate a shift in the perception of grievance: 
 The masses will make their grievances clear when they articulate that their social 
ranking is not as a result of personal wherewithal, but rather a result of other arbitrary 
social indicators such as race. This demonstration of discontent will create a culture of 
objection, and a solidified collective identity within the marginalized group. 
 The rearticulation of Black collective subjectivity in the 1950s led to increased 
levels of grievance during the ideological and cultural shifts that were occurring in the 
United States during this time. This in turn created a more salient racial identity, which 
was used to exemplify communal grievances. Omi and Winant (1994) claim that having 
the necessary resources to mobilize against and resist a repressive system has historically 
been useful for inciting direct action, but note that the politicization of a collective Black 
identity has been the most crucial component for creating a social movement. “It was this 
change [in identity] which would eventually place radical objectives on the agenda of 
racial minority movements, facilitate the diffusion of racially based movement activity to 
other groups, and become anathema to the moderate advocates of civil rights operating 
within the ethnicity paradigm of race” (Omi and Winant 1994 98). 
 Rearticulation of ones identity has led to social movements by providing 
marginalized groups with a renewed sense of self; an understanding of themselves that 
goes beyond the prescription provided by the pervasive social order and also links them 
to other similar communities that may be existing in comparable circumstances (Omi and 
Winant 1994 and Piven 1976). For example, “the civil rights movement linked traditional 
Black cultural and religious themes with the ideas and strategies of social movements 
around the world. On this basis it could rearticulate Black collective subjectivity—it 
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could forge a new Black politics” (Omi and Winant 1994 99). New subjectivity results 
when individuals can understand their place and their culture under new terms.  
 According to Piven (1976), this new subjectivity is usually solidified through in 
witnessing or living through extraordinary conditions; these extraordinary conditions 
oftentimes serve as the initial turning point “to transform the poor from apathy to hope, 
from quiescence to indignation, from docility to defiance… this point, if none other, 
theorists of the most diverse persuasions agree” (305). These “extraordinary conditions” 
are likely to be portrayed through a single galvanizing event such as a particular media-
focused moment like the Selma to Montgomery marches. 
 SOCIAL	  MOVEMENT	  ACTIONS	  
I will use the following to indicate social movement actions: 
 Tactics of disruption, as Piven (1976) alleges, are usually actions that demonstrate 
discontent and utilize whatever means are available to the revolting group. For example, 
employees may go on strike while the unemployed may riot. Nonetheless all tactics are 
deliberate; riots are not chaotic, but deliberate and of a social pattern. Certain institutions 
are also more likely to lead to revolts; when people work closely together and are 
provided an arena to share common grievances, they are more likely to revolt. In these 
instances, especially, people are more likely to revolt against everyday common 
occurrences that they perceive to be unjust or that become unbearable for them. People 
will seek recognition for and changes in their circumstances by acting with the tools that 
are within their reach. Direct actions may be exemplified by boycotts; strikes; riots; 
protests; sit-ins; blockades, and the like. 
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ELITE	  INSTABILITY	  	  
I will use the following to indicate elite instability: 
 Electoral instability is largely based on the amount of time in the interim period 
between the social movement and an election. Instability in the electorate should be taken 
advantage of to achieve policy changes. Electoral instability is seen when the elites who 
belong to the dominant party or group within the political sphere are momentarily unsure 
of their political power. This is often the case during dramatic socioeconomic shifts and 
according to Piven (1976) when social institutions regulatory capacity shifts. 
 Separation within the elite also relates to elite instability. This separation may be 
exemplified by some ruling elites prescribing to a racially-biased order, in which case 
they promote racially unequal policies, while others who are in office are promoting an 
egalitarian order, which seeks positive racial policy shifts. This separation may exist both 
within and between political parties. Social movements benefit from capitalizing on times 
of separation and instability. External destabilizers may also create separation within the 
elites (such as WWII); social movements may also be more effective during these 
moments as well. 
 ELITE	  RESPONSE	  
I will use the following to indicate elite response, which I see as a gradation: 
 1.) Repression of the movement is a denial of the movement’s requests and 
includes action taken to stop protestors (IE police intervention).16 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Sometimes a movement is initially repressed to subdue violence, but its pleas are still 
addressed. I would not categorize these instances as pure “repression.” 
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 2.) Ignoring the movement is a lack any significant response. Skrentny (2006) 
claims that movements are more likely to be ignored if the political elite categorize the 
group who is putting the movement forth within negative definitional criteria.  “This is 
because definitional perceptions will inform elite perceptions of a higher order regarding 
identifiably of target populations, costs of implementation, institutional capability, 
constitutionality/ legality of particular policies, potential for fraud, and potential for the 
policy to work as intended” (1766). 
 3.) Symbolic response is when a response is provided that bares little weight in 
policy reform or social reform, but gives a minor retort to the movement itself, but not to 
its requests. Symbolic responses sometimes materialize as monuments, diplomatic 
discussions, political statements, etc. 
 4.) Cooptation, which notably only helps the leader, “reflect[s] the recognition 
that movement demands were often greater threats as rallying cries for minority 
opposition than they were after they had been adopted in suitably moderate form” (Omi 
and Winant 1994 106), which essentially quiets the cries of the activists without actually 
providing any sort of concession. This is done to create a facade for the public to perceive 
that the elite are “listening” but in reality, they are unwilling to provide any conciliation. 
The difference between this type of response and a symbolic response is that cooptation 
is an attempt to bolster the elite’s political position and symbolic responses are primarily 
to subdue the movement alone. 
 5.) Minor concessions, which will help more than just the leader are given when a 
social movement’s requests are not entirely met, but a portion or variation of its requests 
are met. Minor concession can be exemplified by reforms such as “neighborhood 
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schools,” where the response to social movement is insulation. Insulation is when the 
state confines demands to areas of the state that are not crucial to its operation as a ‘factor 
of cohesion’ in society. Insulation-type responses will not affect the White hierarchy. For 
example, in South Africa there have been more attempts to improve economic 
opportunities in Black townships, but Black people remain largely restricted seeking 
employment within their impoverished settlements. 
 6.) Major changes occur when the elite are willing to make dramatic positive 
policy shifts in favor of the movement’s requests such as the new voter registration 
legislation that was enacted under President Johnson in response to the Selma to 
Montgomery marches, which aimed to dismantle some of the unnecessary and racially 
biased conditions for voting in America. However, it should also be noted that the 
progress made for proper implementation of these changes remained slow. 
 BACKLASH	  (FROM	  WHITES)	  
 When positive racial policies are introduced, backlash often results amongst the 
portions of the White population that feel most threatened.17 Cultural politics, antistatism, 
and the “New Class” are responses by the White population to dismantle the welfare 
state and “stem the tide of political and cultural dislocation that the 1960s and 1970s 
represented.” “The New Right exploits social protest and encourages class hostility by 
trying to fuel the hostilities of lower-middle-class Americans against those above and 
below them on the economic ladder” (Omi and Winant 1994 125). Omi and Winant refer 
to the ‘new right’ as a political group who uses negative code words that are meant to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Busing also serves as an example of backlash as it pertains to Whites refusal to 
participate in integrated schools.  
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respond to the backlash without using clearly racist language, “the key device used by the 
new right in its effort to limit the political gains of racial minority movements was ‘code 
words’. These code words include, but are certainly not limited to ‘multicultural’, ‘group 
rights’, and ‘reverse discrimination.’”18 
 Group rights is a term used by neoconservatives in America. These people claim 
that in the United States only individual rights exist, which trivializes the problems born 
out of racial inequalities. They assert that one should not receive rights as a result of their 
membership to a group; this was clearly stated in opposition to antidiscrimination 
measures. These claims are absurdly contradictory seeing as White members of society 
maintain specialized rights as a result of their membership to the White community.   
 Reverse discrimination claims were also generally made in response to 
affirmative action. White people claimed that affirmative action (and other similar 
policies) were unfair and allowed for special interests in favor of minorities at their 
expense.  
 Under the Reagan administration, White backlash was made apparent through 
claims that affirmative action-type policies were anti-White; Reagan insisted that 
spending to deal with poverty would only exasperate the problem. There have also been 
allegations made that minority peoples are simply playing the race card in an attempt to 
get ahead without deserving their achievements. The Reagan revolution introduced (or re-
introduced) an opposition to race-thinking; there was an “ideological effort to reinterpret 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 These code words are also used during episodes of White backlash in an attempt to 
breakdown positive racial policy progress. 
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once again the meaning of race in the U.S.” and to undo the progress made in the 
previous decades with regard to positive racial policy introduction and implementation. LEVEL	  OF	  CHANGES	  IN	  HIERARCHY	  
 There may be minor or major changes in the hierarchy as a result of the process I 
have outlined in my theory. But any level of change in the racial hierarchy must be 
demonstrated in two ways (for it to be considered a “level of change” within my theory). 
First, there must be positive policy shifts (that appear to be durable, without an expiration 
date) in favor of racial equality such as the Civil Rights Act 1964. And second, there 
must be greater social inclusiveness in society. This will be seen through increases in 
inter-racial marriage rates; less societal separateness (i.e. in employment; geographically 
(homes)); employment and job integration; perception of justice, and expectation of 
protection by the system (i.e. not abused or expected to be stopped by the police). There 
must also be a society-wide understanding that race is a social construct and that societal 
rankings often result from racial constraints not personal prowess (public opinion polls 
will be the primary mechanism for determining this shift). A change in the racial 
hierarchy is deeply interconnected to each of my aforementioned variables; a change may 
be rendered visible through the exposition of the preceding variables in society 
(especially with regard to realizing changes in social inclusiveness).
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IV. Historical Backgrounds 
 This section ultimately aims to provide the reader with an understanding of the 
profound racial histories that continue to articulate the sociopolitical cultures of both the 
United States and South Africa. Marx (1996) argues that, race-differences have bred over 
time, and have led to tremendous social and economic disparities for contemporary 
society (180).19 In order to properly address the complexity of modern-day racial orders, 
it will be necessary to grasp how these structures are ramifications of former racial 
systems. As such, through this discussion of the intricacies within racialized social and 
political cultures, the utility of social movements in inciting systemic change will become 
clear. Racism is imbued in society through both policy and social interactions (and the 
two are deeply connected); social movements function at the intermediary point of these 
two spheres. UNITED	  STATES	  OF	  AMERICA	  HISTORY	  OF	  DISCRIMINATION	  
Oppression of Black people is foundational to the U.S. 
 America’s history is wrought with discrimination; the first African slaves were 
brought to Jamestown (then a British colony) in 1619 in exchange for food and supplies. 
They were the first of 500,000 African slaves (who labored as indentured servants) to be 
brought to North America between 1619 and 1808 (“Slavery in British America” 2009). 
Marx (1996) argues that slavery established race relations, “it fostered attitudes of 
primordial Black inferiority and established patterns of domination and inequality” (184). 
Slavery quickly became normalized as the country’s economic system increasingly relied 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Race inequalities are not necessarily based on minority populations; deprivation may 
rest with the majority in a society as well (Marx 1996 181). 
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on slave labor for prosperity, and eventually, the very documents that established the 
United States as a country reinforced this culture of discrimination and institutionalized 
racism. 
 By 1787, slavery had become a pervasive component to social, political, and 
economic relations in the U.S. by deeply affecting the United States’ national identity and 
the political relations therein (I.E. the federal system of governance (see Miller 2010)).20 
At this time, the Constitution addressed slaves in reference to how they are to be seen as a 
population and how they are to be addressed within society—in neither instance were 
they afforded rights as American citizens. This misguided ideal was institutionalized by 
the infamous three-fifths compromise (1787);21 (“A Brief History of Race Relations in 
the U.S.”) Northern and Southern states agreed to proportional representation in the 
legislative branch under the condition that slaves were to be counted as three-fifths of a 
person in the proportional system.22 Further evidence of America’s attempt to strip 
slave’s personhood can be found in the Constitution’s Fugitive Slave clause. 
 The Fugitive Slave Clause states that “No Person held to Service or Labour in one 
State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or 
Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered by 
on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due” (Art IV Sect 2 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 In fact, by this time, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia’s slave populations 
exceeded their White counterparts (Davis 2009). 
21 “Evidence of the three-fifths compromise can still be found in Article 1 Section 2 of the 
United States Constitution” (“A Brief History of Race Relations in the United States”).  
22 Northern states had far more free citizens (voting citizens) than Southern states, but 
Southern states had a larger overall population including non-free citizens. Thus by only 
counting slaves as three-fifths of a person, Southern states would not be able to dominate 
the legislature by virtue of their slave population.   
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Clause 3). By reiterating the notion that slaves are owned by their masters, if a slave were 
to run away, U.S. law dictated that they are to be returned to their masters. Numerous 
other examples of clauses clearly written to privilege the White population and 
consequently abuse slaves can also be found in the U.S.’s founding documents (see the 
Slave Trace Clause in Article 1, Section 9; Prohibition on Amendment: Slave Trade in 
Article 5; the Fugitive Slave Act in Article 4, Section 2). 
The Antebellum Period 
 Scholars tend to characterize the antebellum period as the interlude in history 
before the Civil War.23 At this time, the North was modernizing socially and via 
infrastructure, while the South remained bonded to the traditions of the 18th century. 
“Historians have noted that the differences between the ‘folk culture’ of the South and the 
‘modern culture’ of the North fueled the broad-based reform movements of mid-century 
and may have ignited the turmoil over state sovereignty and slavery in a form of ‘culture 
war’” (Volo and Volo 2004 4). 
 The slavery-related court proceedings during the antebellum period severely 
impacted the country’s race relations. For example, Prigg v. Pennsylvania is 
characterized as Pennsylvania’s attempt to slowly abolish slavery throughout the state. It 
led “the Pennsylvania legislature [to begin] passing laws that expressly forbid state 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 The beginning of the Antebellum Period is debatable; some scholars claim that it 
started following the War of 1812, while others trace it back to the adoption of the 
Constitution in 1789. 
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officers from cooperating with the Fugitive Slave Act ”24 (“A Brief History of Race 
Relations in the United States”).25 
 Dred Scott v. Sanford (1856) was potentially the most influential race-related 
Supreme Court case of this era.26 This case was indicative of the issues related to 
America’s evolving perceptions of the federal system, because the court found that 
despite one state’s laws against slavery, a man’s ownership of his “property” should not 
be compromised or brought into question based on his constitutionally afforded rights 
(Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 US 393).  
 Finally, in 1863, President Lincoln drafted an amendment to the constitution to 
grant freedom to all slaves in secessionist states. However, the Thirteenth Amendment 
was not ratified for another two years (1865). This move instigated further positive 
reforms in favor of African American’s rights in America. Three years later, “in 1868, the 
Fourteenth Amendment recognized the full citizenship status of African Americans and 
commanded that every state afford its citizens, White and Black alike, equal protection 
under the laws of the federal government and the individual states” (“A Brief History of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 In 1850, after resistance to the Fugitive Slave Clause, the Fugitive Slave Act was 
enacted, which put even more stringent penalties on all parties interacting with runaway 
slaves. 
25 Edward Prigg violated laws against slavery by kidnapping a Black woman who “had 
been claimed as property by a slave owner in Maryland” (Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 US 
539). This case was brought to the Supreme Court (in 1842) and ruled in an eight-to-one 
decision that Pennsylvania’s new laws violated the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793. 
26 “Dred Scott, who lived in a state wherein slavery had been abolished, attempted to sue 
his master for refusing to acknowledge his freedom” (Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 US 393). 
In this Supreme Court case, a seven-to-two decision was ruled that no action could be 
taken on Scott’s case because Mr. Scott was not considered a citizen by virtue of his 
constitutional rights. Chief Justice Taney wrote that “Blacks are beings of inferior order, 
and altogether unfit to associate with the White race, either in social or political relations, 
and so far inferior that they have no rights which the White man is bound to respect” 
(Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 US 393).  
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Race Relations in the United States”). Finally, in 1870 with the ratification of the 
Fifteenth Amendment, all male citizens (despite previous servitude) were given the right 
to vote. 
Reconstruction 
 In 1866 (after the assassination of President Lincoln), President Johnson was in 
favor of some measures against the South’s segregationist propositions, but battled with 
Congress over control of Reconstruction. Johnson was in support of stronger state 
government, but Congress was able to rule in favor of passing the Reconstruction Acts of 
1867, which forced confederate states to accept the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments (Wormser 2002d). However, Black people still struggled to secure land, 
and remained economically underprivileged. “Most Whites rallied around the Democratic 
Party as the party of White supremacy. Between 1868 and 1871, terrorist organizations, 
especially the Ku Klux Klan, murdered Blacks and Whites who tried to exercise their 
right to vote or receive an education” (Wormser 2002d).27 Like in South Africa, there was 
an especially concerted effort to restrict education and voting opportunities for the Black 
community for fear that it would further fuel their will and ability to rise up against the 
current racist system. 
 The Republican Party, however, was a main actor in resistance to state sanctioned 
discrimination, and in 1875, a final effort was put forth to pass a civil rights bill that read,  
Be it enacted, That all persons within the jurisdiction of the United 
States shall be entitled to full and equal enjoyment of the 
accommodation, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, 
public conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other places of 
public amusement…applicable alike to citizens of every race and 
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73 
color regardless of any previous condition of servitude… That any 
person who shall violate the foregoing section by denying to any 
citizen, except for reasons by law applicable to citizens of every 
race and color, and regardless of any previous condition of 
servitude, the full enjoyment of any of the accommodations, 
advantages, facilities, or privileges in said section enumerated, or 
by aiding or inciting such denial, shall, for every such offense, 
forfeit and pay the sum of five hundred dollars to the person 
aggrieved thereby. 
 
However, in 1883, the Supreme Court declared this act unconstitutional. 
  
Education 
 In 1881, Booker T. Washington founded the Tuskegee Institute. “Born into 
slavery in 1856, Booker T. Washington overcame staggering obstacles to lead 
emancipated Blacks into a quiet revolution against illiteracy and economic dependence” 
(Denton 1993). He believed that in order to fight for justice, the Black population would 
need to be properly trained, especially for the job market. The Tuskegee Institute (located 
in Alabama) had programs related to agriculture, industry, education, health, housing, and 
politics (Denton 1993). With an emphasis on agriculture, Washington was able to not 
only garner support from the Black population, but also from the local White population 
(because he made a concerted effort to not overstep the White man’s role, and because 
the school promoted integrating more productive citizens into the community). He said, 
“we wanted them to return to the plantation districts and show people there how to put 
new energy and new ideas into farming as well as the intellectual and moral and religious 
life of the people” (Washington 1881 via Wormser 2002e).28 Then, starting in the 1900s, 
African American began to migrate from the South to the North, where their rights were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Tuskegee Institute is still in operation today and continues to successfully promote its 
mission. 
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more likely to be honored in “The Promised Land” (as described by Richard Wright). An 
estimated six million Blacks migrated away form the South, especially creative artists 
and intellectuals (Wormser 2002e). 
 The positive headway made for America’s Black community through various 
resistance strategies and political decisions spurred incredible backlash from the White 
community, which was met with the Supreme Court ruling in 1896 for separate but equal 
facilities, designated by race. Collective action against Jim Crow was also sought via 
riots, protest, strikes, and other tactics for disrupting the system’s efficiency. Tulsa 
Fisk University 
 For example, in 1925, W.E.B. Dubois visited Fisk University (his alma mater) 
when he heard that the new president was promoting the separation of sexes and races on 
campus. This was in an effort to receive a large endowment from a Northern foundation 
that claimed it “wanted Black schools to teach their students to accommodate to Jim 
Crow as Booker T. Washington had preached, and not to challenge it, as Du Bois was 
suggesting” (Wormser 2002b). With Du Bois’ guidance the students fought against the 
new policies. The student protestors were arrested, and the community in and around 
Nashville became even more polarized. However, the president eventually resigned, 
which spurred similar protests on other Black campuses across the nation. 
WWII 
 Then, in 1941, hundreds of thousands of White people were hired into the defense 
industry; fifty percent of defense employers said they would not hire Black workers no 
matter how skilled they were” (Wormser 2002c). Black leaders met in Chicago to discuss 
the injustice. A. Philip Randolph, head of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters called 
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for a massive demonstration, he said, “it is time to wake up Washington as it has never 
been shocked before” (Randolph 1941 via Wormser 2002c). Most Black organizations 
were in agreement to participate and President Roosevelt became fearful that the March 
would lead to massive race riots. Eventually, Roosevelt compromised and agreed to 
integrate the defense industry, but not the army. He issued Executive Order Number 
8802, which established the Fair Employment Practices Committee, which led Randolph 
to call off the march. 
 World War II took place from 1941 to 1945. Eventually, African Americans and 
White Americans were both allowed to serve, but in segregated units with African 
Americans usually in non-combat military jobs. Despite this, those who served in the 
military were able to discover countless new opportunities, beyond what they had 
previously been prescribed in their pre-war lives. Some relationships between soldiers 
preached this segregation, while others began to look past one another’s race; these 
soldiers were able to act as comrades, while others remained more discriminatory and 
consequently hostile (Wormser 2002g). No matter, “when [soldiers] returned home, the 
color line once again reappeared. When Blacks came home from war, Whites were 
prepared to “put them back in their place” (Wormser 2002g). The war still led many 
African Americans to believe that Jim Crow was not inevitable, and that positive race 
relations were possible.29  
 Jim Crow legislation was often overlooked during the rapidly changing social and 
economic circumstances that were introduced with the onset of World War II (Lowndes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 This was especially reinforced by their treatment by non-Americans: Europeans and 
Australians (Wormser 2002g). 
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2008). However, Jim Crow was not officially dismantled until 1954 (and not socially 
dismantled until much later) and many White people still fervently and even violently 
opposed the integration of Black workers in traditionally “White roles,” especially 
throughout the Southern states. “Race was increasingly articulated in a language of 
economic conservatism both regionally and nationally, just as conservative appeals were 
continually made by reference to racial identity” (Lowndes 2008 5). 
 During this time, segregation was also interwoven throughout the public sphere. 
“Whites only” restaurants, water fountains, benches, schools, etc. quickly became 
commonplace. Policies and laws that favored White people provided unequal access to 
all facilities and services that aided in the individual’s success. For example, White 
citizens were given superior access to education, government facilities, and the legal 
system, which made such things as literacy tests and poll taxes for voting definite 
obstacles for the Black community. This improved White Americans’ opportunities for 
success and their ability to contribute to society, while hindering Black Americans. 
Civil Rights cases 
 However, with racial discrimination no longer indoctrinated in the U.S. 
Constitution, African Americans began using the federal court and the Fourteenth 
Amendment to fight against modern forms of segregation. Various civil rights cases were 
heard by the Supreme Court starting in 1883. The court usually found state sanctioned 
discrimination to be unconstitutional, but until 1954, continued to rule that discriminatory 
practices on the individual level were not unlawful.30  
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serves as the basis for some of the prevailing racist ideologies that we witness today.  
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 In 1954, the Jim Crow era was officially disbanded with the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in favor of positively altering race relations in the U.S. In Brown v. Board of 
Education (1954) the Supreme Court overturned Plessy v. Ferguson, and ruled in disfavor 
of  “separate but equal.” Reexamining Race Relations 
 Societal integration was further solidified in 1957, when President Eisenhower 
used the protection of the Arkansas National Guard to forcibly integrate a high school in 
Little Rock, Arkansas, and in 1963, when President Kennedy insisted that Alabama’s 
state university system be integrated through a state-wide mandate that was put in place 
by George Wallace, the governor at this time. This move then spurred the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Fair Housing Act of 1968, which 
together “ended the ability of any state to discriminate disenfranchise, or otherwise 
restrict any individual on the basis of race” (“Jim Crow Laws”).  
Today 
 Today, the Black community represents a comparatively large and thriving sect of 
America’s middle class, 
Major American institutions are far more integrated than in any 
previous era. The civil rights movement is enshrined in American 
iconography and cited as a source of inspiration for actors across 
the political spectrum. Most Republican leaders now attempt to 
claim the mantle of racial inclusiveness, a fact which makes a 
racial archaeology of the modern GOP that much more necessary 
(Lowndes 2008 7) 
 
For this reason, however, it has become much more difficult to mobilize against the racist 
exclusion that continues to persist in American society. It is increasingly complicated to 
frame an argument and garner collective action against colorblind policies in a less 
blatantly racist era. Today, we see disproportionate rates of poverty, unemployment, 
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infant mortality, poor health, unequal schooling and incarceration (Lowndes 2008), but 
fewer policies that explicitly deny the rights of entire groups of American citizens based 
on their race. As racism become less and less economically viable, policies will tend to 
reflect a more egalitarian society. However, the social status of minority races in the 
United States still clearly remains contentious in some spheres. 
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SOUTH	  AFRICA	  
 Many scholars draw comparisons of the race relations of the United States and 
South Africa during the Jim Crow and the Apartheid eras (see Beinart and Dubow 1995; 
Thompson 2000), yet far fewer have compared the racial hierarchies that persist today 
within these two states. In order to guide an understanding of the racial hierarchies that 
remain in contemporary United States and South Africa, I will now provide an historical 
narrative account for the history of South Africa, including their institutional 
discriminatory prescriptions and the social movement actions that were able to upset 
these systems in order to push for a more egalitarian era. HISTORY	  OF	  DISCRIMINATION	  
 Segregation is often explored by academics in two primary ways: the materialist 
and the ideological. Some attempt to understand why segregation is primarily based on 
the color of one’s skin, while others look more critically at segregation to help pursue 
capitalist growth in favor of Whites. “In the 1970s and 1980s, when a powerful left and 
materialist critique of existing historiography was developed, approaches polarized and 
debated became more intense” (Beinart and Dubow 1995 5). Many scholars believe that 
in the case of South Africa, segregation and discrimination are rooted in the state’s Dutch 
colonial past. In the 19th century, the Afrikaner national identity was becoming more 
salient; they likely began developing their sense of superiority during the slave era 
(Beinart and Dubow 1995). 
 Apartheid rule actually went beyond the margins that were put in place during the 
previous segregation era and found new approaches to purport White supremacist ideals 
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throughout most legislation.31 “The context in which Apartheid was introduced was also 
markedly different from the earlier segregationist period. In the era of European 
colonialism, segregation in South Africa did not appear exceptional. By contrast, in the 
democratizing postwar world and at the time of decolonization, Apartheid began to stand 
out internationally as an immoral system in a way that its predecessor had not” (13). In 
the 1960s, African National Congress (ANC) and Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) leaders 
were unjustly jailed, which resulted in an even greater uproar from the international 
community (Beinart and Dubow 1995). South Africa’s discriminatory system of 
Apartheid began to be deeply effected by the international political climate whereby 
states around the world were entering a new era of respect for and understanding of a 
common human dignity (including the value of human rights). “South Africa’s liberation 
struggle served to symbolize, along with the civil rights movement in the United States, 
the aspirations of all those who strove for common human dignity and freedom” (Beinart 
and Dubow 1995 13). In order to aptly analyze the contemporary racial systems of these 
two countries, the historical backgrounds I provide will not run parallel, but rather will 
represent the most influential historical processes. 
Policies and issues 
 Apartheid can be described as a series of discriminatory policies and acts that 
reached across the entirety of South Africa’s social, political, and economic sector. The 
policies that were enacted by political elites affected individual’s access to the economic 
sectors and their relations in the social sphere. Non-White’s rights were restricted across 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 The previous segregation era refers to the already separate societal boundaries that 
were instilled place as a result of the colonial era, but before the Nationalist party took 
power and began institutionalizing discrimination in all types of policies 
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industries and spheres, “Among the most important of these measures were the 1911 
Mines and Works Act (segregation in employment), the 1913 Native Land Act 
(segregation in the countryside and prohibition on the African land purchase), the 1923 
Natives (Urban Area) Act (urban residential segregation), the 1936 Representation of 
Natives Act (abolition of the remnant elaboration of the 1913 Land Act)” (Beinart and 
Dubow 1995 4). Facilities and services across South Africa were progressively restricted 
to Africans (via social restrictions), and as time passed more and more legislation was 
also passed to increasingly restrict African’s rights and access to such services even 
“more tightly than under the ‘Jim Crow’ laws in the United States” (Beinart and Dubow 
1995 4). Unlike in the United States, where interracial relations were socially restricted, 
in South Africa they were also illegal. “Segregation was, however, more than a panoply 
of restrictive legislation: it refers as well to a composite ideology and set of practices 
seeking to legitimize social differences and economic inequality in every aspect of life” 
(4). Many laws that were drafted during the Apartheid era were founded in previously 
prescribed social mores. For example, churches were already race segregated, Black 
people almost never had superiority over their White colleagues, and the work sector (IE 
the skilled laborers) was already predominantly White (Beinart and Dubow 1995). 
National Party 
 The National party, which was responsible for institutionalizing Apartheid, was 
able to consolidate its power “step by step, [by] eliminat[int] every vestige of Black 
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participation in the central political system” (Thompson 2000 187). 32 At this time (1977), 
South Africa was still in close relations with Great Britain, and had intended to remain a 
member of the British Commonwealth (much like India’s relationship with Great 
Britain). This tied the country to the international community, and led to increasing 
international opposition to their Apartheid system. According to Thompson (2000) the 
Nationalist party decided to disengage with Great Britain and become a republic—in 
pursuit of more independence and less oversight (188), and according to The Common 
Wealth (2015) “South Africa became a pariah nation, forced out of the Commonwealth 
and increasingly isolated internationally. The UN declared Apartheid to be a danger to 
world peace in 1961 and a crime against humanity in 1966”. At this time, the government 
“Africanerized every state institution, appointing Afrikaners to senior as well as junior 
positions in the civil service, army, police, and state corporations…The government also 
assisted Afrikaners to close the gap between themselves and the English-speaking White 
South Africans” (188). Afrikaners moved into mining, manufacturing, commerce and 
finance, all of which had previously been dominated by English-speaking White South 
Africans (Thompson 2000). 
 Efforts to maintain Black people as wage laborers and to push them out of their 
roles in renting, owning, and sharecropping land were pervasive. “The Nationalist 
government also gave fierce expression to its determination to maintain White supremacy 
in postwar South Africa. Much of its early legislation coordinated and extended the racial 
laws of the segregation era and tightened up administration of those laws” (Thompson 
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in the House of Assembly, and the major opposition, the Progressive Federal Party only 
won 17 (Thompson 2000 188).  
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2000 189). At one point, White people had become decreasingly hired for labor with the 
onset of rising cheap Black semi-skilled workers, but White laborers fought against this 
shift and insisted on employment, which led them to fill even more supervisory positions 
(Worden 1994 51). 
Social scheme 
 Under the influence of Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd, Apartheid turned from a 
political slogan to an entire scheme for social engineering. Verwoerd was a psychologist 
who adamantly supported White supremacy. In 1948, he was appointed senator and in 
1950, Minister of Native Affairs. After which, he served as Prime Minister of South 
Africa from 1958-1966, when he was stabbed to death. “During Verwoerd’s premiership, 
Apartheid [became] the most notorious form of racial domination that the postwar world 
has known” (Thompson 2000 189). The system can be simplified into four key ideas: the 
first was to segregate between four racial groups, White, Coloured, Indian, and Africa. 
The second idea was that Whites make up the civilized race, and “were entitled to have 
absolute control over the state” (190). Third, the state was not inclined to create an equal 
society or to provide for marginalized people; White privilege was state sanctioned. And 
finally, “the White racial group formed a single nation, with Afrikaans- and English-
speaking components, while Africans belonged to several (eventually ten) distinct nations 
or potential nations—a formula that made the White nation the largest in the country 
(190). These ideas were further instilled through the aforementioned government policies. 
Sexual relations and marriage were made illegal with this philosophy (The Immorality 
Act of 1950 and the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act of 1949). Coloured and African 
people also had their voting rights stripped (Thompson 2000). 
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Homelands 
 Because parliament struggled to gain a two-thirds majority for some of the racist 
policies that they were attempting to implement, they ended up granting amnesty to eight 
(later ten) territories that made up the remainder of the country, excluding Whites. They 
were able to pursue this new agenda by suing anti-colonial jargon in an attempt to 
convince citizens that they were benefitting from their newfound independence. When in 
fact, their rights as South African citizens were actually being stripped (Thompson 2000). 
Despite the ebbs and flows of the South African economy (for example its growth and 
successes in the 1950s), the new territories continued to struggle; many people were 
forced to leave their homelands to pursue wage labor in the greater South Africa. 
Individuals leaving their homelands to pursue work in South Africa were only allowed to 
stay for as long as they were fit to work. As soon as they were no longer fit to work, they 
faced grave consequences for attempting to reside outside their homelands (Thompson 
2000 also see Comaroff and Comaroff 2008). 
Public segregation 
 There was also a disparity in schooling for White and non-White children. White 
children were required to attend school; White school’s infrastructure was far superior to 
Black school’s infrastructure, and the government imposed segregation at all levels of 
schooling, including higher education. Furthermore, the Black population was growing at 
a much faster rate than the White population, but “the government spent ten times as 
much per capita on White students as on African students” (Thompson 2000 196 also see 
Elusive Equity: Education Reform in Post-Apartheid South Africa Fiske and Ladd 2004).  
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 This blatant segregation extended far beyond schools, however. “From 1948 on, 
‘Whites Only’ notices appeared in every conceivable place. Laws and regulations 
confirmed or imposed segregation for taxis, ambulances, hearses, buses, trains, elevators, 
benches, lavatories, parks, church halls, town halls, cinemas, theaters, cafes, restaurants, 
and hotels, as well as schools and universities” inter-racial contact in sports was even 
made illegal (Thompson 2000 197).  
 The Bantu Laws Amendment Act (1964) also allowed the government to expel 
any African from anywhere that White people resided in. The Public Safety Act (1953) 
allowed the government to declare a state of emergency in any particular area of the 
country (including over the entire country), which hurt judges’ ability to rule against 
inhumane laws, seeing as during emergency rule almost any law or interpretation of the 
law is considered appropriate (under the given circumstances).33  
 The bureaucracy also continued to grow under Apartheid, White people made up 
most of the workforce: Whites were in the public sector and Afrikaners in the majority of 
the supervisory positions. Even “the Black bureaucrats, numbering about 820,000, were 
reliable servants of the regime on which they depended for their livelihood” (Thompson 
2000 199). Apartheid was fervently enforced throughout all aspects of South Africa’s 
social and political system. Black people were rarely issued licenses to carry firearms 
whereas White people were able to obtain these licenses with relative ease. The 
government also clearly provided White people with better services and also made 
attempts to shelter them from witnessing their Black compatriots livelihoods via various 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 The court system, when given the opportunity, seemed to provide more fair judgments 
than the political elites.  
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media outlets, social norms, and state-mapping. “Whites were conditioned to regard 
Apartheid society as normal, its critics as communists or communist-sympathizers.” The 
Nationalist regime was able to deeply impact both Whites and Blacks mentality through 
encouraging divergent languages, churches, social groups, etc. (Thompson 2000 201). 
Black experience 
 Non-Whites in South Africa had varied experiences under Apartheid, but all of 
which were characteristically inferior to their White counterparts. The Apartheid 
government even ensured that the Black people whose lives impacted or improved the 
lives of White people received special benefits to maintain these societal roles. This 
inequality led to policy shifts and societal shifts in the 1970s when “highly capitalized 
industry [began to] dominate the economy, [which led to] using complex technology and 
requiring semi-skilled permanent workers rather than unskilled migrant laborers. In these 
circumstances, segregation and Apartheid, so crucial to the earlier development and 
growth of industry were no longer appropriate to the needs of South African capitalism” 
(Worden 1994 122). 
 South Africa, under Apartheid had one of the most disparate economies in the 
world. White people were as privileged as the White people in the Western world and 
other ethnicities remained as under-privileged as those in the most underdeveloped 
countries. Health outcomes were also extremely unequal during this time, “morality rates 
for both African and Coloured children aged one to four years old were thirteen times as 
high as for Whites” (Thompson 2000 203). This was due to inadequate nutrition and high 
rates of disease. The diseases that plagued Africans in South Africa were the same that 
pervaded third-world countries such as pneumonia, gastroenteritis, and tuberculosis. 
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Resistance to Apartheid 
 When Apartheid was first introduced, churches were among the main sources of 
collective resistance. Student organizations also banned together to resist the 
Nationalist’s regime. Women’s groups, too, came together to publically display their 
disapproval of racist policies. Intellectuals wrote about the injustices under Apartheid rule 
through poetry, novels, plays, etc. Historians spoke out, and scientists proved that racists 
legislation cannot be biologically justified. Black leaders confronted the Nationalist 
regime by mobilizing their communities and creating the ANC, Mandela was one of the 
dominant personalities of this faction. In 1952, the ANC launched a “passive resistance 
campaign” that defied Apartheid policies and resulted in the creation of further policies, 
but this attempt at resistance led to the creation of even more legislation against 
demonstrations of civil disobedience (this campaign was then called off) (Thompson 
2000 208).  
 In 1955, the ANC altered its strategies. Supporters of the ANC attempted to 
demonstrate their grievances to the international community to gain support. This new 
campaign resulted in the creation of the Freedom Charter. “The charter started with the 
ringing assertion that ‘South Africa belongs to all who live in it, Black and White, and 
that no government can justly claim authority unless it is based on the will of the people’” 
(208). The government’s reaction was to repress the African community even further. “In 
December 1956 it arrested 156 people and charged them with high treason, in the form of 
a conspiracy to overthrow the state by violence and replace it with a state based on 
communism,” but the courts found the conspirators not guilty. 
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 In 1959, the Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) in particular was born. This 
movement emerged from the boycott movements that became pervasive that year. The 
AAM was both internally and externally strong. Internally, it was supported by a broad-
based and diverse membership (African Activist Archive n.d.). Externally, the AAM was 
also deeply involved with the international community and dealt with issues regarding 
international investment in South Africa, its companies, and its banks. Many British 
political leaders were also involved in AAM organization and activities. The AAM was 
dissolved in 1994 after the first democratic elections in South Africa, and replaced with 
Action for Southern Africa (ACTSA) (African Activist Archive n.d.). 
PAC 
 The PAC materialized out of diverging Black movements. The PAC was willing 
to face injustice and wanted to create havoc in the system by demonstrating at police 
stations where they were most likely be arrested. The government reacted by outlawing 
both the ANC and the PAC and declaring a state of emergency. “The year 1960 was a 
watershed in modern South African history. Previously, nearly every ANC leader had 
been deeply committed to nonviolence. But nonviolent methods had achieved nothing 
except a series of defeats at the hands of a violent state” (Thompson 2000 211). The ANC 
came to realize that South Africa was distinct form India, where nonviolent resistance 
was a valuable means to instigating change; the South African government frequently 
reacted to nonviolent movements with violence. At this point, three major developments 
were evolving that pushed resistance strategies further: (1) art34; (2) rapid economic 
growth which “involved[ed] a vast increase in the number of Black semiskilled as well as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Such as the Johannesburg magazine Drum as well as poetry and theater movements. 
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unskilled workers, which led to the development of class consciousness among Black 
workers and the creation of an effective Black trade union movement, despite its 
exclusion from the formal bargaining process” (Thompson 2000 212), and (3) 
involvement from young Black people.35  
Downturn of Apartheid 
 South Africa experienced great economic success in the 1960s, but suffered from 
stagnated growth in its agricultural and service sectors in 1970 (Byrnes 1996). The 
economy could no longer sustain without engaging its entire population in the workforce; 
there were too few skilled laborers. The White population was in rapid decline and the 
policies Verwoerd proposed in promotion of the separate development of all peoples 
along racial and ethnic lines also failed. He promoted this separate development through 
the Promotion of Black Self-Government Act (1958), whereby homelands were 
considered separate territories, no longer subject to South Africa’s central government. 
The international community did not recognize these territories as sovereign, they were 
decaying socially, economically, and politically, and residents therein were unallowed to 
leave their territories for employment, thus also unable to contribute to the workforce 
(Thompson 2000). Notably, internal changes in South Africa (outside of the townships) 
were also transpiring and Afrikaner solidarity was deteriorating. By the late 1970s, class 
divisions were becoming more potent markers than ethnic division for the Afrikaner 
community (Vail 1991). The National party was also revealed to be internally corrupt, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Steve Biko insisted that Black people feel pride in themselves in order to transform 
(notably not just reform) the system that represses them. 
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which hurt their ability to maintain credence even amongst their previous supporters 
(Hyslop 2005). 
Reforming Apartheid 
 P.W. Botha’s administration, which led South Africa from 1978 to 1989, 
attempted to adapt to evolving international and South African political cultures, without 
giving up Afrikaner power. Botha introduced a new constitution that ensured a White 
majority in some political affairs, but more equal racial representation in others.36 New 
laws was posited under Botha in his attempt to appear more racially equitable, but these 
were in fact as discriminatory as the previous mandates. He attempted to enhance the 
rights of the Coloured and Asian communities of South Africa in order to gain their 
support (Beinart and Dubow 1995). During his administration, South Africa remained 
officially grouped along racial lines, White people still dominated politics by being able 
to outvote Africans and Indians with a minority vote, and Black townships continued to 
function on the margins of society (Thompson 2000 225).  
 Botha recognized that the reformation of homelands was paramount to actually 
realize less discriminatory, antiapartheid motions and rules, and to stabilize South 
Africa’s economy. “The countryside is pushing you into the cities to survive, the cities 
are pushing you into the countryside to die” (Thompson 2000 226).  The “geographic 
framework” of homelands that was previously promoted by Verwoerd confined 
individuals’ employment to their respective homelands, which the Botha administration 
found “did not correspond with [South Africa’s] economic realities” (227). Instead, South 
Africa was to be cut into four regions, which would engulf the homelands (but he still 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 He also gave himself veto power. 
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failed to support township development directly). In 1986, some discriminatory laws 
began to be repealed; society was becoming less institutionally segregated, facilities were 
becoming more open to use by all, and funding for Black education began to rise. 
 Botha claimed that South Africa had outgrown Apartheid but even his more mild 
reforms were difficult to implement given the deeply embedded under workings of the 
Apartheid system in South Africa (Thompson 2000 227). Segregation remained 
pervasive; Black people were still poorer and grossly underserved compared to White 
people; “the Land Act and the Group Areas Act still excluded Africans from land 
ownership outside the homelands and the African townships;” the government continued 
to relocate Africans by removing them from their homes (despite promises of the 
opposite), and the justice system was still not free and fair—the concessions made during 
Botha’s rule were predominately symbolic (Thompson 2000 228).37 
Making progress 
 According to intellectuals of the 1970s, the realization that the cost of Apartheid 
and its negative implications for domestic economic growth, even for particular 
companies and businesses arguably led to the demise of the system (Beinhart and Dubow 
1995 19).38 In the 1980s an argument for political legitimacy supplemented the previously 
potent economic argument. At this time, Black resistance involved people across 
generations, classes, ethnicities, etc. in their liberation movement. The mobilization of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 “President Botha and his colleagues were adamant about retaining the racial structure 
of government institutions and rejected any suggestion that Africans should participate 
equally with Whites” (Thompson 2000 228). 
38 “It soon became apparent that free-market approaches to labor, land, and ownership 
could have explosive implications in a racially constituted economy like South Africa” 
(Beinhart and Dubow 1995 19). 
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such a diverse group of people allowed for countless social movement actions to address 
the problem from various angles. In 1983, the United Democratic Front (UDF) was 
founded with the inclusion of all races and included representation from “trade unions, 
sporting bodies, community groups, and women’s and youth organizations” (Thompson 
2000 288). The UDF wanted to re-engage with the Freedom Charter and disband the 
country’s prevailing racist policies. The creation of the UDF spurred uprisings all over 
South Africa calling for a new anti-Apartheid era. 
 Growing distrust and dissatisfaction with the Botha administration was prevalent 
across racial lines, and the State began to lose its sense of legitimacy throughout South 
Africa. “The state mostly failed in its quest to find Black urban allies who would take 
their place along homeland leaders.” Nelson Mandela’s release from prison, along with 
the unbanning of various liberation movements led to the eventual downfall of Apartheid 
South Africa. “Nevertheless, it took more than four years of tortured negotiations and 
heightened levels of violence before [a] non-racial election [was] held in 1994 and power 
formally transferred” (Beinhart and Dubow 1995 20). 
 By the time South Africa held its first democratic elections, in 1994, most of the 
African society in South Africa was in support of the African National Congress (ANC), 
which grossed more than 60 percent of the overall vote, despite most Whites maintaining 
support for the Nationalist party (who received about 20 per cent of the vote that year). 
However, the government clearly remained largely racialized despite an attempt to have 
democratic elections go beyond the racial order. As evidenced above, voting still clearly 
followed racial contours (but now in favor of the Black majority) (Beinhart and Dubow 
1995). 
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Moving away from Apartheid 
 In order to understand the shifts that took place in South African society, which 
led to the demise of White minority rule and the first democratic election, we must 
interrogate political, social, and economic foci. It would seem that the convergence of 
Black leaders enlivening a racial consciousness, economic instability, and international 
pressure led to the ultimate demise of White minority rule and the election of a 
government more demonstrative of its people. Nonetheless, racial lines have been driven 
into South African society since the era of Dutch colonialism and this racial identity still 
serves as a potent influence over social relations in South Africa today, whether or not the 
government is more demographically representative—this representation is still based on 
race. Throughout history, South Africans (like many other African citizens throughout 
the continent) have fought and resisted against these injustices both forcefully and with 
fervor.  
Social movement actions 
 South African activists’ actions evolved throughout history, but all reflected an 
aura of strength and ardor. Examples of such movements include: the ANC’s various 
endeavors, which began with legal protests, then shifted to nonviolent direct courses of 
action, and eventually presented a violent militant campaign. The PAC (founded in 
1959), which also worked against Apartheid policies, but primarily through more violent 
forms of resistance. The Umkhonto We Sizwe (“Spear of the Nation”) militant wing of 
the ANC, which emerged in 1961 and promoted “the largest grassroots eruption of 
diverse nonviolent strategies in a single struggle in human history.” The nonviolent 
tactics proved unfruitful (for changing legislation), which led the organization to put forth 
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armed uprisings, but unfortunately neither strategy was successful for Umkhonto We 
Sizwe’s attempt to dismantle Apartheid legislation (“Umkhonto We Sizwe” 2015; Walter 
Wink 1987 4).  
 The Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) (started in the mid-1960s) was “a 
proletariat anti-Apartheid liberal movement that emerged out of the political vacuum 
formed by the decimation—jailing and banning—of the African National Congress 
(ANC) and Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) leadership”; this vacuum fragmented Black 
resistance and birthed the need for a new kind of movement such that Steve Biko was able 
to render through the BCM (Harrell 2011).39 Then in 1973, the Durban Strikes erupted as 
the “largest labor protest since the 1948 election win of the National Party” (Brown 2010 
31). This movement heralded South African workers’ contestation of Apartheid.40 In 
1985, the Troops out of Townships Movement grew out of the troubling fact that Blacks, 
in their own communities, were being killed South African security forces (Glickman 
1990). Also in 1985, 27 year-old Mkhuseli Jack organized boycotts of White-owned 
businesses in Port Elizabeth. This movement demanded integrated public facilities, the 
removal of military presence in Black townships, and an end to workplace discrimination 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 The movement thus sought to change the mindset of all of those involved in South 
African society by discrediting the notion that Whiteness should be attributed to 
normalcy, and Blackness to perversity. Activists converged on the Black-ness of the 
movement; White skin tainted the effort to maintain a single, cohesive movement such 
that Biko strived for, “The White liberal with his ‘Black soul wrapped in White skin’, 
does not shed that skin which is a passport to privilege in a racist society” (Woods 1981) 
for it is the very color of the Black (wo)man’s skin that serves as their reasoning for 
oppression. 
40 “The state did not consider these strikes as a form of public political protest. Instead, it 
described them as resulting from economic grievances and delegated the responsibility 
for resolving them to employers,” which allowed the protests to sustain longer and 
eventually lead to more salient changes in the political system (Brown 2010 31). 
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(Glickman 1990). A final example was the Defiance of Unjust Laws Campaign (1989), 
which operated under the slogan “One South Africa, One Person One Vote” and involved 
protesting Apartheid laws and practices such as the tricameral legislative system and the 
banning of dissidents (Kurtz 2010). 
The effort continues 
 In “The Dynamics of Conflict in South Africa: Routes to Peace?” Isaac (via 
Glickman 1990) states that Black resistance will persist under the condition that the 
national movement, sparked by the Black community (which he states “cuts across race, 
class and gender”), is able to maintain legitimacy and support—more so than the state: 
“The state has lost its credibility and legitimacy among the broad mass of the 
disenfranchised: it governs not by consent but by coercion” (Glickman 1990 49).  
 Throughout South African history countless forms of resistance and various 
strategies were capitalized on in order to overturn the Apartheid state. Among them: 
protests and persuasions such as: mass demonstrations, marches, public declarations, 
alternative press, vigils, memorials, UN Resolutions, etc. As well as non-cooperative 
measures such as: strikes, economic boycotts, school boycotts, international divestment, 
alternative institutions, forms of civil disobedience, etc. And nonviolent interventions for 
example, Desmond Tutu’s protest march of a White-only beach (1989), non-Whites 
showing up at White hospitals, marching without permits, an entering other White-only 
spaces (for a more comprehensive list see Kurtz 2010). South Africa’s brutal history of 
discrimination, and policy-driven segregation continues to inform race relations today. 
The relentless effort put forth by the non-White community may continue to inspire 
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contemporary movements for weakening and eventually dismantling the racial 
hierarchies that persist today. 
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V.	  US	  CASE	  ON	  POLICE	  BRUTALITY	  BACKGROUND	  &	  HISTORY	  OF	  POLICE	  BRUTALITY	  	  	  PROBLEM	  OF	  POLICE	  BRUTALITY	  	   In this section I intend to provide a data set. This data set is comprised of 
historical narrative that makes reference to each of the themes in my theory as well as any 
important contextual information that will be necessary to understand the nuances within 
my case study. It will serve as the source for which I analyze and test my theory in the 
next portion of this paper. This immediate subsection will discuss police brutality as it 
has appeared throughout history in order to explain its broad-based relevance to my 
theory. I have chosen to specifically study police brutality as a reference for our current 
racially hierarchical society because, I argue the persistence of acts of police brutality 
against Blacks in America directly illustrates our inability (thus far) to reach a post-racial 
society. In the subsequent subsection I will discuss Rodney King’s experience as a 
particularly galvanizing case of police brutality that led to civil unrest. This exposition of 
the Rodney King case will serve as the chief dataset for which I assess my theory. This 
immediate subsection will necessarily demonstrate why my theory and hypotheses are 
relevant to today by describing the hierarchy through the lens of police brutality.41 
 Numerous examples of racial inequalities can be named to demonstrate the 
injustice that Blacks continue to confront in post-Civil Rights America, but police 
brutality is one of the clearest examples of a structural problem that affects minority 
(especially Black) Americans today. Hooks (1995), who was the Executive Director and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 This subsection is also necessary to describe how relevant the Rodney King case is to 
the evolution of police brutality as a problem and the public’s evolving response to the 
issue. It is also necessary for situating the Rodney King case in an historical context. 
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CEO of the NAACP from 1977 to 1993, poignantly articulates the Black experience with 
regard to law enforcement officials in America. He describes how Black people would 
hope to be granted protection by police officers under the same mandates that the rest of 
society is protected by, but that there is a “corroding fear” in the Black community that 
any encounter with a police officer may potentially result in abuse or mistreatment. “Rare 
indeed is the Black male, and in some instances the Black female, who has grown to 
adulthood in America without having suffered some unpleasant experience at the hands 
of the police, especially White police” (Hooks 1995). 
 The disparity in cases of police brutality (as well as in other law enforcement-
related issues i.e. criminal sentencing and incarceration) that continues in the U.S. today 
is evidence of our sustained racially hierarchical society. Rather than seeing officers as 
sources of protection, many minority people avoid law enforcement officials in 
anticipation of misconduct. Furthermore, despite statistical evidence of a clear gap in 
incidents of police brutality as well as incarceration rates based on race, we have yet to 
reach a consensus (or to implement adequate policy changes, or sufficient data capture) 
on issues of police brutality and disproportionate patrolling.42 USA Today analyzed seven 
years of FBI data and found that “White officers kill Black suspects twice a week in the 
United States, or an average of 96 times a year” (McKay 2014 also see Health 2014). 
King and Smith (2011) write, “nonwhites are…not just disproportionately arrested by 
also disproportionately innocent victims of crimes” (217). Brown and Wellman (2005) 
claim, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 There is an especially striking insufficiency in nation-level policies on the issue of 
police brutality that my case study will seek to address 
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“Contemporary color lines are embedded in culturally and 
economically produced systems of advantage and exclusion that 
generate privilege for one racially defined group at the expense of 
another. It is time…to replace the attribution of America’s 
persistent color line to intentional discrimination and the 
dysfunctional behavior of Blacks with a historical structural 
account that emphasizes the legacies of discrimination and the 
subtle ways in which those legacies are perpetuated” (189).  
 
In order to rewrite this historical legacy and resituate the Black experience in America, 
we must take note of the violence committed against Black people by police officers: 
those whose duty it is to protect, not harm. In this section, I will discuss the issue of 
police brutality in America writ-large by, first attempting to define police brutality 
(which will include the debate over defining and labeling what police brutality should 
denote), then by providing a brief historical perspective of the issue, which will include 
the complications faced by insufficient adequate data capture, and the inadequate laws 
and policies currently encoded, as well as any attempts made by U.S. officials to 
investigate and confront the problem. After which, I will review the Rodney King 
incident, which transpired as a result of this structural issue. 
 DEFINING	  POLICE	  BRUTALITY	  AND	  EXCESSIVE	  FORCE	  
 Police brutality directly refers to police officers using excessive force against 
civilians. Excessive force has become a controversial, highly debated phrase, which has 
ultimately convoluted the more urgent discussion that should be had on some police 
officers’ conduct. “Indeed police officers are expressly authorized to use necessary, 
reasonable force to perform their duties. As Jerome Skolnick, an influential police scholar 
in the United States, underscores: ‘as long as members of society do not comply with the 
law and resist the police, force will remain an inevitable part of policing’” (Henry 2007 
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502). However, the legitimacy and legality (and limits therein) of the executed force must 
be considered. The issue of police brutality not only deals with whether or not force is 
used, but also the “degree, kind, reasonableness, and even an omission” of said force 
(Henry 2007 502). The police officer’s intention for using force (which is nearly 
impossible to define or situate) is also discussed when attempting to distinguish acts of 
police brutality—whether or not the use of force was deliberate, or a good-faith mistake.43 
Unfortunately, the police sometimes use the “law” itself and claims of aiming to “protect 
the law” as covers for their unlawful and unjust actions, and under the ambiguity of the 
“law”, they are able to avoid repercussions for their actions.44  
 In 1998, the Human Rights Watch spoke out against police brutality naming the 
issue as one of the most enduring, divisive human rights violations in the United States. 
“The problem is nationwide, and its nature is institutionalized” (Collins 1998). The 
Human Rights Watch report defines "excessive force" as force that exceeds what is 
objectively reasonable and necessary in the circumstances confronting the officer to 
subdue a person. This definition resembles Article 3 of the U.N. Code of Conduct for 
Law Enforcement Officials, which provides that: "Law enforcement officials should use 
force only when strictly necessary and to the extent required for the performance of their 
duty."45 The Human Rights Watch report also cites Graham v. Connor 490 U.S. 386 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Whereby a police officer, stunned by how a situation unfolds and is permitted to act 
violently (Henry 2007). 
44 The ambiguity of the law itself and police relations with the judiciary often leave 
abusive acts by law enforcement officers unpunished. 
45 GA resolution 34/169 passed on December 17, 1979, and in the U.N. Basic Principles 
on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, which stipulates that, 
"Whenever the use of force and firearms is unavoidable, law enforcement officials shall 
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(1989), to exemplify when the United States Supreme Court held that that the United 
States Constitution's Fourth Amendment requirement of "reasonableness" on the part of 
the police applies to "all claims that law enforcement officials have used excessive force - 
deadly or not - in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other seizure of a free 
person." Throughout the Human Rights Watch report, Collins (1998) uses the term 
"excessive force" to refer to abuse occurring both during apprehension and while in 
custody.46 
 HISTORY	  OF	  POLICE	  BRUTALITY	  
 Police brutality is a structural inequity faced by the Black community. Evidence 
of this issue can be traced back to corrupt policing practices of the 1800s and early 1900s. 
According to Henry (2007), two-thirds of victims of lynching between 1882 and 1959 
were African Americans, and an estimated half of these incidents were executed by 
police officers; 90% of all incidents had police officers present (and likely assisting). 
The Wickersham Commission 
 In response to this structural problem, President Herbert Hoover created The 
Wickersham Commission in 1928. This was the first institutional effort to track and 
regulate law enforcement officers’ methods and practices. The Commission was able to 
attract broad-ranging attention to the issue of police brutality by highlighting particular 
incidents, but it nonetheless struggled to create a comprehensive report on past incidents, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
exercise restraint in such use and act in proportion to the seriousness of the offence and 
the legitimate objective to be achieved." UN Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 (1990).  
46 Sexual assault and torture by police officers are also referred to as “excessive force” in 
the Human Rights Watch report, which Collins states may not be, strictly speaking, seen 
as excessive force, but are nonetheless unjustified and criminal assaults. 
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and also failed to assemble a framework to track future incidents. Still today, the United 
States does not track police brutality events despite concerted efforts made by both 
individuals47 and organizations (IE the Human Rights Watch).48 
Issue with data capture 
 Unfortunately, because incidents of police brutality are so under documented it is 
extraordinarily difficult to mobilize policy makers to address the issue. Whether or not 
social movements transpire after the onset of an incident, and despite the public’s 
reaction to police-related issues, policy elites tend to react more fervently when the 
problem can be substantiated by quantitative data sets.49  
 The Wickersham Commission actually drafted a uniform statute in 1937 in an 
attempt to require states to collect criminal statistics for the Census Bureau to keep track 
of, but South Dakota was the only state to adopt the plan (Maltz 1977). Many years later, 
the FBI promoted a similar mission, they asked states to collect Uniform Criminal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 See Brian Burghart “What I’ve Learned from Two Years Collecting Data on Police 
Killings” (September 22, 2014) via Gawker.com 
48 Not only is this extremely problematic for data collection, but it is also a telling sign 
that the hierarchical racial system is still a pervasive component to modern-day policing. 
With the majority of police brutality being inflicted on African Americans, I would argue 
that the lack of data collection is linked to a racially-biased criminal justice system. 
Without proper tracking and analysis procedures, it is not only more difficult to mobilize 
against the system, but it also becomes increasingly difficult to make changes to the 
system. Such changes should include police training and policy building. Increased social 
awareness could also result from better statistical representations of police brutality (from 
today and throughout history). 
49 This is one reason why incarceration issues have historically been more widely 
addressed by policy elites. The data on incarceration rates reveal striking examples of 
racial disparities guiding jurisprudence in the United States, whereas even the most 
dramatic incidents of police brutality are not systematically tracked and analyzed. Instead 
we must manually seek out examples of police brutality in individual cases. Nonetheless, 
there is a great deal of anecdotal evidence and numerous historians are making arguments 
related to police brutality. 
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Reporting (UCR) data to aggregate with the FBI’s data, but only two states, California 
and New Jersey followed through. So, in 1972 Law Enforcement Alliance of America 
(LEAA) created a program that would fund statewide comprehensive criminal data 
systems (Maltz 1977). Today, more and more data is being collected and we are moving 
into an era where states can demand data from local jurisdictions, but we still have yet to 
instill a system-wide program for data collection. 
 The Center for Disease Control (CDC) has also made strides in their data 
collection efforts and has found that Black people are 3 times more likely than White 
people to be killed by a police officer (Wihbey 2014).50 “Blacks are more likely than 
others to be arrested in almost every city for almost every type of crime. Nationwide, 
Black people are arrested at higher rates for crimes as serious as murder and assault, and 
as minor as loitering and marijuana possession” (Health 2014). Also according to the 
CDC, Oklahoma has the highest rate of Black people killed by law enforcement per 
capita than anywhere else in the country (based on data gathered from 1999-2011). And 
in Missouri, where the late Michael Brown lived, the CDC found that Black people are 
killed twice as frequently by police officers than White people are (Wihbey 2014). 
However, despite all of the gains made by some in collecting this type of data since the 
late 1970s, there remains no national aggregate source of police brutality data, and King 
and Smith (2011) assert that “combating invidious racial profiling requires collecting 
racial data on law enforcement practices and questioning racially disproportionate official 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 “Blacks are [also] more likely than others to be arrested in almost every city for almost 
every type of crime. Nationwide, Black people are arrested at higher rates for crimes as 
serious as murder and assault, and as minor as loitering and marijuana possession” 
(Health 2014). 
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conduct” (216).51 The arrest rates are clearly lopsided, but we are far from reaching a 
consensus for explaining why.  
Phillip Goff, president of the University of California Los Angeles' 
Center for Policing Equity, said such comparisons are "seductively 
misleading" because they say more about how racial inequities 
play out than about what causes them. Those disparities are closely 
tied to other social and economic inequities, he said, and like most 
things that involve race, they defy simple explanations (Health 
2014). 
 
He goes on to concede to a “significant degree of law enforcement bias that is the engine 
for this. But there's also no controversy that educational quality and employment 
discrimination lead to this” (Goff 2014 via Health 2014). Without substantial data on 
actual incidents of police brutality all of the comparisons between crime, education, and 
employment rates and arrest rates for Black citizens remains hearsay. This is important, 
too, in order to clarify whether or not a White person who is being arrested is as likely or 
less likely as a Black person to be brutalized—with the current state of data capture it is 
difficult to say with 100 percent certainty. “Not only do we not know the racial 
breakdown of police homicides, we don’t know with any precision how many homicides 
occur, period” (Wines 2014). We must be able to substantiate our claims about police 
brutality with reliable aggregate national data sources in order to deal with the potential 
underlying problems related to crime and disproportionate arrest, as well as to verify once 
and for all the disparity in acts of police brutality against Black citizens (also see 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 While President Obama was a state senator in Illinois, he sponsored a law that required 
the “Illinois Department of Transportation to record the race, age, and gender of all 
drivers stopped for traffic violations so that bias could be detected” (King and Smith 
2011 216). 
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commentary by Richard Rosenfeld, University of Missouri-St. Louis criminology 
professor via Wine 2014). 
 The massive the bipartisan support for stricter crime policies has been since the 
1980s cannot be overstated. There has been a federal push to deal with crime throughout 
the U.S. “Electoral pressures generated a huge bipartisan elite consensus in favor of 
punitive criminal justice measures,” which actually made the role of racial alliances in the 
electoral system less relevant for a few decades, seeing as Democrats, in particular, had a 
rightward ideologically shift to support these measures. But, nonetheless data collection 
has remained off the agenda. 
Laws and policies 
 Legally addressing police brutality would inevitably recognize the racial charge of 
such incidents. In discussing contemporary lawmakers’ reluctance to address the 
problem, Stables uses a colonial analogy stating that, “historically, a good case can be 
made for the argument that the function of law was to establish and regulate the colonial 
relationship of Blacks and Whites in the United States. Initially, the colonial system was 
established by laws which legitimated the subordination of the Black population” 
(Staples 1975 15). Throughout history, criminal justice in the U.S. has tended to benefit 
the White man and perpetuate the subordination of racial minorities. For instance, certain 
illegal acts that tend to be more characteristic of Blacks are over criminalized while 
illegal acts that are more characteristic of Whites are more likely to be absolved (Staples 
1975). Staples (1975) also claims that “as a result of the colonial administration’s power 
to define the nature of criminality, the White collar crimes which involve millions of 
dollars go unpunished or lightly punished, while the crimes of the colonized involving 
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nickels and dimes result in long jail sentences” (16). This statement can be exemplified 
by the unequal sentencing for crack cocaine versus powdered cocaine in the U.S., which 
mandated (in 1986) a “five-year minimum federal prison sentence for possession of five 
grams of crack cocaine or five hundred grams of powder cocaine” (King and Smith 2011 
219). However, it should also be noted that in 2010, under the Obama administration, the 
Fair Sentencing Act (which attempts to equalize criminal sentencing for cocaine) passed 
through the Senate with unanimous consent, and through the House with a simple voice 
vote; this can be interpreted as a positive bipartisan step toward equalizing the criminal 
justice system. 
 However, other lapses in the system remain (also, many of the Fair Sentencing 
Act’s goals have not yet been fully realized) that perpetuate feelings of distrust between 
the Black community and law enforcement officers. On this note, the NAACP (1995) 
claims, “it cannot be denied that a wall of mistrust exists between minority groups and 
the police, and that the relationship between the police and the community has eroded 
considerably” (7). Simply by virtue of an individual’s race, it appears that he or she is not 
granted equal protection under the U.S. rule of law, and in fact, is more likely to confront 
the brutal force of a police officer. This crisis is immanent and must be addressed 
immediately. 
Kerner Report 
 One major reaction to police brutality has been civil unrest, especially when the 
incidents entertain the media’s attention. From 1965-1968, a mass scene of race riots 
broke out around the country, despite the recent achievements of two momentous Civil 
Rights Acts (ending segregation and achieving voting rights in the South). The “long hot 
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summer” of 1967 was particularly rampant with riots and disorder in America. In the year 
1967, the U.S. experienced 157 race riots (McLaughlin 2014). It was revealed that 12 of 
the 24 riot-events that transpired during this time (the summer months) were in response 
to police actions (Hooks 1995). Historically, riots typically result with one group of 
people directly attacks another. These riots were different, however, because the 
destruction was confined to Black neighborhoods (such as Watts, Newark, and Detroit). 
 President Lyndon B. Johnson responded to the outburst by establishing the Kerner 
Commission. The Kerner Commission was set-up to investigate the exact causes of the 
unrest. The Kerner Report, which was produced by an 11-person National Advisory 
Commission on Civil Disorders in 1967, focused on the riots taking place in U.S. urban 
centers, and claimed that urban societies in the U.S. are evolving into two separate 
entities, segregated by race and intrinsically unequal.52 The report states, “The abrasive 
relationship between the police and the minority communities has been a major—and 
explosive source of grievance, tension, and disorder” (1967). The members of this 
commission asserted that the evolving discrimination must halt in order to avoid a 
“system of Apartheid” in the country’s major cities. It stated, "What White Americans 
have never fully understood -- but what the Negro can never forget -- is that...White 
institutions created [the ghetto], White institutions maintain it, and White society 
condones it" (The Kerner Report 1967, 1). The report ultimately claimed that societal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 The Kerner Commission membership included Republican Mayor John Lindsay of 
New York City as vice chairman; the U.S. Senate’s only Black, Republican Edward 
Brooke of Massachusetts; United Steel Workers of America president I.W. Abel; Atlanta 
police chief Herbert Jenkins; Charles B. Thornton, chief executive officer of Litton 
Industries Inc.; NAACP executive director Roy Wilkins; Sen. Fred Harris, (D-Okla.); 
U.S. Reps. James C. Corman (D-Calif.) and William M. McCulloch (R-Ohio); and 
Katherine Graham Peden, Kentucky`s commissioner of commerce. 
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inequalities such as police brutality are a result of both White racism and condemned 
Black extremists (Schlickman 1992). Specifically (but in fairly abstract terms), the 
Commission recommended implementing programs to close the gap between “promise 
and performance,” and to change the system of frustration and failure that is hindering 
Black American society. These programs included, creating 2,000,000 jobs over the 
following 3 years; increasing job training and reimbursing private employers for such 
training; aiding public schools who are attempting to desegregate; improving welfare, and 
expanding public housing. Most of the recommendations are followed by specific 
mandates already in place to help bring the recommendations to fruition, or particular 
goals are supplemented by cost-breakdowns. The report clearly focused on addressing the 
underlying structural issues that are made visible through overt racist actions such as 
police brutality. The recommendations span from incremental to non-incremental and 
from symbolic to serious. 
U.S. Civil Rights Commission 
 More than a decade later, the U.S. Civil Rights Commission began to research 
indications of racial biases in the U.S. by specifically examining New York City’s Police 
Department. It focused on and attempted to establish a system of standards for police 
conduct. The original report was produced by the U.S. Civil Rights Commission in 1981, 
and was called Who Is Guarding the Guardians, and in 2000 the problems were 
elucidated again in Revisiting Who is Guarding the Guardians. The 2000 report added 
more contemporary suggestions and examples, but maintained the same foundational 
understanding of police brutality and the complications therein as the 1981 report. It has 
proven incredibly difficult to track rates or incidents of police brutality in order to 
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determine why, a decade after the Kerner Commission, the U.S. Civil Rights Commission 
also undertook to understand police brutality, which was a primary responsibility of the 
Kerner Commission a decade prior. And then again another two decades after the first 
Civil Rights Commission, a second Commission was set up in 2000. 
 In The Who Is Guarding the Guardians? (1981) report, the Commission 
emphasized the lack of available redress for victims of police misconduct and the ways in 
which state and federal law inhibit the effectiveness of using civil lawsuits. It should be 
noted, however, that the Civil Rights Commission was also very complementary of the 
hard work that many police officers execute for the greater good of society. Police should 
be recognized for their often selfless service, and the significant role they play in 
reducing crime, which also is a critical problem for many poor and minority communities 
who deserve to be protected. However, it must also be stressed that police misconduct (by 
some officers) is a serious issue and, “[officers’] crime reduction achievements often 
have come at a significant cost to the vulnerable communities in the greatest need of 
police protection” (“Who Is Guarding the Guardians?” 2000). The commission makes a 
number of recommendations to improve the efficiency and honesty of police units across 
the nation. They suggest heightening internal regulation of law enforcement agencies as 
well as improving external controls. Specifically, however the recommendations appear 
to be largely incremental and somewhat symbolic. For example, the commission 
recommended that police officers continue to be trained in using deadly weapons, but 
there can be varying “interpretations as to what constitutes legitimate use”(“Who Is 
Guarding the Guardians?” 2000). It also suggests that national, state, and local 
governments should “conduct further analysis to determine whether a uniform policy can 
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be constructed for their respective internal departments,” but does not give more specific 
recommendations for this (“Who Is Guarding the Guardians?” 2000). 
 The Commission also recommends that officials on the local level make a 
commitment to developing a greater system of oversight, and should cooperate with 
federal monitors. “State prosecution of police misconduct cases is not effective primarily 
because district or county attorneys rely heavily upon the support and cooperation of 
police departments.” Thus, the Commission suggests that particular people are given the 
sole responsibility to monitor police misconduct issues within individual departments and 
that civilian review boards are granted more power to investigate incidents of abuse.53 
 Human Rights Watch investigated and reported on the effectiveness of the Who is 
Guarding the Guardians? Commission and the laws that have been instated since its 
publishing. They noted, “that one major barrier to federal prosecution of police officers 
who commit human rights violations is the ‘specific intent’ standard: prosecutors must 
prove that an officer specifically intended to deprive an individual of a constitutional 
right in order to win brutality cases” (“Special Commissions and their Aftermath”). 
However, neither Congress nor the Executive Branch has pursued a revision to this 
statute, which is presently almost impossible to prosecute under. 
 Redress and prosecution for police brutality is clearly shuffled between local 
police departments, local governments, state governments, and the federal government. 
Arguably change must come at every level in order to actively affect the system. Despite 
the federal attempts to bring these issues to light, the police departments themselves must 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 This may be problematic because of the ethos of loyalty between police officers in 
departments across the U.S. It is rare for police to be willing to “out” their fellow 
officers. 
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also be willing to alter their behavior and penalize abusive actions. Hubert Williams, the 
president of the Police Foundation, a Washington, D.C. based research group, stated, 
"Most police chiefs are honest and have integrity, but they fail due to an ignorance of 
what is occurring in their own departments.” Williams noted a "disconnect between 
policies and practices" within police departments"(U.S. Department of Justice 1997). 
Within the issue of brutality lies corruption, ignorance, and loyalties to comrades in arms. 
Since the publication of Who Is Guarding the Guardians (and Revisiting Who Is 
Guarding the Guardians) the United States Civil Rights Commission has produced more 
than 20 reports on how to address police misconduct. 
 LAW	  42	  U.S.C.	  §	  1983	  &DIFFICULTY	  OF	  REMEDYING	  POLICE	  MISCONDUCT	  	  
 Most issues with police conduct are filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but often times 
claims made under this mandate are not met with answers or changes in policing 
behavior. Section 1983 (which 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is commonly referred to as) allows 
individuals to sue state actors (including police officers) who are “acting under color of 
law” and in violation of the individual’s constitutional rights. The Supreme Court has 
defined “color of law” as the "[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and 
made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law" 
(Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922 1982). Notably, the officer must be on 
duty to fall under this category. The most common claims made under this statute are 
against excessive force (brought under the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of 
unreasonable seizures) as well as false arrests and unreasonable searches. 
 Civil and criminal prosecutions are problematic because police relations with the 
judiciary can sometimes hamper the service of justice. There are also be structural 
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barriers that hinder local authorities ability to remedy Civil Rights violations, and 
oftentimes the victims of police misconduct are “felons, criminal suspects, or other 
marginalized members of society [who] lack credibility before a jury,” and thus face 
additional obstacles. Furthermore, usually the only witness to the brutality is another 
officer, who will often take a “Code of Silence,” which disallows them to speak out about 
other officer’s misconduct.54 Also, Kim (2002) claims “prosecutors are hesitant to bring 
charges against those they depend” on, such as police officers (770).  
Addition to 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Section 14141 
 In 1994, Congress added § 14141 onto 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which was the first 
mechanism to allow the federal government to directly address problems within local law 
enforcement agencies. In particular, under this mandate the Attorney General is given the 
authority to conduct investigations and file civil litigation with regard to local police 
misbehavior. The Attorney General delegated this authority to the Special Litigation 
Section of the Civil Rights Division of the United States Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”).55  
Title 42 U.S.C. § 14141 authorizes the United States Department 
of Justice ("DOJ") to seek injunctive relief against local law 
enforcement agencies to eliminate a pattern or practice of 
unconstitutional conduct by these agencies. Rather than initiate 
lawsuits to reform these agencies, DOJ's current strategy is to 
negotiate reforms using a process that involves only DOJ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 It has been found that the code of silence is not a legally bound code, but a network of 
understanding that persists throughout many police departments. See Westmarland, 
Louise. 2005. “Police Ethics and Integrity: Breaking the Blue Code of Silence.” Policing 
and Society 15(2): 145–65. 
55 This section of the DOJ “investigates allegations of patterns or practices of 
constitutional violations in order to determine whether enforcement under § 14141 is 
justified” (Simmons 2008 493).  
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representatives, municipality officials, and police management 
officials (Simmons 2008 489).  
 
Unfortunately, the primary stakeholders (the community members and rank-and-file 
police officers) are not involved in this process of investigation and litigation as it is 
currently outlined. Simmons (2008) argues, “ultimately exclusion of these stakeholders 
undermines the legitimacy of the reforms, thereby threatening the implementation and 
permanence of the reforms” (489-490). To address this drawback, he suggests that the 
DOJ formally adopt the paradigm of regulatory negotiation to incite more cooperation 
“among those implementing the reforms.” This could also lead to “the creation of 
innovative solutions to address police misconduct that are specifically tailored to the 
respective community” (490). This recommendation has yet to be adopted, but §14141 
has certainly experienced some success in its implementation, but arguably not enough to 
affect the whole system of “pattern or practice of unconstitutional conduct” (Title 42 
U.S.C. § 14141). 
Racial policing & Rodney King as a precipitating event 
 Laws and policies can only be as effective as their subscribers’ actions (or 
implementations).  Racist policing is a product of a racist society, but in order to shift 
society away from racism (and consequently affect policing) we need to start by 
addressing the racial biases that are inherent to American society. “While the police did 
not invent racial divisions or racism in America, they play an integral part in perpetuating 
the chasm between Black and White life” (NAACP 1995 13). The NAACP describes the 
cycle of racism and police brutality as a dehumanizing process, “the forces of racism and 
police militarism combine to dehumanize African American citizens; this, in turn, leads 
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to a pattern of using excessive force against Blacks and to beatings like that of Rodney 
King” (NAACP 1995 16). 
  I argue that incidents like Rodney King’s often lead to a heightened sense of 
grievance amongst the effected community. This is particularly relevant to events that 
attract the media’s attention—media attention often elicits grandiose responses from its 
audience, both in numbers (reach) and emotional reactions. As such the media can be 
used to dramatically increase the number of witnesses made privy to an event. Collective 
frustration with the system (which may result from observing injustice) will lead to more 
social movement actions, which should ultimately incite a response from political elites. 
This response may or may not lead to policy changes and further political actions. In 
Rodney King’s case, once the incident transpired and footage was released, collective 
frustration began to skyrocket throughout the Black community and amongst its allies. 
The offending officers were then put on trial, but subsequently acquitted. Massive riots 
broke out in Los Angeles in response to the acquittal. The US Justice Department 
followed up with an investigation, which led to the Justice Department Federal Grand 
Jury’s re-indictment of the four (previously acquitted) police officers on civil rights 
violations (NAACP 1995). In April 1993, two years after the original incident took place, 
and one year after the acquittal on state criminal charges, the federal jury convicted 
Sergeant Koon and officer Powell on civil rights violations and acquitted the remaining 
two officers. In the next section I will discuss the Rodney King case in greater detail, 
with particular attention paid to the incident itself; the officer’s acquittal; the LA riots, 
and their political and legal responses; the legislative changes that followed the incident, 
and the elite’s that were involved throughout the process. 
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THE	  RODNEY	  KING	  CASE	  	  
 The video of Rodney King that went internationally viral depicted,  
a large Black man down on hands and knees, struggling on the 
ground, twice impaled with wires from an electronic TASER gun, 
rising and falling while being repeatedly beaten, blow after blow 
after blow—dozens of blows, fifty-six in all, about the head, neck, 
back, kidneys, ankles, legs, feet—by two police officers wielding 
their 2-foot Black metal truncheons like baseball bats. Also visible 
was a third officer, who was stomping King, and about ten police 
officers watching the beating along with a number of Holliday’s 
(the man with the camera) neighbors (Skolnick and Fyfe 1993 2).  
 
The Christopher Commission found that “while Rodney King was lying on the ground, 
Sergeant Koon of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) twice fired a TASER 
electric stun gun at him…three uniformed LAPD officers then clubbed King fifty-six 
times with their batons and kicked him six times in the head and body” (Davis 1994 275). 
The LAPD, at this time, made claims that it was severely understaffed, yet there were in 
total 23 police officers present at the scene.  
 Rodney King’s brother, Paul King, and George Holliday both attempted to file 
complaints of police abuse to the LAPD. Holliday offered the video as proof of the 
mistreatment, but neither man received any sort of respect for their concern. So instead 
Holliday called KTLA Los Angeles and the TV station agreed to broadcast the video 
(Davis 1994). Soon after, CNN got a hold of it and looped it endlessly for the entire 
world to see. “Like films of the police dogs in Selma or the clubs and tear gas of the 1968 
Chicago Democratic Convention, the dramatic videotape gave new credibility to 
allegations of a sort that many people—including police officers—formally dismissed as 
unbelievable” (Skolnick and Fyfe 1993 3). The video simply exposed the LAPD’s 
misconduct that has been steadily increasing over the past many years. From 1987-1990 
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there were 4,400 misconduct complaints filed against the Los Angeles police department 
(which only takes into account the cases that were actually filed) (Skolnick and Fyfe 
1993).56 “In 1989 Los Angeles paid out $9.1 million to settle lawsuits alleging police 
misconduct. In 1990 that figure had risen to $11.3 million for suits alleging excessive 
force, wrongful deaths, false arrests, negligence, misconduct, and civil rights violation” 
(Skolnick and Fyfe 1993 3). Data capture remains an issue with incidents of police 
brutality, but “a Gannett News Service study of one hundred police brutality lawsuits 
nationwide found “that taxpayers are punished more than the officers responsible for the 
violence” (Davis 1994 274).57  
 ACQUITTING	  OF	  OFFICERS	  AND	  THE	  LA	  RIOTS	  
 The Rodney King case became an even greater sensation because most people 
believed that without question the officers would be tried and jailed—that the proof was 
so overwhelming no further questions needed to be asked; the videotape explained it all. 
Yet still, on April 29, 1992, the 12-person jury, including 10 Whites, 2 nonwhites, but no 
Blacks issued a verdict of not guilty on all accounts except for one assault charge against 
Powell, even then, all of the officers were eventually acquitted in the state court. 
Following this announcement (what is now known as) the Los Angeles riots erupted. 
Riots in reaction to the first verdict 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 At this time, Black people only made up 13% of Los Angeles’ population, yet filed 
41% of the complaints (Skolnik and Fyfe 1993). 
57 “The 100 cases, involving police departments that lost lawsuits and had to pay victims 
at least $100,000, cost the nation’s taxpayers nearly $92 million. But of 105 officers 
involved, only five were fired—and 19 were promoted” (Davis 1994 274). 
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 Researchers focused on rioting patterns tend to find that riots and repression share 
a positive correlation (Perez et al. 2003 154).58 “Specifically, many have recognized that 
police contribute to many of the racial riots in the United States (National Advisory 
Commission, 1968; Useem, 1997), but this relationship is not well specified and further 
investigation is necessary to uncover what kinds of police behavior most often results in a 
riotous response and what social contexts are most likely to foster this reaction” (Perez et. 
al. 2003 154). In a discussion on the police-minority relations that led to the misconduct 
and subsequent uproar in Los Angeles, the NAACP (1995) stated “it is impossible to 
understand the police conduct of the Rodney King beating—or the daily incidents of 
police ‘use of force’—without understanding the history of police-minority relations. 
Those who claim that the verdict in the ‘first Rodney King case’ can be explained as one 
that was not racist, but ‘pro-police’ should next try to separate land from sea” (10). 
 Many riot-focused scholars argue that coercive and militant police behavior is 
more likely to lead to rioting, but that this style of policing will also be more efficient in 
constraining riots that have already broken out. Perez et. al. (2003), on the other hand, 
find that the more militant a police force is, the less likely it is to aptly handle riots that 
have erupted.59 They argue that the “counterproductive inflammatory effect seems most 
likely to occur, namely (a) when repression is excessive and/or racially selective, (b) 
when police have poor training in crowd control, and (c) when police-community 
relations are strained or lacking in formal connections and channels for feedback” (155). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Academics who focus on riots more frequently study the role of repression in 
terminating riots, but “it has [also] been generally recognized that different types of 
repression under certain conditions can incite protest” (Perez et al. 2003 154). 
59 They believe that more militant police forces will lead to more rioting as well.  
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The LA riots began in reaction to the officer’s acquittal, after it was already made clear 
that the officers acted in an excessively repressive manner and had strained relations with 
the community. 
 The LAPD was uncharacteristically slow to respond to the uproar, and the riots 
tallied up over $1 billion dollars in damages. That day, California Governor Pete Wilson 
had to call in the National Guard and a curfew was subsequently instituted. Murder, 
arson, looting, and injury filled the Los Angeles streets (NAACP 1995). “On May 1, 
President George Bush ordered military troops and riot trained federal officers to Los 
Angeles and by the end of the next day the city was under control” on this day, Rodney 
King also made an emotional plea for calm (History.com n.d.). He said, "People, I just 
want to say, can we all get along? Can we get along? Can we stop making it horrible 
(CNN Library n.d.). 55 people were left dead, 2,000 injured, 7,000 arrested, and 4,000 
buildings burned; over 1,100 Marines, 600 Army soldiers, and 6,500 National Guard 
troops patrol the streets of Los Angeles into early May (Pamer 2012). 
 POLITICAL	  RESPONSE	  	  
Investigations 
 Previous to Rodney King’s experience, numerous acts of police brutality had 
transpired, but it was not until the videotape of Rodney King was released that the public 
writ-large was made privy to the scale of such atrocities (or even believed that such 
instances really did transpire). Before the Rodney King case legal action was rarely taken 
against abusive officers. It was not until the public began speaking out about their 
discontent that legal repercussions began to emerge. Without the heavy media attention 
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around the Rodney King incident, a collective identity against police brutality would 
likely not have been as saliently produced, and thus this level of collective action against 
racially biased police conduct would likely would not have been reached. Academics 
widely accept the notion that if the incident had not been videotaped, there would not 
have been any uproar and consequently legal action would not have been taken (Davis 
1993; NAACP 1995; Simmons 2008; Skolnick and Fyfe 1993). 
 In response to the severe civilian uproar, political elites called for numerous 
investigations. There were three major investigations of police misconduct in the city of 
Los Angles, and the Department of Justice and the U.S. Congress of complaints also put 
forth a national investigation (NAACP 1995). Warren Christopher, a state department 
official said that without the videotape, the investigation would likely not have transpired 
seeing as the police department previously silenced Paul King’s effort to file a report 
(Skolnick and Fyfe 1993). The stories recounted throughout the investigation were 
controversial and contradictory.  
 Amongst the present officers, at least two have spoken out against the beating 
claiming, “King did not kick or punch the officers…He was merely trying to get away,” 
the paramedics on the scene, too, agreed that “King was coherent and not acting 
violently” (Skolnick and Fyfe 1993 7). Within the police department, it is common for 
officers to stand by their fellow officers, but when a chief is privy to wrongdoings 
committed by his or her officers, it is also common to make an example out of the 
wrongdoer—to demonstrate that his or her abusive behavior is not permissible (Skolnick 
and Fyfe 1993). The 23 officers who watched and did nothing to stop the abuse from 
occurring endured no legal backlash for their morally impermissible actions, but most of 
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their individual police departments personally reprimanded the officers individually 
(before and after the riots) (Skolnick and Fyfe 1993).  
 On March 20 and April 17, 1991, the United States House of Representatives 
Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, held 
hearings on the issue of police brutality. It found that the LAPD (along with other police 
departments) regularly used excessive force against African Americans (NAACP 1995 
6). On August 4, 1992, a federal grand jury indicted Koon, Powell, Wind, and Briseno on 
the basis that they had violated Rodney King’s civil rights, and the trial began in the 
following February. In early August, U.S. District Court Judge John Davies sentenced 
both Koon and Powell to 30 months in prison for violating King’s civil rights and the 
other two officers were once again acquitted (NAACP 1995) 
 Davis (1994) suggests, “only the realistic threat of criminal prosecution will 
actually deter police violence. Unfortunately, the close working relationship between the 
police and prosecutors continues to make it extremely unlikely that many prosecutors will 
ever mount a credible challenge to systemic police brutality” (271-272). The Christopher 
report claims that police brutality has been decriminalized over the years.  
Decriminalization has occurred for many reasons including the 
influential role of the police in an organized society, the 
desensitization of the public and the judicial system to the realities 
of police criminal behavior, the symbiotic relationship of 
prosecutors and the police, the growth of the legal doctrine of 
prosecutorial discretion and the corresponding decline of private 
prosecutions, and the waning independence of the grand jury 
(Davis 1994 275). 
 
 	  
121 
LEGISLATIVE	  RESPONSE	  
 However, the public’s clear objection to the outcome of the Rodney King case 
actually led to the passing of new legislation against police violence. A survey conducted 
by the Washington Post (1992) following the King Verdict found that 64 per cent of 
Whites and 92 percent of Blacks thought that “the police officers in the Rodney King 
case should have been found guilty of a crime,” and only 5 percent of Whites and 1 
percent of Blacks disagreed (the rest were unsure). 
The Rodney King incident and ensuing national outcry, 
particularly by minorities compelled congressional action. 
Subsequent to the Rodney King incident, the Police Accountability 
Act was incorporated into the Omnibus Crime Bill as Title XII. 
Title XII authorized the Attorney General to sue for injunctive 
relief, but the Crime Bill never reached President Bush Senior due 
to a filibuster by Senate Republicans and the threat of veto. The 
103rd Congress reconsidered the issue and drafted the Violent 
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1993, which included 
a provision giving the Attorney General authorization to pursue 
injunctive relief for patterns of police misconduct. The final 
enacted version included this provision, codified at 42 U.S.C. 
Section 14141” is often referenced as the “Police Accountability 
Act” (Kim 2002 772). 
 
As previously addressed, this law, which was codified in 1994, deals with rectifying the 
issue of police brutality on the federal level. “In considering the need for legislation that 
confers standing to pursue injunctive relief on the Attorney General, the House 
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights…specifically referred to the Rodney 
King incident and to alleged misconduct”(Kim 2002 772). In these hearings, Fyfe, 
advocated for the bill by claiming that there are currently no profound actions currently 
taken against police who are acting unjustly, and such action is etched in “a culture in 
which officers who choose to be brutal and abusive are left to do so without fear or 
interference” (Kim 2002 772). 
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 Unfortunately, as Simmons (2008) describes, the negotiation process mandated in 
this law does not follow ideal democratic processes whereby effected actors have a say in 
new policy production. The negotiations have far-reaching implications for the effected 
community members and the police officers, yet neither are involved in the process by 
which these negotiations are reached, which “undermines the legitimacy of DOJ’s reform 
efforts, thereby threatening the successful implementation and performance of the 
reforms” (Simmons 2008 494). 
 Previous to this mandate, police abuse was dealt with on the individual level, 
punishing the officer and compensating the victim.60 While I do not believe that all police 
officers should be punished for the exceptional actions of a few, I do believe that the 
system in which these police officers are willing to execute violence, the lack of 
reproach, as well as the lack of redress for the victims needs to be dealt with on a 
systemic level. “The culture of police violence is tightly woven into the institutional 
fabric of the police organization itself” (Simmons 2008 497).61 The way § 14141 is 
currently written addresses the issues of police brutality on a more systemic level than 
before, but it still fails to provide redress for the victims of said abuse. Unfortunately, the 
effectiveness of section 14141 has largely been untested given the relatively few reports 
made under this statute.62 63 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Oftentimes the officer does not pay out for the compensation personally, thus feeling 
little to no repercussion for his or her actions. 
61 “See Marshall Miller, Note, Police Brutality, 17 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev, 149, 153 (1998). 
62 There has not been any study of § 14141's effectiveness across the aggregate 
jurisdictions subject to federal oversight under § 14141. However, “through field 
observations, interviews with key officials, focus groups, and surveys, the Vera Institute 
of Justice found that in the year following the termination of the consent decree, the 
Pittsburgh Police Bureau was able to sustain many of the reforms it accomplished under 
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ACTORS	  INVOLVED	  AND	  PROCESS	  OF	  PASSING	  THE	  LEGISLATION	  
 Initially, a subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee held hearings on 
police officers’ excessive use of force and found that police misconduct was endemic. 
However, until Section 14141 the federal government and the Department of Justice 
“ha[d] no authority to sue the police department itself to correct the underlying problem” 
(Simmons 2008 507).“No matter how reprehensible their action, or their inaction, no 
person can be charged with a crime unless they have violated a statute” (Ira Reiner Los 
Angeles District Attorney via Skolnick and Fyfe 1993 9). In order to affect the system 
that fails to properly deal with (and that allows the execution of) abusive acts, we must 
encourage the police departments themselves to make changes. Previous statutes only 
permit action against individual police officers.64 This mandate legislation, in particular, 
attempts to address just that. Section 14141 was drafted in response to the Rodney King 
incident following the Christopher Commission’s finding that the LAPD was 
systematically problematic.65 It (like many other police departments across America) had 
failed to sufficiently discipline police officers for their brutal conduct and to investigate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the decree.” See Robert C. Davis, Christopher Ortiz & Nicole J. Henderson, Can Federal 
Intervention Bring Lasting Improvement in Local Policing: The Pittsburg Consent Decree 
41 (2005). 
63 For more information see Simmons, Kami Chavis. 2008. The Politics of Policing: 
Ensuring Stakeholder Collaboration in the Federal Reform of Local Law-Enforcement 
Agencies. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. SSRN Scholarly Paper. 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1088140 (January 25, 2015). 
64 In United States v. City of Philadelphia, “the court held that the federal government 
does not have implied statutory or constitutional authority to sue a local government or its 
officials to enjoin violations of citizens’ constitutional rights by police officers” (1980). 
65 Notably, Section 14141 has no separate legislative history, but a predecessor bill does 
exist called the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1991, Title XII, Police Accountability Act 
also directly addressed the Rodney King case.  
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complaints of said conduct (as evidence in the King case; both Paul King and George 
Holliday’s complaints were met with disrespect and disregard).  
 Previously, the federal government and the Department of Justice in particular 
played no role in local police accountability. Section 14141 increases the DOJ’s authority 
and permits their intervention in local police conduct issues (much like how the DOJ is 
permitted to take action in other spheres like voting, housing, public accommodations, 
and access to public facilities) (Livingston 1999 818). The primary effort of this bill was 
to allow the Attorney General to investigate wrongdoings in order to “eliminate the 
pattern or practice” of such issues (42 U.S.C. § 14141). Unfortunately, “despite the high 
profile nature of the reform process generated by §14141 settlements, and its importance 
to legal, public administration, and criminal justice scholarship, there has been very little 
published research on the subject to date” (Chanin 2009 8).66 My intention, however, is 
not to dissect the interworking of the policy itself, but rather to use this policy as an 
illustration of political elite’s response to the riots following the Rodney King incident. I 
am also interested in determining if this policy alters the current system enough to change 
the hierarchy or even aspects therein. The public’s reaction (either their acceptance of or 
backlash) to this legislation will help me to determine whether or not legislative 
responses such as this may ultimately lead to some level of change (positively or 
negatively) in the racial hierarchies that plague American society. This case is especially 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 “What does exist includes an ongoing debate among academic lawyers regarding the 
merits of structural reform litigation generally…with much of the work focused on the 
ability of federal judges to manage successfully the reform of school districts, public 
prison systems, and mental facilities. There are several public administration studies that 
examine institutional reform litigation generally, but few, if any works that focus on 
§14141” (Chanin 2009 8). 
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relevant because I intend to determine if social movements, based on (1) their ability to 
effect legislation and (2) policy elite’s response to the movement’s outcries are capable at 
affecting race relations (which is related to my dependent variable, level of change in the 
racial hierarchy). 
 In 1999, the Special Litigation Section of the Justice Department’s Civil Rights 
Division brought forth two civil suits pursuant to Section 14141. These suits resulted in 
consent decrees with the police departments of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania and 
Steubenville, Ohio as well as nine other police agencies across the U.S. (Livingston 
1999).67 These two consent decrees serve as the groundwork for how other departments 
“seeking to avoid federal intervention would be well-advised to undertake changes in 
their operations” (Steve Rosenbaum, Chief of Special Litigation, Civil Rights Div., US 
Department of Justice 1998 via Livingston 1999 820). Neither of these departments 
actually litigated, but instead the DOJ investigations resulted in agreements with their 
municipalities and their police departments.68 69 The decrees have provisions for better 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 “The Department, moreover, is reported to be investigating or monitoring at least nine 
other police agencies—in Los Angeles, California; Orange County, Florida; New 
Orleans, Louisiana; East Point, Michigan; Buffalo, New York; New York, New York; 
Washington, D.C.; Charleston, West Virginia; and Columbus, Ohio—in order to decide 
‘whether to seek judicial orders on respect for governing law” (Livingston 1999 818).  
68 The Pittsburgh consent decree was approved by the District Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania in April 1997, one year after the Justice Department 
investigation began, while the Steubenville decree was approved by the Southern District 
of Ohio in September, 1997 
69 The Steubenville complaint was filed against the City of Steubenville, Steubenville 
Police Department, Steubenville City manager, in his capacity as Director of Public 
Safety, and Steubenville Civil Service Commission and signed by Sharon J. Zealey 
(United States Attorney Southern District of Ohio), Isabelle Katz Pinzler (acting 
assistance Attorney General, Civil Rights Division), Steven Rosenbaum (Chief), and 
Margo Schlanger (Trial Attorneys). 
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training, improved investigation of referrals and complaints, enhanced early warning 
systems, and tracking systems for repeated offenses by individual officers. 
 The backlash that this been received has, primarily been from those who have 
expressed concern in having the federal government interfere in local and state level 
policing. They argue that federal civil rights attorneys may not be able to understand the 
nuance of the situations in which they intervene. However, for the countless frustrated 
citizens who understand that changes in policing behavior must be brought about by the 
national government and maintained on the department level, (in promotion of systemic 
changes) the mandate has been accepted as effective means for creating administrative 
reforms and the mechanisms within departments that combat police brutality (Livingston 
1999 822).  
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VI.	  SOUTH	  AFRICA	  CASE	  ON	  SERVICE	  DELIVERY	  PROTESTS	  
 In this section I intend to provide another data set. This data set is comprised of 
historical narrative that makes reference to each of the themes in my theory as well as any 
important contextual information for understanding the nuances within my South African 
case study. It will be the source for which I analyze and test my theory in the next portion 
of this paper. In this immediate subsection, I will discuss the issue of poor service 
delivery in post-Apartheid South Africa in order to explain this issue’s broad-based 
relevance to my theory and to society (note it is constitutionally mandated that the state 
provides basic services such as water, sanitation, electricity, and other basic needs. I have 
chosen to specifically study service delivery as a reference for how South African society 
remains racially divided; I argue that the persistence of poor service delivery to informal 
townships in South Africa directly illustrates the country’s inability to reach a post-racial 
society.  
 In this chapter, I will first discuss service delivery writ-large, and then I will 
provide background on the “Toilet Wars” as a particularly galvanizing movement against 
this issue. This exposition of the “Toilet Wars” will serve as the primary case background 
from which I assess my theory. The immediate subsection on basic service delivery, 
however, necessarily demonstrates why my theory and hypotheses are relevant to today 
by describing service delivery through the lens of hierarchy, and by providing important 
historical and contemporary context for my case study. 
 Service delivery protests largely erupt out of grievances regarding class divisions 
and unequal distribution of economic power. However, class and race remain intimately 
intertwined in South Africa; each individual obstacle to opportunity (class and race) must 
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be thought of independently as well as conjointly in order to develop a more nuanced and 
informed understanding of South African society. Interestingly, in 2013 Kim Wale 
conducted a South African Reconciliation Barometer Survey and found that almost 30% 
of people surveyed pointed to the gap between the rich and poor as the most prevailing 
societal division since Apartheid. In this survey, she also found that most people perceive 
race relations to have greatly improved throughout the country, and class relations to 
continue to worsen.  
 Based on these results, Wale (2013) more closely examined the intersection 
between race and class. She found that within the “lowest four [of ten] [Living Standard 
Measure] (LSM) categories there is a much higher percentage of Black South Africans 
(relative to the total Black South African population) than any other race group in the 
most economically excluded categories—35.4% of Black South Africans are in the 
lowest four LSM categories, 48.2% are in the middle categories and 16.3% are in the 
highest four categories” (15). Furthermore, “we see the opposite trend for White and 
Indian/ Asian South Africans as they are entirely absent from the lower LSM categories 
and the majority of individuals within these race groups are found in the higher LSM 
groups,” this data is far more extreme than that which we see in the United States (Wales 
2013 15) (See graph).70 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 “For White South Africans, 0% are in the lowest four LSM groups (in fact there are no 
White South Africans in our sample in the first five LSM categories), 5% are in the 
middle categories, and 95% are in the top four categories (with 73.3% of White South 
Africans in the highest 2 LSM categories 9 and 10). Within Indian/Asian South Africans, 
0% are in the lowest LSM categories, 15.5% are in the middle LSM categories and 84.3% 
in the highest LSM categories. For coloured South Africans, the majority are found in the 
middle LSM groups with 3.6% in the lowest four LSM categories, 38.7% are in the 
middle categories and 57.8% are in the highest four LSM categories” (Wales 2013 15).  
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Figure 2: Living Standard Measure by race in South Africa (Wales 2013 15) 	  
 Based on this study, it is clear that class (living standard) and race are still deeply 
connected post-1994, but that the overarching perception amongst South Africans is that 
race relations have improved. The improved social and certainly the improved political 
relations, which have in fact progressed in South Africa, may explain this perception but 
unfortunately there is still clearly a racialized economic system. This economic inequity 
is further impelled by poor service delivery to informal townships (where lower class 
Black citizens tend to live). Since 2004 however, South Africans have been avidly 
protesting this discrepancy of services. 
 UNDERSTANDING	  SERVICE	  DELIVERY	  THROUGH	  AN	  HISTORICAL	  PERSPECTIVE	  
 Service delivery refers to the distribution of the basic resources that citizens 
depend on such as water, electricity, sanitation infrastructure, land, and housing. Unequal 
distribution of such fundamental resources has furthered deepened cleavages throughout 
society. When basic needs are not met, a snowball effect often results: without access to 
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the most basic resources (that are necessary for survival), it becomes increasingly 
difficult to take advantage of the resources that are necessary to fulfill the next level of 
human needs such as, education and employment. Not only are issues with poor service 
delivery reflective of great sociopolitical instability, but they also perpetuate 
sociopolitical injustice. In order to provide better service delivery across the state, the 
government (in the most shrewd way) must move past its racial tendencies (i.e. the most 
significant gaps in service delivery are predominately low-class, Black townships) to an 
impartial democracy. 
 DEFINING	  SERVICE	  DELIVERY	  PROTESTS	  
 Harber (2009 via Nleya 2011) claims that the phrase “service delivery protest” is 
problematic because the protests considered within the length and breadth of time that are 
referred to as “service delivery protests” actually encompass far more resentments than 
those solely pertaining to service delivery. The protestors are calling for better delivery of 
basic services, but after further investigation, it is clear that they also are calling for other 
systemic issues to be assuaged. As such, this section seeks to shed light on the system-
wide matters that motivate what I will continue to refer to as “service delivery protests.” 
To make sense of these matters, I will first discuss various attitudes and perceptions of 
state legitimacy held by South African citizens. Then in order to elucidate constituents’ 
conceptions of their political system I will address the inequality that continues to persist 
throughout the country. After which, I will demonstrate how service delivery is both a 
local-level and national-level government dilemma, which will be informed by the 
subsequent section on local government evolution in South Africa. Then, I will discuss 
other political matters that have significantly impacted service delivery such as related 
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laws and policies and the political system. Each of these topics aim to illustrate the 
primary problems related to service delivery as well as how social movement actions are 
attempts to make clear community grievances regarding service delivery. Service 
delivery certainly provides a useful lens to guide one’s understanding of South Africa’s 
current state of inequity (which is useful for my project), but I am primarily focuses on 
bringing forth an understanding of how the protests against service delivery may serve as 
a mechanism by which social movements can impact a society’s structural hierarchy. In 
order to decipher protest’s role in South Africa, my discussion will continue on topics 
related to citizen’s grievances and State response. 
 STATE	  LEGITIMACY	  
 Perception of state legitimacy universally affects the level and types of protests 
that take place in societies. The perception of state legitimacy in South Africa has also 
greatly impacted the overall political transition from Apartheid to a representative 
democracy. Generally, the State is understood to embody the values of its citizens or at 
least it tries to appear to be an embodiment of its citizen’s values by promoting a 
collective identity (Ndletyana 2015). The State’s ability to achieve this collective identity 
will greatly affect its citizen’s willingness to conform to the laws it sets forth. Many 
Black South African people do not see the state as properly representative of their 
interests (especially their economic interests).71 A survey conducted in 2013 by the South 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 However, the same organization found that perception of economic change is positively 
growing for Blacks, more so than for Whites in South Africa. In a 2013 survey, 36.8% of 
Black people and 26.0% of White people said that they are “in a better financial situation 
than they were one year ago, 33.0% of Black people and 18.8% of White people said they 
perceive to “have a better chance of finding a job than a year ago, and 45.2% of Black 
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African Reconciliation Barometer, shows “a drop in citizens’ confidence in governance 
institutions, especially national government (10.8% decrease since 2012), as well as a 
13% increase in the percentage of citizens who feel that government does not care about 
people like them. While alternative forms of voice and political inclusion such as strikes, 
demonstrations and more violent unrest have been on the rise since 2011, in 2013 we 
witness a slight drop in the percentage of citizens participating in protest” (Wale 2013 
24). This same survey found that Western Cape had the lowest percentage (in 2013) of 
trust in local government, especially for people in the lower LSM categories. 
 A new collective identity, that incorporates its newly enfranchised Black citizens, 
is required for South Africa to fulfill its transition to a democratic state. To achieve this, 
oftentimes, “citizens must actively mobilize the state to attract its attention to their plight, 
” and even then, mere changes in legislation are typically the response, which alone will 
not “yield the intended objectives” of representing this group’s needs in order to 
incorporate them into society (Ndletyana 2015 13). Furthermore, the demands made by a 
group of citizens can be interpreted to grasp how that group of people perceives their 
position within the nation-state and what they apprehend the state to owe them. Also, the 
manner in which demands are made will indicate how a group perceives both their 
standing within the State and their relationship with the State’s elites. 
 In 1994, Apartheid was officially disbanded. However, the police largely 
continued to enforce Apartheid laws, which led government institutions for the most part, 
to be seen as illegitimate (especially in the years immediately following independence). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
people and 28.4% of White people thought that their “economic situation [was] likely to 
improve in the next two years” (Wale 2013 27).  
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“Legitimacy forms the basis of the State. It determines the relationship between the State 
and the citizenry. Where the citizenry considers the State legitimate, they defer to its 
laws, and look upon it to enforce them” (Ndletyana 2015 13). In South Africa, the issues 
surrounding State legitimacy have affected civic participation and the people’s 
willingness to abide by its laws; more importantly (with regard to my case study), this 
perception of illegitimacy has led South Africans to refrain from voting and to engage in 
protests as a more efficient avenue for expressing their grievances (Alexander 2010; 
Wale 2013; Powell 2012; Grobler 2009).72 The service delivery protests, in particular, 
reflect South African’s dissatisfaction with the State’s governing processes and its 
neglect in providing basic services to all. Despite the end of Apartheid leading to some 
(unquestionable) level of success for Blacks in the political sphere, the country’s social 
and economic spheres remain strikingly uneven. 
 INEQUITY	  
 Ndletyana (2015) writes, “Life in new South Africa… continued to mimic life of 
old. South Africa’s Black communities, especially, faced immense social backlogs. Most 
lacked base necessities such as water, housing, and sanitation. Roads were simply dirt 
and turned irritatingly dusty on a windy day. This was the result of years of official 
neglect and lack of revenue” (12). The service delivery protests are highly reflective of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 In particular, there is a movement called No House! No Land! No Vote! that encourages 
citizens to refrain from voting in protest of the government’s failure to recognize poor 
people’s needs throughout South Africa. Abstaining from voting is also uses as a tactic in 
other poor people’s movements throughout the country (Imbokodo 2008) 
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disintegrated population, but the pleas made are primarily with regard to South Africa’s 
basic inequities:73  
It is evident that people living in more rural provinces still receive 
the worst delivery of services, the Fast Facts June 2009 report 
states. The worst-hit provinces were the Eastern Cape, Limpopo 
and Mpumalanga, where the proportion of households with access 
to water was 73%, 83% and 89%. Turning to electricity services, in 
the Eastern Cape only 66% of households used electricity for 
lighting, with a respective 81% and 82% in Limpopo and 
Mpumalanga. Nationally, housing delivery by the government had 
dropped by 8,2% between April 2007 and March 2008, compared 
with the same period the previous year (Grobler 2009).74  
 
Since 2008, more than 2 million people have taken to the streets in protest of these 
circumstances (Ndletyana 2015). The protests are largely born out of dissatisfaction with 
local government actions related to service delivery; either a failure to provide services or 
when they are provided the services are often inadequate or delayed due to inefficiencies 
within the local municipalities. Notably, this issue affects municipalities across the entire 
country, and thus, the central government must address the underlying, systemic 
complications that are leading to poor service delivery, or at least perception of and 
rallies against the current standard of service delivery.  
 Allan and Heese (n.d.) argue that poor communication between local officials and 
the central or state government may also lead to inadequate service delivery and evaded 
accountability. Moreover, many of the communities that face the direst conditions are 
largely informal and lack organized local leadership, much less correspondence with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Based on Piven’s discussion of how protests are structured, later in this section I will 
discuss how protestors are typically revolting against the issues that directly effect them, 
as opposed to making claims that suggest reforming an entire institution or societal 
structure. 
74 In most of the quotes that reference decimals from South African sources the authors 
have used commas in place of decimal points. 
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national government. Boysen (2009 via Alexander 2010) claims that even though service 
delivery protests are based in grassroots actions, the “triggers [are] increasingly national-
level responsibilities, including housing, land and jobs,” and there is typically a slow 
reaction from political elites regarding their constituents’ grievances (29). These issues 
are “undergirded by the legacy of Apartheid” according to Alexander and Pfaffe (2013) 
“in particular, townships are still places of Black residence separated off from most 
formal workplaces and from the suburbs (now racially mixed)” and are thus given 
unequal attention by both the local and central government, compared to the more formal, 
predominately White neighborhoods (5). This physical separateness of Black people and 
White people in South Africa also causes the two groups to not only lack social bonds, 
but also understanding of one another’s circumstances. There is a growing body of 
literature that references “contact hypothesis” as a proposition for improving race 
relations. This notion asserts, “increased contact reduces prejudice, but it might be just as 
reasonable to suppose that less prejudiced individuals are simply more likely to seek out 
contact with people of other races and ethnicities” (Gibson 2005). No matter, the social 
and physical divisions in South Africa are striking, 42 percent of people surveyed by the 
Reconciliation Barometer reported that they “rarely or never talk to people from other 
racial groups, and 55 percent said that they never socialized outside their own group” 
(Gibson 2005). 
Service delivery as both a local and national government dilemma 
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 Apartheid was undoubtedly a politically repressive system, but its force spanned 
far beyond politics; it controlled the very layout of the country.75 Findley and Ogbu 
(2011) write during this time, the Nationalist party “passed miscegenation laws, 
institutionalized legal segregation, formalized racial categories and restrictions on 
movement, and embedded Apartheid physically in the landscape” (2011). Townships 
were reserved for nonWhite laborers and consequently served as a mechanism for 
controlling this population due to their geographic limits. Also, not surprisingly, few 
facilities were properly maintained in these areas, which further illustrates the 
institutionalized discrimination of the time. However, when the ANC replaced the 
Nationalist Party in 1994, such policies that were explicitly racially motivated were 
formally disbanded. But unfortunately the fabric of society still remained somewhat 
racialized; “racial group areas endure in fact, even if not in law” (Powell 2012 11). Just a 
few years ago, Findley and Ogbu (2011) found that 81% of township residents have 
continued to live in townships despite the fact that they are no longer legally bound to. 
They found that some stay out of choice, to remain with their communities, while others 
cannot afford to leave.76  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 In fact, South Africa was geographically segregated since the colonial era: “In the late 
19th and early 20th centuries, the British colonial government resettled racial groups under 
the pretense of responding to disease epidemics in overcrowded neighborhoods” (Findley 
and Ogbu 2011).  
76 “In 2007, according to a report by Johannesburg-based consultancy FutureFact, 55 
percent of Black adults lived in townships, and more than 40 percent of these were 
members of the working class. As White-only areas have opened to other races, the 
biggest post-Apartheid population shift has been the movement of Black middle-class 
residents from townships to formerly all-White suburbs, enabled by the Black middle-
class. And yet, the FutureFact report found that 81 percent of township residents planned 
to continue living there” (Findley and Ogbu 2011).  
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 Mandela’s administration (1994-1999) introduced the first racially integrated 
municipalities each of which answered to a community-level governing body. Mandela’s 
goal was to have individual “municipalities redistribute expenditure to service delivery in 
poor Black communities,” but alas this goal was beyond the local governments’ scope in 
1994. And unfortunately, the goals and promises made by public officials even today 
“continually exceed local delivery capacity and the skill base of the economy.” This leads 
to unfulfilled promises, slow progress, and distrust between the community and 
government officials (Powell 2012 12).77 
 HISTORY	  OF	  LOCAL	  GOVERNMENT	  IN	  SOUTH	  AFRICA	  
 In 1994, Mandela’s plan to disseminate political and governmental power to local 
governing bodies was borne out of an attempt to better address the individual and 
community-level grievances throughout the state. The resolve for the first local-level 
governments was a broad-based developmental mandate. The Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) referenced here was also put forth as an attempt to 
address nation-wide socioeconomic instability and to instill at a newly defined, post-
Apartheid sense of national unity. However, numerous contradictory policies were 
enacted at this time, which ultimately ended up hindering local government 
development.78 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 I will go into greater detail on this issue throughout my paper (including in the sections 
on the electoral system and elite response). 
 78 From 1994-1999, local government development was affected by various constitutional 
negotiations; the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), the Growth 
Employment and Redistribution program (GEAR), the Municipal Demarcation Act (Act 
No. 27 of 1998), and the Municipal Structures Act (Act No. 117 of 1998) for details see 
Powell, Derek. 2012. “Imperfect Transition – Local Government Reform in South Africa 
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 Later, under the Mbeki administration (1999-2008), the Department of Provincial 
and Local Government replaced the Department of Constitutional Development. The 
legislative framework for this new phase “was completed with the passage of the 
Municipal Systems Act (Act No. 32 of 2000) [which dealt with] regulating planning, 
service delivery, performance monitoring and public participation,” the Municipal 
Finance Management Act (Act No. 56 of 2003), and the Municipal Property Rates Act 
(Act No. 6 of 2004). Unfortunately, the initial policies put forth under Mandela’s 
administration became even more profoundly contradictory with these new enactments. 
Again, the legislation’s goals far exceeded the framework and infrastructure available to 
fulfill their intentions (Powell 2012 17).  
 In his second term, Mbeki was able to promote: his program called Project 
Consolidate, the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act (Act No. 13 of 2005), and 
a five-year strategic agenda to improve local governments’ capacity. However, none of 
the aforementioned policies or plans were able to promote an entirely successful and 
efficient agenda for South Africa’s local governments.79  
 In 2009, Jacob Zuma took office (he continues to serve today). “The Zuma 
government’s approach to local government reflected the sense of crisis in the country” 
(Powell 2012 21). Zuma disembarked from many of the aforementioned polices put forth 
by Mbeki in order to address the “distress” in the system. “Indicators of this distress 
included ‘huge service delivery backlogs,’ a breakdown in council communication with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1994-2012.” In SUN Press. http://repository.uwc.ac.za/xmlui/handle/10566/551 
(February 8, 2015). 
 
79 Towards the end of this subsection I will attempt to address why these failures keep 
happening 
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and accountability to citizens, political interference in administration, corruption, fraud, 
bad management, increasing violent service delivery protests, factionalism in parties, and 
depleted municipal capacity” (Powell 2012 21). However, most of these issues are still 
prevalent today, as evidence in my discussion of the continually executed protests. 
 LAWS	  AND	  POLICIES	  RELATED	  TO	  SERVICE	  DELIVERY	  
 Throughout these three administrations, various mandates regarding local 
governments’ responsibilities, with reference to service delivery in particular, were 
instilled both in accordance with and independent of the constitution. The Constitution 
grants the central government authority to intervene when the local government is unable 
to fulfill its citizen’s requests. Such intervention is in terms of Section 139 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, which states: 
When a municipality cannot or does not fulfill an executive 
obligation in terms of the Constitution or legislation, the relevant 
provincial executive may intervene by taking any appropriate steps 
to ensure fulfillment of that obligation. Including- (a) issuing a 
directive to the Municipal Council, describing the extent of the 
failure to fulfill its obligations and stating any steps required to 
meet its obligations; [and] (b) assuming responsibility for the 
relevant obligation in that municipality to the extent necessary [to] 
maintain essential national standards or meet established minimum 
standards for the rendering of a service; (ii) [to] prevent that 
Municipal Council from taking unreasonable action that is 
prejudicial to the interests of another municipality or to the 
province as a whole; or (iii) [to] maintain economic unities 
dissolving the Municipal Council and appointing an administrator 
until a newly elected Municipal Council has been declared elected. 
If exceptional circumstances warrant such a step.  
  
Also, in 2000, the Municipal Systems Act was enacted “to define how municipalities 
should provide services to local citizens”.  This Act in particular has a provision whereby 
if municipalities are unable to provide a certain service, they should enter into a service-
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delivery agreement contract “with external agencies to provide the service on their 
behalf” (Mananga 2012 5). Clearly, these provisions along with others, are in place to 
help local governments attend to the needs of their citizens and to provide them with their 
constitutionally-granted services. But unfortunately, as previously mentioned by 
Ndletyana (2015), legislation alone does not always yield its intended results. 
 Protests against poor service delivery often erupt when there are insufficient 
channels available for community members to voice their concerns (a precursor for all 
types of protest). However, there are Acts in place to address this issue in particular, as 
well. The Local Government: Municipal Systems, Act 32 of 2000 “states that 
communities have the mandate to participate in any public consultation and decision-
making processes in the local sphere; for example, ward committees, budget 
consultations, ward meetings, and Integrated Development Planning (IDP) forums” 
(Mananga 2012 4). And, according to Local Government: Structures, Act 117 of 1998, 
section 73(2), “public participation is an essential factor for effecting and enhancing 
accountable governance driven by ward committees” (Mananga 2012 5). With proper 
implementation of these two mandates, improved institutional channels for citizen 
participation could potentially lead to fewer protests and greater accountability to the 
public on behalf of the politicians. 
 ELECTORAL	  SYSTEM	  
 The implementation of these laws and policies as well as how leaders respond to 
social movements will also be effected by timing and stability in the electoral system. 
The timing of the protests and whomever is currently in office will not only affect the 
events leading up to social movements, but also the outcome of the social movements. 
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The incumbent administration itself greatly impacts how basic services are delivered and 
how the public perceives various issues related to service delivery. For example, “many 
issues that underpinned the ascendency of Jacob Zuma also fueled the present action, 
including a sense of injustice arising from the realities of persistent inequality” that has 
become especially pervasive since Zuma took office.  
 Service delivery protests skyrocketed in 2009, the year the President Jacob Zuma 
first assumed office. “Municipal IQ reported that 105 ‘major service delivery protests’ 
had taken place during the 2009 year, a figure that was roughly equivalent to the total for 
the previous five years combined (106 protests)” (Jain 2010). Also notable is jump in 
service delivery protests in 2009, particularly during the first 7 months of Zuma’s 
administration, which exceeded the number executed in the final three year’s of Mbeki’s 
administration. It is unclear whether this is due to increasing service delivery problems or 
rising expectations from Zuma’s promises, or a combination of the two. 
 On the other hand, 2006 was an unusually slow year for protests. Interestingly, in 
2006, there were local government elections taking place. Alexander (2010) suggests that 
either the activists, who make up the service delivery protests were expending their 
energy in the local election, or else that “broader populations placed some hope in the 
possibility of electoral politics addressing their concerns” (28). Booysen (2007) claims 
that “South Africa’s March 2006 local government elections in many ways assumed the 
character of a de facto referendum on service delivery. Leading into this election were 
two years of grass-roots protests against both the quality of service delivery and public 
representation of the grass-roots’ service delivery needs” (21).  
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Figure 3: Municipal IQ- Number of Service Delivery Protests by Year 2004-2009 
(Jain 2010)  	  
 The massive number of service delivery protests met with decreases in voter 
turnout once again calls into question the government’s legitimacy. For example, “the 
voter turnout in the national general election in SA decreased from 19.5 million people in 
1994 to just over 16 million in 1999, and fewer than 16 million in 2004” (wa Bofelo 
2011). Furthermore, “public skepticism has been worsened by the bad state of internal 
democracy in political parties and by the general impression that politicians and parties 
only use popular support as leverage and device to attain power and wealth for 
themselves” (wa Bofelo 2011). This has also led to an overall decrease in civic 
participation with regard to pubic gatherings and hearings, and greater mistrust for public 
officials.  
 Pithouse (2007 via Alexander 2010) argues,  
There is a pervasive sense that the state disrespects people by lying 
to people at election times and by failing to listen to them at other 
times…Where councilors are present they most often function as a 
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means of top-down social control aiming to subordinate popular 
politics to the party’. There are doubtless some councilors who live 
alongside their constituents and do their best to articulate popular 
concerns, but where they are absent, or operate in a top-down or 
corrupt manner, space is opened up for new leaders to fill the void 
(29).  
These leaders are called on through protest action. Ducan (2009 via Alexander 2010) 
claims it cannot be denied that protests have become a “significant feature of political life 
in South Africa” (27). 
 RESPONSES	  
 For the most part, the central government has been superficially receptive to the 
requests made by the protestors; most of their reactions have been largely symbolic or are 
bound by promises made during the election cycle that are then followed by unfulfilled 
action. Nonetheless, the ANC has acknowledged the importance of providing better 
delivery of basic services. Union Association of South Africa (UASA) CEO Koos 
Bezuidenhout said, “Dissatisfaction with poor service delivery, or the complete lack 
thereof at the municipal level is now spreading like wildfire throughout South Africa,” 
the problem is reaching national heights and must be addressed (Grobler 2009). The 
protests have drawn more attention to impoverished communities and informal 
settlements in the metro for all levels of government (national, provincial, and local) to 
now look into. 
 Municipal IQ has had a significant presence in the tracking of service delivery 
protests and consequently in garnering responses from political elites by providing data 
and analysis on the issue. This organization has successfully disseminated their 
information to government officials at all levels and to the public. Allan and Heese of 
Municipal IQ (n.d.) suggest “The national departments of Cooperative Governance and 
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Traditional Affairs as well as Human Settlements in partnership with local government, 
should clarify a much needed interim policy on the formalisation of informal settlements 
and the integration of these areas into those urban municipalities where they occur.”  
Johannesburg was the first South African city to try this and can serve as an example case 
for future cities’ endeavors80. 
 Federation of Unions of South Africa also indicated their willingness to become a 
part of the solution, to “make a positive and constructive contribution towards assisting 
the government to improve service delivery as expressed by President Jacob Zuma in his 
budget vote speech” (Grobler 2009).81 Service delivery concerns seem to have moved to 
the “top of [the agendas for] all political parties with ambitions to be elected by Black 
African voters,” but unfortunately agendas do not always reflect reality and little remains 
to have been executed (Booysen 2007 25). This may be because “whilst the government 
would like to improve service delivery, it is constrained by the conservatism of its 
economic polities and by the current recession. While there has been some reallocation of 
resources, the government’s main response has merely been that of pushing for greater 
monitoring and evaluation of elected officials and administrators” (Alexander 2010 38). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 See Cooperative Governance Traditional Affairs at http://www.cogta.gov.za/ 
81 The transcript for this speech can be found at: 
http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/pebble.asp?relid=17758. 
In his speech, President Zuma claimed that the administration would focus on: building 
relationships (internationally, and between the levels of government nationally), 
improving the President’s Coordinating Council’s output (a mechanism that brings 
together the presidency, crosscutting ministries, premiers and the South African Local 
Government Association, to discuss issues affecting the three spheres of government), 
improving quality of service, advancing communication, developing the National 
Economic Development and Labour Council, and providing better medical attention. 
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 Typically in democratic systems with constituency dissatisfaction, voters are 
quick to move to opposition parties, however in South Africa ANC support has generally 
persisted, or at least has not been seriously threatened by significant support for an 
opposition party. Instead, individuals have taken to civil unrest to demonstrate their 
dissatisfaction. However, data shows that since the 2009 elections, there has been 
increased dissatisfaction with Zuma’s administration, yet still an opposition party has not 
risen up, and instead the number of protests have continued to increase, along with a 
strategy to abstain from voting. 
 President Zuma, during his re-election campaign took to “door-to-door 
electioneering in some of the country’s poorest communities.” He “revealed that it had 
exposed him to a disturbing side of South Africa’s living standards that government 
officials do not mention in their service-delivery reports” (Managa 2012 5). In 2010, 
Zuma created a telephone hotline and social networking page as a forum for communities 
to express their grievances, but those in the direst conditions were not able to take 
advantage of this mode of recourse due to lack of access to technology and other 
impeding factors such as poor explanations and expositions of this new outlet (people 
either have not heard of it, or were not sure how to take advantage of it) (Mananga 2012). 
Clearly, despite some attempts to deal with service delivery issues, the problem itself 
persists, as do issues around civic participation, voter turnout, and overall societal 
contentment. 
 PRIMARY	  PROBLEMS	  RELATED	  TO	  SERVICE	  DELIVERY	  
 The primary concerns voiced by service delivery protests tend to regard a lack of 
basic services for proper sanitation, drainage, sewage, water, electricity, and street 
 	  
146
lighting. However, Alexander and Pfaffe (2013) argue that they also often include 
demands regarding housing, roads, schooling, political corruption, demarcation, and job 
loss or inadequacy: “protests frequently mix claims about services with other issues”(4). 
In other words, pleas for basic services are combined with appeals for the next level of 
fundamental services that further reflect and deepen societal cleavages (especially 
regarding divides along racial and class-lines). 
 Some of the foundational political issues that lead to service delivery protests 
include: a lack of institutional capacity, poor infrastructure, and lack of public 
participation. Limited institutional capacity and a deeply entrenched culture of corruption 
hampers the public’s ability to make appeals to the local government (Mananga 2012). 
Arguments related to lack of institutional capacity affecting service delivery protests tend 
to take two primary paths: either the broad-based issue, which refers to a lack of adequate 
staff and leadership therein, or more specifically, under-spending of allocated funds “due 
to lack of leadership skills. This is mainly attributable to a lack of skills in project 
management and financial management, and has prevented certain projects from being 
started or completed,” both of which are magnified by nepotism and partiality amongst 
government officials (Managa 2012 4). Ineffective leadership in many informal 
settlements also exaggerates financial mismanagement issues, which hinders these 
communities’ ability to build infrastructure that would lead to better service delivery. 
 Wasteful spending on salaries and misallocation of government funds also make it 
difficult for informal settlements to develop the necessary infrastructure to bolster service 
delivery processes. The public is frustrated with service delivery procedures because not 
only are they largely inadequate for fulfilling citizen’s basic needs, but also, even with 
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legislation in spite of this, communication channels between municipalities and 
communities are faulty (Mananga 2012). Furthermore, inadequate service delivery has 
led to other social problems such as increased xenophobia in informal settlements. 
Community members perceive their access to resources to be negatively affected by 
immigrants who are putting pressure on the system and further restricting their already 
limited access to basic services. High levels of poverty and unemployment also increase 
“the number of people dependent on basic and indigent services and makes further 
demands on the scare resources of municipalities with large impoverished communities” 
(Managa 2012 3).82 
 SOCIAL	  MOVEMENTS:	  A	  RESPONSE	  TO	  COMMUNITY	  GRIEVANCE	  
 The Centre for Development and Enterprise (CDE) states, “It is not the intensity 
of the disturbances that should concern us most…[but] that they have been widespread, 
repeated over a long period, and triggered by a variety of grievances, thus illustrating a 
persistent and general malaise in out system of governance” (Alexander 2010 29). In the 
2000s, there was a brief moment where social movements began surfacing from poor 
communities, but it was in 2004 that the larger-scale township revolts really began to 
increase in prevalence. 
 The CDC (2007) also stated that the unrest has changed the state of local affairs: 
people have been taken out of office, the national government has begun putting forth 
efforts, and some administrative issues have been fixed. However, oftentimes these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 “South Africa had an unemployment rate of 25 per cent, 1 per cent up from 24 per cent 
between the fourth quarter of 2010 and first quarter of 2011 (although reports reveal that 
it was down by 1,1 per cent to 23,9 per cent in the third quarter of 2011)” (Managa 2012 
3). 
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changes are not reflective in township residents’ daily experiences. Their living 
conditions largely remain the same, and on occasion, the officials who were taken out of 
office are rehired (to better posts) elsewhere. 
 The actions taken by protestors vary greatly. “They have included mass meetings, 
drafting of memoranda petitions, toy-toying, processions, stay-aways, election boycotts, 
blockading of roads, construction of barricades, burning of tires, looting, destruction of 
buildings, chasing unpopular individuals out of townships, confrontations with the police, 
and forced resignation of elected officials” (Alexander 2010 26). Notably, it can also be 
difficult to capture adequate, all-inclusive data on such events due to their widely varying 
nature.  
 Service delivery deals with the political realities of both top-down and bottom-up 
perspectives. The top (the government) is responsible for creating mandates, producing 
policy frameworks and mechanisms for implementation, whereas the bottom (the people) 
are charged with demonstrating their needs and expressing their content or discontent 
with the aforementioned implementation—apparently through protests (Booysen 2007 
21). In most liberal, multi-party democracies (IE South Africa post-1994), citizens would 
tend to express their political opinions through choosing between rival electoral programs 
of different political parties, and then would usually trust the chosen party. “If 
discontented, the argument goes, voters can turn to opposition party or boycott the polls. 
Yet South Africa’s experience is rather more complex” (Booysen 2007 21 also see 
Powell 2012). South Africans widely choose a grass-roots approach to making their 
political opinions heard, through protest. 
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 Service delivery protests reflect personal grievances. They are not usually put 
forth with the intention of recreating the system, but rather to request a response from 
their elected officials to make good on their promises, and their constitutionally bound 
responsibilities. “Piven and Cloward point to the linkage between daily experiences, 
grievances, targets and forms of protests” (Alexander and Pfaffe 2010 14). This linkage is 
made clear through South Africa’s service delivery protests. 
 
CASE	  ON	  SERVICE	  DELIVERY	  	  BACKGROUND	  
 Again, my theory aims to understand the role that social movements may play in 
weakening racial hierarchies. In order to provide the most accurate, honest and fitting 
comparative analysis of my theory, I have chosen the to study the two most contemporary 
and galvanizing cases of social movements within the United States and South Africa. 
These cases not only reflect the two most prominent issues that produce social 
movements in each country, but they also, coincidentally (but relevant to my theory), are 
reflective of the structural racism that continues to affect the United States and South 
Africa in their post-institutionally racist eras.83 In order to accurately examine my theory 
in its most applicable (and appropriate) context, I have chosen to analyze the inequities 
(linked to racial issues) that are being responded to with social movements within my two 
country’s of analysis: police brutality in America and public service delivery in South 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 See Alexander, Peter. 2010. “Rebellion of the Poor: South Africa’s Service Delivery 
Protests – a Preliminary Analysis.” Review of African Political Economy 37(123): 25–
40. 
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Africa84. Service delivery protests in South Africa and police brutality protests in the 
United States are also apt for comparison because both issues occur on the local-political 
level, but are systemic to their entire countries, and thus both issues must be addressed by 
the respective central governments in order to promulgate change. My theory ultimately 
argues that in order for a social movement to impact the racial hierarchy of a post-
institutionally racist country, a certain response to the respective social movements, must 
to be given by policy elites. 
 In general, service delivery, and even more specifically toilets and sanitation, 
present concerns for public heath and must be dealt with promptly. These issues often 
escalate to matters of concern for human rights:  
The roots of a dysfunctional health system and the collision of the 
epidemics of communicable and non-communicable diseases in 
South Africa can be found in policies from periods of the country's 
history, from colonial subjugation, Apartheid dispossession, to the 
post-Apartheid period. Racial and gender discrimination, the 
migrant labour system, the destruction of family life, vast income 
inequalities, and extreme violence have all formed part of South 
Africa's troubled past, and all have inexorably affected health and 
health services (Coovadia, Hoosen et al. 2009). 
 Today, fairly comprehensive policies exist in South Africa to deal with these complex 
issues, but unfortunately, the proper implementation of said policies and the vagueness 
encapsulated in their content oftentimes leaves room for weak management and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Protests erupt when people feel like they have no other option. These two issues 
represent the public’s concerns that do not seem to be receiving adequate answers nor 
attention by political elites. Service delivery and police brutality are problems in both 
societies, but perhaps the US government deals better with complaints regarding service 
delivery, and South Africa with complaints regarding police brutality, through manners 
of more traditional political response that solve the respective issues before they lead to 
protest. 
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occasionally corrupt operations. The problems thus continue to persist, despite legislative 
attempts. 
 HISTORICAL	  BACKGROUND	  OF	  “TOILET	  WARS”	  
 The Toilet Wars are an example of, and more pointed appeal for better service 
delivery for informal townships; The toilet war protests are contained within the broader-
themed protests for service delivery, but represent a particularly galvanizing example of 
such protests—that were able to garner unusually vast support. The underlying issues 
encompassed within appeals for better sanitation and toilets reflect the legacy of the 
Apartheid state: structural poverty persists, due to racialized access to proper sanitation 
mechanisms, inadequate outlets for public appeals, elite-level disregard for 
predominantly Black townships, and the continual struggle for Black South Africans to 
have their basic needs met.  
 Steven Robins is the most predominant academic on the topic of ‘toilet wars.’ His 
work primarily focuses on South Africa’s ongoing (and notably unfinished) effort to 
reach transitional justice, post-Apartheid. He claims, “the politicization of sanitation—for 
instance, in the form of Toilet Wars…suggests that transitional justice is going to 
continue to be a protracted and messy process involving, amongst other things, the 
systemic reform of the mundane conditions of structural poverty” (Robins 2014 480). 
TRC influence 
 Immediately following Apartheid, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC) served as the primary force pursing transitional justice in South Africa, but their 
efforts focused on the more-traditionally thought of ailments related to human rights, 
whereas “issues such as sanitation, housing and public education [which can also involve 
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human rights violations to an extent] can only be addressed by long-term state 
interventions at a systemic level” (Robins 2014 480). Robins (2014) claims that the toilet 
war protests provide a necessary new form of social activism that can respond to the gaps 
in the TRC’s endeavors. As such, service delivery activists “critically engag[ed] with the 
state in order to lobby and pressure it to meet its constitutionally enshrined obligations to 
it citizens in terms of housing, education, sanitation and land restitution” (481). 
 The TRC’s efforts were productive in many respects, but they ultimately failed to 
address the daily grievances of poor, Black, previously disenfranchised citizen’s who 
continually struggle to have even their most basic needs met.  After the TRC left South 
Africa, they claimed that a “new beginning” would ensue as a result of their legacy. 
However this notion has been widely contested and popular politics have tended to 
replace TRC efforts with a newfound focus on issues of service delivery, labor 
conditions, and employment equity. 
Social movement tactics 
 The toilet wars were initially set in motion by two primary events that I will refer 
to as the “anti-dignity case” and the “media-focused case”). I will be predominately 
applying my theory to an analysis of these two events (this analysis will inevitably 
include other important aspects regarding the toilet wars such as other events that are 
affected by or that have affected what went on in these chief examples; what transpired 
that led to these events, and the various levels of response (from public officials, 
community members, activists, political organizations, etc.) that may have impacted 
future occurrences. The two instances I am referring to led to protests that each made 
very similar appeals, had the same broad-based goals, and materialized under like 
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circumstances—their outcomes’ diverge somewhat, but in ways that seem to compliment 
one another to have had an even more significant impact on South Africa’s racialized 
system of service delivery, and the country’s paradigm for respecting the dignity of all its 
citizen’s.  
 It should also be noted that 10.5 million people in South Africa continue to live 
without access to basic sanitation, and millions outside of this region have no access to a 
toilet, which puts them at risk for assault, robbery, rape, and even sometimes murder, all 
in what has become a plight just to relieve oneself (Department of Water Affairs and 
Forestry 2010). And furthermore, the issues related to this case span far beyond accessing 
to toilets, and also deal with disease and other ailments that result from poor sanitation. 
“According to the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, 100 children may die daily 
from diarrhea—a number which could be reduced by 40% with the delivery of adequate 
sanitation” (Silber 2011). 
 PRECIPITATING	  EVENTS	  
Background and preceding event 
 The first event that I will detail transpired in 2010; this was the first large-scale 
protest in the Toilet War’s movement. It erupted in response (and revolt) to the 
suggestion that community members should cover themselves in blankets to protect their 
privacy whenever they use the unenclosed toilets provided by the national government. 
The City of Cape Town Municipality quickly responded to the protests by piecing 
together iron and timber in an effort to help create a sense of privacy for the residents. 
However, Khayelitsha residents, led primarily by the African National Congress Youth 
League (ANCYL) activists, demanded that the City build concrete privacy structures. 
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The residents revolted further by destroying the makeshift arrangements. In response to 
this movement, the City attempted to charge the protestors for their destruction. 	  ANTI-­‐DIGNITY	  TOILET	  
 Later that year, in September, an especially horrid case of open toilets violating 
human dignity transpired that served as the precipitating event for a mass movement. A 
seventy-six year-old woman, named Mrs. Beja, “had been attacked and stabbed while 
going to an unenclosed toilet in Makhaza informal settlement in Khayelitsha.” (Robins 
2014 488). She filed the case against the City and on April 29, 2011 Judge Erasmus of 
the Western Cape High Court ruled that the City must build legitimate enclosures around 
the government-provided toilets in Makhaza (Dietvorst 2011). Protests of the unenclosed 
toilets had latched onto service delivery protests nearly two years prior, but Mrs. Beja’s 
case galvanized a more significant uproar than ever before and attracted new followers to 
the effort for toilet and sanitation rights in particular. Also, because the event occurred in 
late 2010, and the subsequent ruling took place in 2011 (and the next event I will discuss 
also took place in 2011) it gained even more attention and ended up impacting the local 
elections across the nation that took place in May 2011. 
 In response to the protests, a landmark judgment was made that claimed the City 
and the conditions presented to the citizens of this township are in violation of the 
residents’ constitutional rights. However, in an attempt to bypass taking full 
responsibility for the matter, the City stepped forth and claimed that they had previously 
made an agreement with Makhaza whereby Cape Town authorities would build 1,316 
open toilets (in Makhaza and other informal settlements in the Khayelitsha township) 
given that the residents would build their own enclosures. As such, the City would only 
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obliged to build “communal” toilets, and with any extra funds would provide private 
toilets as well (Dietvorst 2011).85 86 However, this accusation does not comply with the 
local government’s constitutional obligations related to service delivery and many 
residents could not afford to build enclosures for the toilets.87 Furthermore, in an internal 
audit of the City, Judge Erasmus found that the government “fail[ed] to adequately 
engage and consult meaningfully with the community,” seeing as only 60 of the 6,000 
residents were consulted about the toilets beforehand (Dietvort 2011; Silber 2011). After 
the ruling, Cape Town mayor, Dan Plato, made mention of other faulty ambiguity within 
the legal and political systems, he said, the court made no specific requirements for the 
timeframe nor the type of enclosure that the City must implement. Unfortunately, the 
language regarding what exactly the State is required to provide is left ambiguous.  
 Despite the controversy, the ruling given by Judge Erasmus nonetheless revealed 
the centrality of questions regarding dignity and privacy in constitutional law and in the 
democratic culture of the post-Apartheid state. The ruling was pervasive; it animated a lot 
of political and public discourse regarding the “jurisprudence on dignity and privacy” and 
clearly demonstrated the state’s previous failure to fully democratize (Robins 2014 289). 
In the Western Cape High Court Records on the Beja case, it is stated, “The Constitution 
asserts dignity to contradict our past in which human dignity for Black South Africans 
was routinely and cruelly denied” and thus this treatment is intolerable (Robins 2014 
489). The Beja judgment reclaims the notion that the post-1994 state must care for and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Robins 2014 claims that this was an attempt to stretch the City’s budget. 
86 The government standard is one toilet for every five homes (Underhill 2012). 
87 See section on Laws and Policies Related to Service Delivery for the constitutional 
mandate. 
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respect the dignity of its people; the transitional justice endeavors are not over. “For the 
ANCYL in particular, the High Court judgment seemed to confirm its assertions that the 
open toilets were clear evidence of the inherent racism of the DA-controlled Municipality 
and its refusal to recognize the dignity of Black people” (Robins 2014 490). 
Electoral stability’s effect on the response to the 2010 protest 
 Many believed that the issues related to the “Toilet Wars” would impact the local 
elections, but few realized the intensity of the impact that it would also have on the 
national-level. Initially, the DA’s campaign was hindered by the protests because the 
Western Cape is the only province they have legitimate authority over and the area was 
under the microscope for issues related to toilets and sanitation. However, shortly after, 
attention shifted to the ANC-controlled Free State Province as well. The 2011 local 
elections fully politicized the issue and additionally gave rise to other associated matters 
such as dignity, privacy, and human rights. The implications of the toilet wars elucidate 
the fact that the very fabric of South African society still reflects Apartheid-type 
discrimination and disregard for human dignity (Powell 2012 11): Until its citizens are 
not forced to defecate in public, South Africa will not yet succeed in reaching its 
transitional justice goals.  
 Due to the increasing importance of politicians’ public image and impending 
local-level elections, party leader Helen Zille “said she accepted the ruling, including the 
judge’s order to enclose the toilets” (Underhill 2011). She also mentioned that despite the 
DA’s attempt to enclose the toilets, the ANCYL continues to tear down the new 
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structures. These actions are especially relevant given the opposing nature of these two 
groups and their relevance to the upcoming elections.88 
 Nonetheless, the DA said that based on the court’s findings’ it would be willing to 
“move forward and continue upgrading informal settlements, within the limits of the 
national housing code” and will “try again” to enclose the toilets. Also following the 
ruling, the ANC in the Western Cape called on DA leader, Helen Zille, to step down, but 
she did not agree to (Phakathi 2012).89 Interestingly the DA has typically promoted its 
ability to provide “service delivery for all.” An independent analyst, Daniel Silke said 
that the ruling will not have a significant impact on the DA’s political image, and that the 
entire politically laden process can be “seen as an attempt by the ANC to destabilise the 
DA's public relations campaign” (Phakathi 2012). 
 The political fight around this case clearly self-perpetuated, which led Judge 
Erasmus to criticize both the DA and the ANCYL’s politicization of the issue at the 
expense of the community. “He said that mayor Dan Plato and ANCYL member Andile 
Lili “simply failed to rise above their political contest as opposed to their duty towards 
those that need to benefit – the poor and vulnerable” (Dietvorst 2011). 
 2011	  TOILET	  WARS:	  MEDIA-­‐FOCUSED	  CASE	  
 The second pivotal movement that led to the full-fledged, national movement for 
proper toilets and sanitation was when the images of the unenclosed toilets in “Section 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 The debate over whether or not these structures are enough to provide for human 
respect and dignity is too convoluted to clearly tell if the structures are in fact sufficient, 
however based on their descriptions they do not seem to be. 
89 Specifically, ANC provincial leader Marius Fransman called on DA leader Helen Zille 
to resign “as her credibility now lies in tatters” (Phakathi 2012). 
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Q,” an informal settlement in Khayelitsha on the outskirts of Cape Town (also known as 
Abahlali-Western Cape) were released.90 The Toilet Wars movement was given massive 
attention by both ordinary citizens and public officials after the media disseminated the 
images of the unenclosed toilets. The images generated responses from both ordinary 
citizens and public officials immediately in-time for the 2011-local government 
elections.91 The images are said to have had an especially significant impact “partly 
because [they] seemed to condense and congeal long historical processes of racism and 
Apartheid” (Robins 2014 479). Robins discusses protests’ impact through two lenses, the 
“politics of the spectacle,” and the “politics of the ordinary.” The images both 
demonstrated exceptional state violence through an honest and dramatic lens (“politics of 
the spectacle”), and exemplified mundane realities (“politics of the ordinary”). The latter 
tactic typically deals with structural poverty and long-term impacts such that Robins 
claims is necessary in South Africa’s post-TRC era.92 The Social Justice Coalition (a 
primary actor in the plight to obtain better sanitation for informal townships), in 
particular, has used “politics of the ordinary” to strategize against the sanitation issues 
that hinder South African townships.  
 The SJC focuses especially on Cape Town in an effort “to develop improved 
policies and approaches…which can be replicated elsewhere” (Silber 2011). For years, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 The QQ Section residents were adjacent to the Q section, which is a formal housing 
scheme. On occasion the Q residents would be able to use the toilets in the QQ Section, 
but more often then not they would not be able to afford the exorbitant fees, and 
additionally, the walk was often too far for many of the residents (Robins 2014). 
91 The impact that this moment had on the 2011 local government elections cannot be 
overstated: they were literally coined the “toilet elections.” 
92 This is referring to “social movement tactics that seek to render as politically legible 
the normalized and taken-for-granted daily realities of structural violence and racialized 
poverty” (Robins 2014 481).  
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this group was using a strategy of slow and patient lobbying for better circumstances, a 
lens along the lines of “politics of the ordinary” however, the release of the images 
quickly escalated the movement to take on a lens more closely associated with “politics 
of the spectacle,” which pushed the issue to the national agenda. “There was something 
quite extraordinary and shocking about the mass media image of the unenclosed modern 
porcelain toilet that captured the attention of politicians, activists and citizens in 2011” 
(Robins 2014 483).  
 The SJC capitalized on this moment and “on 27 April 2011, 2500 SJC members 
marched peacefully from St. Georges Cathedral to the Mayor of Cape Town's office. 
There a petition was handed over endorsed by over 10,000 residents of Khayelitsha and 
25 organisations, calling on the City of Cape Town to initiate a public consultation to 
discuss the long term delivery of basic sanitation to all those in need” (Silber 2011). This 
took place just two days before the Judges’ ruling against the City, which called for 
legitimate enclosures to all government provided toilets. The march led the City of Cape 
Town to make some improvements to the sanitation infrastructure, but not enough; the 
conditions remained largely unlivable.93 On October 3, 2011, the SJC claimed that they 
were able to “persuade the Office of Cape Town Major Patricia de Lille to make 
available R 138 million for janitorial services for sanitation facilities in informal 
settlements.” But regrettably this step in the right direction was not planned out carefully 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 “Despite the target of completely eradicating the bucket system by 2007, there were 
still an estimated 200,000 bucket toilets in municipalities throughout the country in that 
year. In addition, there were over 1 million households, or 2 per cent of households in 
South Africa, without any toilet facilities in 2009” (The Municipal Outreach Project 
2009).  
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enough. The working conditions for the new janitors were so poor, it led the staff 
themselves to protest (Robins 2014 483). 
Privacy politics 
 Previous to the service delivery movement, toilet and sanitation issues were 
resistant to becoming political matters. (As previously mentioned, the concurrence of the 
elections and the protests greatly impacted this shift.) However, even within the service 
delivery movement, toilet and sanitation issues had always been muffled by other service 
delivery concerns. But nonetheless, those who are affected by compounding service 
delivery issues often maintain that sanitation should elicit special attention. Toilets, in 
and of themselves, have historically been kept out of the public sphere. But, in 2011 the 
toilet took on political and juridical implications that made reference to concerns for 
racism, dignity, and privacy— notably more than their previous more functional utility.  
 Hannah Ardent is one of the primary political theorists to introduce the distinction 
between public and private, while drawing on the Aristotelian distinction of the oikos 
from the polis.94  Activists were able to bridge this gap when they “literally dragged the 
stench from the urban periphery and its informal settlements to the seat of political and 
economic power in the city center” (Robins 2014 480; also see Robins 2013).95 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 See Hayden, Patrick. 2014. Hannah Arendt: Key Concepts. Routledge. 
95 This example can be compared to London in 1858, when the Thames River was finally 
addressed as a key issue by the English parliament, once the stench became too intense 
for the political elites to handle. However, in the South African context, the stench was 
not evolving in the vicinity of the elites, due to the urban-planning schemes instituted by 
the Union Parliament (Native Land Act, 1913) and re-institutionalized under legislation 
enacted during the Apartheid era (Group Areas Act, 1950). In South Africa, “because of 
[the] special legacies of Apartheid urban planning, these activists had to make their point 
about poor sanitation in informal settlements by transporting the smell of the slums on the 
urban periphery to the sanitized city center and seat of state power” (Robins 2013). 
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Moreover, these issues also drive public attention when they are linked to the “resulting 
poor hygiene conditions [which] contribute directly to an array of illnesses including 
diarrhea, gastroenteritis and skin rash” (SJC 2011). The SJC (2011) also claims that the 
lack of access to proper toilets has placed residents at a greater risk for criminal attacks. 
This is especially intolerable considering in some communities, “more than 100 
dwellings (500 people) share one toilet stall…Many toilets and standpipes have 
consequently fallen into disrepair, due largely to high use and a lack of routine 
maintenance, repairs, and monitoring” (SLC 2011). It was not until the images were 
released that the issue affected national political campaigns. The anti-dignity case 
garnered national attention, but the images are what pushed the problem to the national 
agenda. 
Response  
 In particular, the protests that erupted in response to the images protests brought 
national-level policy elites to recognize the weight of the issue. This “promoted Tokyo 
Sexwale, the Minster for Human Settlements, to announce in September 2011 that he was 
appointing Winnie Mandela to head an eleven-member national task team which he had 
commissioned to investigate open toilets in poor communities throughout the country” 
(Robins 2014 484).96 He stated, “The sordid chapter [of the open toilets] must be brought 
to an end” (Business Day 2011). Other far-reaching outlets also began to respond 
including, the Western Cape High Court (as previously mentioned), the Human Rights 
Commission, political party representatives, social movement activism, popular 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 See “Toilet Wars.” The M&G Online. http://mg.co.za/article/2011-05-12-toilet-wars/ 
(February 13, 2015). For an example of other municipalities facing the issue of poor 
sanitation services and inadequate toilets. 
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protestors against poor service delivery writ large, and the mass media. The Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation also got involved, with the goal of  “ensur[ing] that the state 
provides, monitors, and maintains toilets and existing sanitation technologies in poor 
communities” (Dietvorst 2011). 
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VII.	  CASE	  STUDY	  ANALYSES	  
 I now intend to separately analyze the case studies that I provided on both Rodney 
King and the Toilet Wars, side-by-side, from chapters 5 (for the U.S.; Rodney King) and 
6 (for South Africa; the Toilet Wars) through the theoretical framework that I outlined in 
Chapter 3.97 I am conducting my analysis via the collective case study method; my 
theoretical framework draws from the work of several chief social movement theorists. 
By applying my theory to the historical narratives that I provided for both the Rodney 
King case and the Toilet Wars’ case, I am introducing an innovative approach for 
understanding how social change may ultimately transpire as a result of the influence that 
social movements have on political elites. In this section, I will explicate two separate 
theoretical analyses based on a single theoretical framework  (the comparative analysis 
will occur in the next chapter). 
 These analyses will be structured around a discussion of how each of my 
variables may be used to explain the potential for social movements to ultimately affect 
the two separate racial hierarchies of the United States and of South Africa (the first 
based on the Rodney King case and second based on the Toilet Wars case). Together, my 
variables aim to explain the potential for social movements to ultimately affect the United 
States’ and South Africa’s respective (but comparable) racially-biased systems. The 
primary focus of this section is to test my theory.  The first paragraph of each 
variable’s subsection aims to provide an unbiased account of how I conceptualized my 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 My aforementioned discussions in chapters 5 and 6 over the history of and debates 
around police brutality and service delivery, respectively, is intended to serve my 
argument for why these two issues are strong indicators of the racial biases that persist in 
American society, but they will also be useful in some regards, for analyzing my theory. 
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theory before conducting the case study research.98 The theory may therefore be tested 
objectively in a side-by-side analysis. After providing individual case analyses in this 
chapter, the next (and final) chapter will provide a comparative analysis and conclusion 
between the two cases. This final chapter will serve to discuss how generalizable my 
theory is, whether or not the cases are actually comparable, and where lessons may be 
learned between (and across) the two cases, as well as suggestions for future research. 
 
	  
Figure	  4:	  My	  argument 	  PERCEPTION	  OF	  GRIEVANCE	  	  
Summary of variable’s operationalization: 
 I have operationalized “perception of grievance” to include discontent that can 
mobilize a renewed and rearticulated sense of Black subjectivity. This new subjectivity 
results when individuals can understand their place and their culture under new terms. 
(Collective subjectivity results when a group can understand their place and their culture 
under new collective terms.) This renewed understanding may incite social movement 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 The aptitude of each variable for capturing the reality of the situations at hand may 
differ depending on how I operationalized them previous to my case study research. 
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actions to transpire, when individuals transform their frame of mind from “quiescence to 
indignation, from docility to defiance” (Piven 1976 305). Perception of grievance both 
leads to and affects social movement actions. This variable is deeply interconnected to 
the following variable (social movement actions) because it is more easily identified 
during social movement actions, when grievances become apparent; social movements as 
a whole, will also enhance both elites’ and Blacks’ understandings of perceptions of 
grievance within the Black community.  
 In other words, the social movement itself will cause elites to apprehend the 
growing perception of grievance within the Black community, and the movement will 
also lead Blacks to understand the growing perception of grievance within their own 
community. This will facilitate the rearticulation of Black subjectivity that Omi and 
Winant (1994) articulate. Social movement actions and perception of grievance are thus 
difficult to separate in the operationalizing process, because the two variables are 
interconnected on multiple levels. 
 THE	  RODNEY	  KING	  CASE:	  	  	  
Media influence 
  The video of Rodney King that went viral was a crucial component to producing a 
newfound perception of grievance amongst the Black community. Perceived grievances 
will be translated into social movement actions when a collective identity is formed in 
accordance with these grievances. The video simply brought to light the LAPD’s 
misconduct, which had been increasing over many years, “we know... that there is a long 
history of African-Americans and Latinos being stopped by law enforcement 
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disproportionately” (King and Smith 2011 216) (also see Justice on Trial: Racial 
Disparities in the American Criminal Justice System). But, when the system itself fails to 
offer proper redress for victims of police brutality and it does not properly track incidents 
of abuse, it is unlikely that people will be driven to rise up against it; they may feel that 
they are the exception, not the rule; that their incident is detached from the rest of society. 
Collective identity 
 The videotape made visible the problem of police violence to the grander public 
in a single moment and around a single case to aid in the production of a new Black 
collective subjectivity (such that Omi and Winant (1994) emphasize). The initial 
development of a new Black identity under common themes and common grievances 
later facilitated the Black public’s (and its allies’) even more dramatic response to the 
police officers’ acquittal, which launched into riots. Police-minority relations had been an 
ongoing problem for decades, but as Marx (1996) claims, marginalized racial identities 
may serve as the foundation for resistance only if these identities result in collective 
action. And collective action will only happen once a collective identity has been formed. 
 The uproar in response to the officer’s acquittal was especially far-reaching 
because the police violence was caught on camera, which made it less easily disputed and 
because there was a steadily increasing awareness that police brutality is a national issue. 
The footage personally impacted many people, which fueled a more substantial response 
(in terms of number people joining the movement as well as the forcefulness of the riots). 
It is also important to note the role that the “long hot summer” of the late 1960s played in 
producing a collective Black identity years before. This identity continued to evolve up 
until the LA Riots, and has also had an impact on Black’s basic understanding of their 
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subjectivity, which is a crucial component for rising up against the system. (The “long 
hot summer” was an important time for solidifying this new collective Black identity, 
because it erupted with the joining of Blacks all across the nation in a collective struggle 
against the structural inequalities that they faced, including police brutality).99 Each of 
these variables coalesced in the Black’s shift from a culture of inaction to a culture of 
movement against the police brutality that was executed in the Rodney King case in 
1992.100 According to Perez et al. (2003), inadequate channels for community feedback 
and racial selectivity of police relations will both lead to rioting. These two variables 
certainly merged just before the LA riots erupted. 
 The Rodney King incident in particular helped transform the masses’ 
understanding of their social positioning from divinely ordained and individualistic, to a 
societal qualm that has been prescribed to them, irrelevant of their personal aptitude. It is 
this understanding that leads to the creation of a “culture of resistance,” in which social 
movement actions emerge (Omi and Winant 1994). A Washington Post survey conducted 
on public opinion regarding the “King Verdict” found that a large majority of peoples, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Some believe the “long hot summer” to have erupted in response to the escalation of 
thwarted self-interests post-civil rights progress, and especially the realization that police 
were promoting this unequal treatment. There have been numerous important racially 
charged social movements throughout the U.S.’s history, but this succession of riots was 
especially important for developing a sense of subjectivity in the Black community; 
newfound grievances. 
100 I am arguing that these variables, the video recording, an understanding of police 
brutality as a national issue, and the 1967 race riots all contributed to a new development 
of Black people’s perception of grievance that led them to take action against the system 
in 1992. The video recording made the evidence of the brutality abundantly clear, the 
understanding of police brutality as a national issue helped turn a feeling of 
exceptionality into a feeling of collective adversity, and the race riots served as 
encouragement from Black people who had previously risen against the system (and with 
particular force against police brutality). 
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Black and White, think that the police officers in the Rodney King case should have been 
found guilty, and the same size majority also claimed that the U.S. Justice Department 
should file criminal charges against the officers, according to a new Washington Post-
ABC News poll (1992). However, a minority of Whites (25%) agreed that the “Rodney 
King case shows that Blacks cannot get justice in this country,” whereas a majority of 
Blacks (78%) agreed with this statement. Here, Whites seem to have recognized the 
problem, but do not want to, or simply do not, understand the issue as a structural 
problem. Another majority of both races agreed that the “innocent” verdict will 
negatively impact race relations in the United States, and that race prejudice is a 
persisting problem in the United States.101 Clearly, there has been a movement for Black 
people toward understanding one’s own position (at least in terms of police brutality and 
seeking justice) to be reflective of structural qualms more so than individual wrongdoing. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Those interviewed and surveyed in the Washington Post poll left ambiguity in terms of 
their perceptions of race relations in the United States, because even though they claimed 
that issues of race preside, and that the verdict was prejudice, only about half of Whites 
said that Blacks and other minorities do not receive equal treatment in the justice system, 
and that the case is indicative of injustices. Also interestingly, in response to the question: 
“The only time the federal government really pays attention to Black problems is when 
Blacks resort to violent demonstrations,” 39% of Whites agreed, while 79% of Blacks 
agreed. 
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THE	  TOILET	  WARS	  CASE:	  	  
Race and class connection 
 The perceived grievances in South Africa appeared slightly different than I had 
initially anticipated.102 The resentment felt (by the citizen’s that my study is focused on) 
toward the State was directly related to service delivery and poverty; the protestors made 
mention of race far less frequently than I had expected. However, according to Shen 
(2013) in 2013 (and still today)  
the average White family earns six times what Black households 
make, and 73 percent of top business managers are White. 
Unemployment levels among young Black workers is nearing 50 
percent. The number of South Africans living on less than a dollar 
a day has doubled along with the number of millionaires in the 
country. Overall, unemployment is around 25 percent, 
 
 which clearly draws the link between poverty and race in South Africa. Wale (2013), 
also more explicitly depicts the inextricable link between living standard and race 
throughout the country. She claims, “for White South Africans, 0% are in the lowest four 
LSM groups (in fact there are no White South Africans in our sample in the first five 
LSM categories), 5% are in the middle categories, and 95% are in the top four categories 
(with 73.3% of White South Africans in the highest 2 LSM categories 9 and 10).” 
Whereas, “35.4% of Black South Africans are in the lowest four LSM categories, 48.2% 
are in the middle categories and 16.3% are in the highest four categories” (Wale 2013 
15). Poor service delivery amplifies poverty in South Africa’s townships (which are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 I anticipated the grievances to more explicitly reference race. This anticipation was 
based off of my previous understanding of South African history, news, and my effort to 
compare this society with America’s, which all inevitably is based on the personal bias I 
am bringing to the study. 
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characteristically poor and Black) and thus has became a problem of racial integration 
and bias as well as an economically rooted issue. Marx (1996) claims “race making 
cannot be disentangled from the process of economic development. Crow and Apartheid 
have been described as an effort to protect Whites from Black competition” to ensure the 
economic power of Whites. Piven (1976) claims that economic power leads to political 
power and vise versa; with the Black population oppressed economically they present 
less of a threat to White power. “In South Africa segregation and Apartheid fed the 
process of economic development and proved highly profitable…state policies of racial 
domination ensure[d] a supply of cheap Black labor” and the legacy of this lives on today 
(Marx 1996 189).  
New subjectivity 
 Since the enactment of the most recent Constitution in 1996, there has been an 
evolving sense of new subjectivity throughout South Africa. This subjectivity was largely 
based on the proclamations put forth by the Constitution and political leaders alike, which 
recognize the atrocities of the past and seek to move forward in a more egalitarian 
manner. This process for moving forward includes ensuring the delivery of basic services 
to all South African people. Thus, since 1996, people have felt that it is within their 
constitutional rights to be given basic services from the State. There has been a steady 
increase in service delivery protests since 2004, which has largely been in response to a 
developing understanding that that service delivery is a national problem that affects 
townships across the nation (rather than individuals feeling as though their township was 
the exception to the rule whereby adequate service delivery is a given). The Social Justice 
Coalition (SJC) played a primary role in developing this understanding and growing a 
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collective identity, especially with their work in Cape Town, which led other townships 
to not only see that their circumstances were not exceptional, but also that mechanisms 
exist to solicit political elites’ help to change their circumstances. 
Collective identity 
 The same steadily increasing awareness that poor service delivery existed 
throughout the State occurred with sanitation and toilets in particular (as an example of a 
basic service that is especially problematic). This developing understanding has led to a 
collective identity and a mode for collective action. The anti-dignity toilet served as a 
galvanizing case for those who had already begun to perceive injustices within the system 
(and those who had not, but to a lesser extent) of service delivery to now rally around. 
Then later, the images of the unenclosed toilets that sparked national attention led to an 
even more dramatic response, “partly because these images seemed to condense and 
congeal long historical processes of racism and Apartheid” (Robins 2014 479). Also, 
because the images captured so many people’s attention and increased the number of 
witnesses to the event, the uproar grew even more immensely. 
 Furthermore, the perception grievance around service delivery, and toilets and 
sanitation in particular, seemed to also be heightened by the un-kept promises made by 
the political elite. Greater social movement actions resulted because politicians (and the 
Constitution) convinced society that their situation could be different than that which they 
were facing. 
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SOCIAL	  MOVEMENT	  ACTIONS	  	  
Summary of variable’s operationalization 
 Social movements must be in response to and born from the masses’ grievances, 
and will often target the state. Social Movement actions are rooted in particular tactics of 
disruption and will usually have a target (for my study, I am looking at the national 
agenda as the target). The typical target is not some larger obscure systemic structure, but 
rather to attract the higher entity’s attention to the masses’ grievances in order to pursue 
changes that will contribute to their daily success. The tactics put forth by the activists 
may either be geared toward disrupting the hierarchical system, or the system that 
operates on a higher political level that could change their circumstances. Marx (1996) 
also mentions that social movement actions are especially effective when their disruption 
becomes a high priority—“replacing intra-White conflict as the most pressing threat to 
the nation-state” in order to garner more significant elite response (183). 
 THE	  RODNEY	  KING	  CASE:	  	  
Tactics of disruption 
 The tactics of disruption particular to the Rodney King case included murder, 
arson, looting, and injury. The activists made clear their discontent by looting stores, 
blocking intersections with torched cars, and pulling motorists from their own cars and 
beating them. These extreme measures clearly got the attention of local, state, and 
national governments and required great humanpower to control the activity’s 
momentum. 
Media growing membership 
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 There were also exponentially more social movement actors due to the attention 
that the entire progression of events (from the beating through the trial) was given by the 
media. The media was an especially strong force because it was able to increase the 
number of witnesses privy to the event. When one witnesses an event he or she feels 
more connected to it; this, in turn, leads to a more pointed response (Bedford 2000). The 
public writ-large felt personally invested in the outcome of the case (the officer’s initial 
acquittal) because they bore witness to the event leading up to it. This increase in 
collective frustration will typically lead to increased membership in a social movement, 
which ultimately affects the implementation of disruptive tactics by increasing the scale 
thereof (Piven 1976). This notion is supported by the fact that there were over $1 billion 
dollars in damages made. 
Collective frustration 
 This collective frustration also clearly fueled aggression. The frustration was 
rooted in the fact that many Blacks’ positions remained subaltern post-Civil Rights, and 
the overt evidence that they were also more likely to suffer physical abuse by those 
whose job it is to protect them, as members of society and citizens of America. “The 
classical model of social movements proposes that social movements come about as a 
“collective response to structural weaknesses in society that have a psychological effect 
on individuals” (Poulson 2005).  
Against police brutality 
 According to Piven, the activists, or those affected by the system, are not after the 
system itself, they intend to elicit change from their direct-overseers, who are personally 
setting them back, or I would like to add the policy makers that appear to be setting them 
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back. They may understand that their positionality is not a result of personal 
impediments, which will spawn social movement actions, but they will not necessarily be 
fighting within the intricacies of the economic system that led them to face more dire 
economic circumstances. So, even though in the Rodney King case the activists were 
theoretically fighting against a racist society, for which racist policing is a product, 
according to Piven (1976) the activist were likely focused on the racist policing in and of 
itself—with additional frustration also geared toward the other intricacies of society that 
produce their marginalized positionality, (such as the economic system) but rooted in 
anger toward the law enforcement system. 
 THE	  TOILET	  WARS	  CASE:	  	  
Tactics of disruption 
 The tactics of disruption particular to the Toilet Wars case varied throughout the 
movement depending on the moment at which the protests were responding. For 
example, in response to the anti-dignity episode, protestors destroyed the toilets and the 
makeshift “privacy” structures surrounding them. They also put forth more pointed calls 
to political elites around the fact that physical abuse had resulted from the government’s 
poor management, and made calls to residents to make their townships ungovernable.103 
Media influence on actions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 As previously stated in Chapter 5, the actions taken by protestors varied greatly. “They 
have included mass meetings, drafting of memoranda petitions, toyi-toying, processions, 
stay-aways, election boycotts, blockading of roads, construction of barricades, burning of 
tyres, looting, destruction of buildings, chasing unpopular individuals out of townships, 
confrontations with the police, and forced resignation of elected officials” (Alexander 
2010 26).  
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 The next moment that garnered an extraordinary response was the dissemination 
of the images of the unenclosed toilets. These images of unenclosed toilets changed 
social movement actions by demonstrating both exceptional state violence and the 
obscenity of the mundane realities within some of South Africa’s informal townships 
(Robins 2014). Previous to the release of the images, the SJC had tended to use politics of 
the ordinary to pursue social change over time, but this group still capitalized on the 
media event. They utilized the moment to march to the Mayor of Cape Town’s office to 
petition for a “public consultation to discuss the long-term delivery of basic sanitation to 
all those in need” (Silber 2011).104 Others utilized the moment that had already begun to 
garner elite response by literally dragging the stench from the urban periphery to the 
political city center in an attempt to gain even more national visibility for their cause. A 
common tactic of disruption in response to inadequate service delivery, which was 
especially prevalent during the toilet wars, was to make the townships “ungovernable” by 
abstaining from voting and prompting actions that neglect civic participation, which 
together forced elites to respond in an effort to regain control of their constituency. Each 
of these actions were dealt with and responded to by the political elite, whose responses 
were conditioned by the level of electoral stability during the time of the protests.   
 LEVEL	  OF	  ELITE	  STABILITY	  	  
Summary of variable’s operationalization 
 Level of elite stability is largely based on the level of electoral stability. The 
electoral instability facing the government (especially the national government) at the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 This took place two days before the call from Judge Erasmus for legitimate enclosures.  
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time of a social movement, I argue, will have a significant impact on the type and scope 
of elite response. I operationalized this variable to take into consideration how the 
electoral system appeared at the time of the social movement and any significant shifts in 
power dynamics that may have an effect on political elites’ response.105 Social 
movements that emerge when there is instability in the electorate are more likely to 
obtain a positive response from elites who, in turn, may promote policy changes in favor 
of social movement pleas. Piven (1976) would argue that the timing of a social 
movement is not typically this organized or intentional so far as to plan to execute actions 
based on electoral instability. However, when a social movement does happen to take 
place at a time of electoral instability, it is likely to secure greater policy achievements. 
When an elite is unsure of his or her political support, he or she will be forced to make 
decisions that respond to the resounding grievances of the coalition that they are in 
pursuit of. However, he or she may also vie for power by promoting a policy agenda in 
the rhetoric of said coalition’s opinion without actually addressing their grievance.106 
  In the American context, during times of instability, elite action is largely 
influenced by a consideration for whose vote is necessary to capture in order to maintain 
a particular party’s power for that time. As such, policy production and choices as well as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Electoral instability may also appear as separation within the political elite, including 
both inter- and intra-party separation. 
106 King and Smith (2011) are able to articulate this point by discussing the shifting party 
dynamics during Reagan’s administration. “Reagan attributed ‘the crime problem’ to a 
‘misguided philosophy’ holding that ‘society, not the individual, is to blame’ due to ‘poor 
socioeconomic conditions or an underprivileged background.’ He insisted instead that 
‘evil is frequently a conscious choice, and that retribution must be swift and sure.’ To 
focus instead on socioeconomic inequalities or the disparate racial consequences of anti-
crime measures was to encourage lawlessness. Many Americans responded favorably, 
and soon thereafter, many Democrats began moving closer to Republican anti-crime 
rhetoric and policies, especially when campaigning” (225-226). 
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other political decisions will be weighted by the persuasion of whomever’s vote is in 
question. In South Africa, a similar scheme follows, but the ANC’s power has remained 
largely unquestioned since they first took office in 1994 (with the exception of my case 
of inquiry, in the Western Cape province). Thus, the effect that electoral stability may 
have on political decisions in South Africa will only be somewhat related party power 
dynamics; instead the impact of electoral stability will primarily be seen in the individual 
elite’s efforts to retain power. (And thus I found the effect of electoral stability in South 
Africa is likely less consequential, and also that developing a grasp of the process was 
more manageable). Elite instability and elite response again demonstrate the inextricable 
link between many of my variables, and thus an introduction to elite response will be 
provided in this subsection, and further explicated in the following subsection. 
 THE	  RODNEY	  KING	  CASE:	  	  
Presidential politics (elections) 
 In the Rodney King case, the level of electoral stability throughout the social 
movement and during the subsequent hearings conditioned the legislative responses. The 
electoral system at this time was especially unstable; the LA riots took place on April 29, 
1992, and the Clinton-Bush-Perot elections were held on November 3rd of that same year. 
This election was remarkable for numerous reasons including the fact that no one 
candidate received even 44% of the popular vote (Clinton had 43.01%, Bush had 37.45%, 
and Perot had 18.91%, also making it atypically a three-way race); this lack of a clear 
majority indicates fundamental instability in the system (Pew Research Center 2012). 
Clinton’s victory was also the first presidential success for the Democrats after three 
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consecutive Republican triumphs, and was inevitably met with political upheaval in 
various forms (Lelp 2012). The Democrats also lost control of Congress in the 1994-
midterm elections for the first time in 40 years. All of these events point to the great 
changeability within the system at this time (Stone 2003). 
Changes in the electorate affecting party politics 
 President Clinton’s election (and the subsequent era) was further characterized by 
instability in the U.S. electoral system due to the waning Reagan coalition,107 and the 
absence of a new and emerging dominant replacement coalition (King and Smith 2011). 
Massive shifts in the ethnic electorate were beginning to transpire, which was met with 
Clinton’s inability to maintain the ethnic coalition (in fact, no one party was able to 
secure consistently the multi-ethnic minority vote). 
 According to Abramowitz, “without question, the most important change in the 
composition of the American electorate over the past several decades has been a steady 
increase in the proportion of nonWhite voters” (2009).108 This is especially relevant to the 
Rodney King case because it conditioned elites’ responses to the protests. During his 
presidency, Clinton would make claims in favor of the nonWhite community while also 
trying to tread lightly on positive racial agendas in order to garner a significant portion of 
the White vote. Ultimately, Democrats were unable to maintain a minimum White 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 Clinton and even later Obama’s elections indicate this. 
108 Abramowitz goes on to say that “this trend has been evident for at least 50 years but it 
has accelerated in the last quarter century. It is a result of increased immigration from 
Asia, Africa and Latin America, higher birth rates among minority groups, and increased 
registration and turnout among African-Americans, Hispanics, and other nonWhite 
citizens,” and that these trends will continue (2009). 
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working class vote, while Republicans could not garner minimum support from the ethnic 
coalition either (which remained unstable and inconsistent in its own right). 
 Further increasing the level of instability at the time of the Rodney King incident, 
Democrats were moving right with Clinton’s more conservative agenda, but Republicans 
maintained that their Democratic opponents “had not really changed” (King and Smith 
2011 226). In 1992, the growing ethnic electorate’s inconstancy allowed for even less 
predictability around election results and policy outcomes.109 These contradictions and 
shifting political dynamics in the electorate undoubtedly conditioned Congress’ response 
to the activists’ pleas. I however anticipated the instability to lead to a more dramatic 
shift towards positive racial policies, whereas Clinton’s conservative agenda and attempt 
to capture the White working class vote actually led to more mild concessions (see 
Frymer 2005).  
 America’s two-party system has far-reaching implications for “the role of parties 
as agents of democratic inclusion,” the system was, after all, developed in “the context of 
racial and ethnic division” (Frymer 2005 126). Based on Frymer’s (2005) argument, the 
mild concession imparted by Clinton (if a concession is given at all) is to be expected. He 
claims that Black support for the Democratic Party will persist simply because they have 
nowhere else to go (Republicans are even less representative of their needs), and thus in 
some cases Democrats can take this relationship for granted. In other cases, however, 
increasing concessions for Blacks will decrease White support for the Democratic Party 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 This lack of attachment to a single party was likely impacted by Clinton’s notoriously 
conservative political agenda. 
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and even further, he claims that increasing the Black vote can actually be an electoral 
liability. 110 
Racial alliances 
 Along with shifts in party agendas (for and against racially positively policies), 
divergent racial alliances’ (which are oftentimes linked to political parties, but not 
necessarily) ideologically laden policy agendas were also decisive in shaping elite 
response to the Rodney King case (King and Smith 2011). Discourse on crime-related 
issues in particular was heavily influenced by racial biases (at the time, and still today); 
“racial politics have infused these issues with a content and significance they would not 
otherwise have” (King and Smith 2011 215 also see When the official subject is 
presidential politics, taxes, welfare, crime, rights, or values…the real justice is Race 
Edsall (1991)). This conflict surrounding the racial underpinnings of policy (especially 
crime policy) has unnecessarily obfuscated the production of adequate mandates, which 
is only exacerbated during times of electoral instability.111 
 Surprisingly, President Clinton posited that he was in favor of more mandatory 
anti-drug laws and increased death penalties, but along with these tighter restrictions he 
also promoted programs for prevention and treatment of the underlying links to higher 
crime rates, such as poverty and unemployment. “Clinton praised the 1993 Violent Crime 
Control and Law Enforcement Act as ‘the toughest, largest, and smartest federal attack 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 “Throughout much of U.S. history, party leaders have perceived the potential support 
of Black voters as not simply leading to more votes in their electoral coalition but as 
destabilizing and divisive for winning elections” (Frymer 2005 126). 
111 “Anti-crime” orders actually started to emerge as a top political priority for both 
parties in the 1960s, “but they have [typically each] done so in ways that have been 
framed to a great extent by the concerns of the racial alliances with which they have been 
affiliated” (King and Smith 2011 228). 
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on crime’ in the nation’s history” (King and Smith 2011 230). Along with the mandate 
that I am chiefly concerned with, Section 14141, the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act also includes a three-strikes and you’re out provision that leads to life 
imprisonment, and “increase[s] the number of federal crimes that are subject to the death 
penalty” (King and Smith 2011 231). Even though I am mostly concerned with the more 
liberal Section of this bill, it should be noted that the Act also contains conservative anti-
crime rhetoric. This is likely attributed to the aforementioned point made by Frymer 
(2005) whereby Democrats are more likely to make concessions for White people than 
for Black people, but still are more likely to make concessions for Black people than 
Republicans are. Also, the first attempt to add legislation that deals with police brutality 
to the Police Accountability Act of the Omnibus Crime Bill (as Title XII) was stopped 
with a filibuster by Senate Republicans (and due to the threat of veto by President Bush), 
and it was not until the same bill appeared before the 103rd Congress (under President 
Clinton this time) that it was able to pass. 
Adapting to new realities 
 “Many analysts—and even many Republicans” claimed that Clinton had finally 
cracked the code, and “that Conservative hegemony was at an end” in 1992, and in 2009, 
voting patterns still favored Democrats (Edsall 2009). However, Whit Ayers, a 
Republican pollster, asserts that any predictions for permanent or even very long-standing 
political party control are likely to be proven wrong seeing as these predictions 
“underestimate the parties’ politicians’ ability to adapt to new realities” (Edsall 2009). 
This is relevant to the Rodney King case because in 1992 the Democrats (and even to an 
extent the Republicans) were willing to adapt to the new realities mentioned above. This 
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affected their response to the social movement’s pleas, and ultimately the passage of the 
Violent Crime Control Act, which as I mentioned earlier is largely conservative, with a 
few key racially liberal sections.112  
 THE	  TOILET	  WARS:	  	  
Proportional representation and political processes 
 The need to respond to the public’s grievances in order to maintain power was 
especially relevant for the toilet wars case seeing as they erupted at a time that affected 
both local (and to a less immediate degree national) elections. In order to appreciate how 
electoral stability will affect elite response in South Africa, it is crucial to first recognize 
the type of electoral system in which this country’s elites operate. Pre-1994, South Africa 
operated under a constituency democracy, but post-Apartheid they have shifted to a 
proportional representation system for electing officials to the central government. 
Proportional representation functions by having individuals vote for political parties, and 
then the political party determines the members of parliament (MPs). In this system, the 
percentage of votes determines how many parliamentary seats are allocated to each party 
and the individuals who claim those seats are elected using party lists. The various elite 
responses throughout the toilet wars movement were conditioned by the fact that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 King and Smith (2011) articulate these ideological shifts by describing the movement 
of Democratic ideologies from 1984-1992. In 1984, Democrats were taking a fairly 
centered stance, by stating that “neither a permissive liberalism nor a static conservatism 
is the answer to reducing crime…” and while unemployment and poverty “foster the 
criminal atmosphere, we must never let them be used as an excuse. By 1992, Democrats 
stressed that ‘crime is not only a symptom but also a major cause of the worsening 
poverty and demoralization that afflicts inner city communities,’ a signal reversal of their 
earlier emphasis” (226). 
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“anti-dignity” case took place in late 2010, followed soon after by the release of the 
images in 2011, which then brought the issue to national attention and impacted 
municipal elections across the nation in May of 2011. The latter example (which was 
influenced by the former) also had a significant and direct (but belated) impact on the 
general elections for the new National Assembly in 2014. 
 Also of consequence to the Toilet Wars case, the Western High Court 
(particularly Judge Erasmus) played a significant role in advancing elite response and 
consequent concessions to the movement’s pleas. The sitting president inadvertently has 
a role in court-related processes as well because, according to the terms of section 174 (6) 
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) the president appoints South 
Africa’s High Court judges from a list provided by the Judicial Service Commission. 
Along with the president, MPs province premiers, municipality elites, etc., the justices 
and other members of the court systems (in particular the Western High Court) all 
advanced decisions that had an effect on the social movement’s pleas, and were all 
influenced by electoral stability. 
Party politics 
 The Western Cape is the only South African province that is not ruled by the 
ANC (instead the opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA) is the presiding party 
in this province), which makes the political activity here especially formidable and 
consequential (and also allows for a more direct comparative analysis of party 
contestation between the U.S. and South Africa). At first the DA’s campaign alone was 
negatively affected by the protests, but after the problem gained national exposure, the 
ANC also began to receive blame. The political contestation that surrounded the toilet 
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wars both positively and negatively impacted the protestors’ cause. The issue received 
greater attention due to its timing, in line with the elections, but it was also overly 
politicized.113 The politicization helped initiate some level of response and attention from 
political elites that may have otherwise not been had, but it also led to numerous 
unfulfilled promises that were made to help boost party-campaigns. 
 Helen Zille, the DA premier of the Western Cape responded favorably (in the 
end) to Judge Erasmus’ ruling that the province must provide better enclosures for the 
toilets. Phakathi (2012) claims that Zille finally responded to the ruling because her 
public image was in question. Despite Zille’s eventual submission to the court ruling, the 
politics around the case continued to escalate; Zille claimed that the ANCYL had 
destroyed the newly constructed enclosures as a tactic to hurt the DA’s public relations 
(Phakathi 2012). Judge Erasmus criticized both parties for their lack of regard for the 
impact that their politically motivated actions were having on citizens and their inability 
to see past the political battle to address the legitimate needs of their impoverished 
constituents. Again, although the electoral condition helped bring attention to the 
movement’s campaign, it also led to less fulfilling responses. Some analysts (including 
Gibson 2015) think that multiracial political coalitions must be formed in order to make 
positively racial policy decisions that can be understood across race lines. Electoral 
stability tends to refer to whose vote is in question when the instability arises, and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 The issue began being utilized by both the DA and the ANC to make support their 
personal political campaigns by making claims against the other party’s inability to 
provide proper service delivery. The literature on this was so heavily opinionated, it was 
difficult to determine which provinces are actually being properly serviced and which are 
not, because the scholarship is laden with personal opinion and political campaign 
rhetoric. 
 	  
185 
political moves necessary to garner that support for a particular party, but because South 
Africa’s political parties are less variable than the United States’, the level of stability 
actually affected elite’s response in their pursuit of personal power within their respective 
political parties. The South Africa Reconciliation Barometer Survey (2013) asked, a 
group of citizens (grouped on race and level of living standard measure) if they would 
consider joining a different political party, 41.4% of all people would “rather not vote at 
all than join another political party,” but by race Blacks were the most willing to change 
(Wale 2013 24). 
 ELITE	  RESPONSE	  	  
Summary of variable’s operationalization: 
 I have operationalized elite responses to fall along a scale from repressing the 
movement to initiating major changes in response to the movement’s pleas.114 In the two 
cases at hand, as with most civil uproars, elites 115responded to the riots as well as to the 
pleas. For clarity I will briefly outline both types of responses, but I am chiefly interested 
in their response to the pleas.  
 Piven argues that elites will typically respond to the pleas of a social movement in 
order to maintain their own power, and will typically respond once the movement has 
effectively disrupted the system. The response will then typically be made with the elites’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Scale: Repression Ignoring Symbolic Response Cooption  Minor 
concessions Major changes 
115 “In response to the statement: You could never imagine being part of a political party 
made up mainly of (other race group) people, 32.8% of South Africans agree that they 
could not imagine being a racial minority in a political party and 30.9% disagree. The 
percentage of agreement is lowest for White South Africans (18.7%) and highest for 
Black South Africans 36.6%” (Wale 2013 24). 
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interests or the national interest in mind. For example, if the protesting group is seen to 
play a pivotal role in nation building (Skrentny 2000), or if the movement-requests fit 
within the elite’s agenda (Piven 1976; Omi and Winant 1994), then elite’s will respond 
favorably. 
 THE	  RODNEY	  KING	  CASE:	  	  
Response to the riots 
 The LAPD was actually uncharacteristically slow to respond to the riots’ 
disruption, but Governor Pete Wilson of California, called in the National Guard within a 
day and quickly enstated a curfew. President George Bush also responded by ordering in 
military troops and riot-trained officers to control the situation in Los Angeles. The riots 
were repressed, but largely with the intention of halting the violence to protect citizens 
and bystanders from abuse. 
Response to the pleas: 
Investigations 
 In the Rodney King case, multiple investigations were ordered in response to the 
riots in order to explore police brutality within the LAPD, and the nation at-large. 
However it should be noted that investigations in general tend signify a symbolic 
response more so than a major political shift or even a more minor concession. The 
LAPD actually ordered an internal investigation in addition to the national investigation 
ordered by the DOJ. These investigations were clearly in response to the public outcry 
(and the dissemination of the video footage), seeing as numerous acts of police brutality 
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had gone largely unnoticed before this incident unfolded.116 117 The protests were called to 
stop after they had already had a significant impact on the public’s opinion and 
consequently the political elite. According to a Washington Post poll from 1992, “99 
percent of those questioned, both Blacks and Whites, said they had read or heard about 
the verdict. And more than nine out of 10 said they had seen portions of the video” 
(Morin and Warden 1992). 
Hearings 
 The national response post-investigation was to hold hearings led by the US 
House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Civil and 
Constitutional Rights. These hearings, in addition to the Federal Grand Jury’s indictment 
of Koon, Powell, Wind, and Briseno in violation of Rodney King’s civil rights began as 
symbolic responses, but led to more significant concessions when District Court Judge 
John Davies sentenced Koon and Powell to 30-months in prison. 
Legislation 
 Crucially, Congress also provided what I would deem minor concessions by 
drafting and passing legislation to deter police violence by incorporating the Police 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 Also, the fact that Paul King and George Holliday’s attempts to call attention to the 
incident had gone unnoticed makes clear that the responses were in fact as a result of the 
social movement actions put forth (including the dissemination of the video footage). 
117 Further investigation must be done to determine if our currently ability to capture 
police misconduct on camera can play a similar role to the videotape of Rodney King. 
Based on the recent episodes of police brutality in 2014-2015 it would appear that video 
continues to have a significant impact on the public’s response. However, today society is 
less likely to consume balanced news in reaction to such videos and events, and can 
choose to listen to a take on the story that aligns with their preconceived views, which is 
unlikely to affect the hierarchy in the long run. The potential, too, for collecting massive 
amounts of video of police conduct (for example through lapel cameras) may lead to an 
inundation of resources, and will no longer serve viewers with the same force of novelty 
that the Rodney King case provided. 
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Accountability Act to the Omnibus Crime Bill as Title XII, after a law that attempted to 
grant power to individual litigants in an attempt to address structural police reform 
already failed, “The George H.W. Bush DOJ and police advocacy groups strongly 
opposed the inclusion of any such individual right of action, eventually contributing to 
the measure’s failure” (Rushin 2014 3214). However, liberal members of Congress 
continued to address police brutality as a systemic issue. The Police Accountability Act 
“which would have authorized both private and publically initiated structural police 
reform,” and even included various more conservative agenda’s in an attempt to win over 
Congressional Republicans, but it nonetheless died in a filibuster (Rushin 2014 3214). 
However, in 1993, the 103rd Congress drafted the Violent Control and Law Enforcement 
Act (as a result of the Christopher Commission’s investigation, which found that police 
brutality is endemic to the system). It was later codified as USC 42 Section 14141, giving 
the federal government authority to pursue cases of police brutality, surprisingly as 
Rushin (2014) points out, the “national news media paid virtually no attention to the 
passage of [this] structural police reform” (3214).118 
 Ultimately, the response that led to the drafting of this legislation was based on 
the notion that police departments writ-large must be dealt with in order to stop the 
pattern of misconduct that currently plagues our society. The success of this bill can be 
seen in the consent decrees issued with the police departments of Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania (1997), Steubenville, Ohio (1997), and Cincinnati, Ohio (2002), which now 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 Professor James Fyfe stood by this new law and claimed that the officers could 
previously act abusively without fear of interference. Dr. Fyfe was an academic with a 
Ph.D. in criminal justice, an author, a police officer, and retired as a lieutenant. He has a 
long legacy of promoting more just police practices (Baker 2005). 
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serve as models for how police departments ought to conduct themselves in order to 
avoid federal intervention. 
 The modesty of the progressive sections within the Violent Crime Control Act 
may be attributed to an effort put forth by the Democrats to maintain White support, 
while also appeasing the Black population with a minor concession. Because the 
Republicans and the Democrats both struggled to form a new coalition to replace the 
fading Reagan coalition, both parties were encouraged to compromise and adapt to the 
political realities of 1992. 
 However, in many cases racial conservatives remained in support of bills that 
heighten the retribution for crime, whereas liberals were in favor of instilling programs 
that could help to prevent the structural patterns of crime and delinquency (King and 
Smith 2011) (which is cast under a similar light to Section 14141, which aims to address 
the patterns and practices of police brutality). This racially polarized understanding of 
justice within the American system was depicted in by a Washington Post poll 
(conducted in 1992) that demonstrates both races were in accordance that police brutality 
is prevalent and wrong, but they splinter in their claims for what that alludes to for the 
criminal justice system. White people claimed that Black people do not think that Black 
people cannot get justice in the system, whereas Black people think the opposite (Morin 
and Warden 1992). Essentially, Blacks and Whites were shown to differ in how they 
interpret the root of the problem and potential solutions. 
 Previously, I demonstrated how the electoral instability in 1992 both hampered 
and aided in elite’s immediate response to social movement actions. Arguably, the 
instability led to a more minor response in the direct aftermath of the event (but without 
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any instability there may have been no response). However, the Cincinnati case of 2002 
demonstrates the broad-reaching and long-term impact that the passage of Section 14141 
has had. In response to the Timothy Thomas case, where an unarmed Black man was 
killed by police officers after his attempted arrest on “more than a dozen nonviolent, 
misdemeanor warrants.” “The Justice Department [under Section 14141] entered into an 
agreement with police officials in 2002 resulting in a litany of reforms of all facets of the 
city's use of deadly force protocol – from the wording used in the rule book to the 
training procedures to the board that reviews police brutality complaints” (Shaffer 2014). 
It is understood that there have since been significant improvements made in police-
community relations (Shaffer 2014). 
 THE	  TOILET	  WARS:	  	  
Response to the riots 
 In response to the toilet war protests in particular, there were numerous attempts 
to charge protestors for destruction, or other issues that were not directly related to the 
protests’ underlying calls for actions— in a bid to repress the activists in the moment and 
to threaten future protest action. However, these attempts were not able stop to the 
protestors, or the future positive responses from high court and national officials. 
Response to the pleas 
Court ruling 
 In response to the anti-dignity case, Judge Erasmus of Western Cape High Court 
said that the unenclosed toilets are a question of human dignity and privacy and he called 
for the City to provide legitimate enclosures. The City acted on this request, but before 
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conceding, officials argued that they were not actually operating outside of their 
governmental agreement, which requires them to provide adequate toilets and sanitation 
for their residents. Nonetheless, the Western High Court contended that the present 
conditions were in violation of Khayelitsha resident’s Constitutional rights and therefore 
must be changed. 
Symbolic settlement 
 The ambiguity in the laws surrounding this issue, as well as the vagueness of 
Judge Erasmus’ court order hindered the urgency and scope of the City’s response, but in 
spite of that, the issue was still eventually dealt with to some degree. Furthermore, the 
aforementioned march also promoted the mayor of Cape Town to provide money to hire 
janitors, but the horrid working conditions led to further unrest. One of the most effective 
responses (or that which could potentially become the most effective response) was put 
forth in September 2011, when Tokyo  m Sexwale (the Minister for Human Settlements) 
appointed Winnie Mandela to head a newfound national task team to investigate the issue 
of open toilets throughout South Africa (Robins 2014 484). This response may have 
begun as a symbolic settlement, but it also has the potential to make wide sweeping 
changes in line with the social movement’s pleas.  
 BACKLASH	  	  
Summary of variable’s operationalization 
 
 Backlash is typically seen when the White hegemony feels threatened by elite 
responses in favor of social movement pleas. Backlash can be understood as motions 
presented that promote racially biased policies (protective of Whites) in order to push 
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back newly suggested, racially positive policies. It may also materialize as the 
introduction of new policies that could make the egalitarian policy null, or may even be 
understood as the speaking out against concessions before they become policy 
The Rodney King Case: 
Two types of backlash 
 “Pro-police” claims, or excuses for police violence, as well as claims against 
federal intervention can all be understand as backlash in reference to the Rodney King 
case. The former includes claims that race-conscious advocates are “‘soft on crime,’ 
particularly crime by nonwhites” (King and Smith 2011). While the latter includes 
assertions made around dissatisfaction for the process by which this mandate determines 
if a police officer has acted wrongfully. In response to the mandate, many people 
(especially conservative congressmen) spoke out with claims stating that the federal 
government is not the appropriate level of government for dealing with local issues 
regarding law enforcement, and that repercussions for police brutality should be dealt 
with on the local level. 
Minor backlash overall 
 Backlash to this policy in particular has been remarkably mild, but nonetheless, 
action against racially biased policing and crime control has generated significant debate. 
The minimal racial backlash to the policy itself can likely be attributed to the fact that, 
not only is the concession made by the bill minor, but also that the Act itself received 
very little public attention. In fact the Rodney King case at-large was discussed 
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surprisingly little in the following 1992 election, despite the heavy emphasis on anti-
crime and other law enforcement issues throughout the campaign.119 
Federal argument 
 The primary backlash against the bill features arguments against federal 
government intervention in local issues. Simmons (2008) claims that in general the law 
does not follow ideal democratic processes because the actors who are most significantly 
affected by the problems that the law sets out to rectify are not involved in the resolution 
process. The law allows the Attorney General to pursue injunctive relief for patterns of 
police misconduct; ultimately giving the federal government the ability to intervene in 
local affairs regarding police misconduct, especially regarding acts of abuse. The federal 
input is given in an attempt to deal with issues on a grander scale, the systemic level. 
“Rather than initiate lawsuits to reform the agencies, DOJ’s current strategy is to 
negotiate reforms using a process that involves only DOJ representatives, municipality, 
officials, and police management officials.” Simmons (2008) also critiques the law for 
potentially compromising the police-community partnership further because it fails to 
involve the rank-and-file police or the community in its negotiations (this may also 
simply be due to the limited impact of the law that I discussed above in terms of elite 
response). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 “The intertwining race and criminal justice policies in American history is long-
standing. Antebellum pro-slavery southerners resisted penitentiaries in part because 
abolitionists favored them as preferable to permanent servitude. Hard-line Jim Crow 
supporters favored the convict leasing system in the early twentieth century to control 
Blacks and boost the southern economy. Moderate racial Progressives thought 
rehabilitative prisons might help to ‘uplift’ African Americans. At the national level, as 
we have seen, segregationists and anti-segregationists warred over the creation of federal 
anti-lynching laws throughout the New Deal” (King and Smith 2011 219).  
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Positive feedback 
 However, the response to the bill, however minimal, has been predominately 
positive. Administrative reforms have been accepted as the next step toward dismantling 
the injustice that pervades the law enforcement system. And, the backlash to this mandate 
does not seem to have been able to make a significant impact on the actual 
implementation of the law. However, the full impact remains to be seen considering there 
have been relatively few (and most of which have been underpublicized) negotiations 
under this statute. 
Backlash to police brutality efforts at-large 
 Backlash regarding police brutality, however, was potent in 1993 and continues to 
persist today, which may have actually hindered (by anticipation) more major 
concessions from first transpiring. In 1992, the Democratic Party’s platform stressed 
“that crime is not only a symptom but also a major cause of the worsening poverty and 
demoralization that afflicts inner city communities,” but they were also in favor of 
increasing the number of police officers and extending the death penalty. This 
contradiction may help to explain why the concession was so minor, and consequently 
why there seemed to be so little White backlash. The police brutality section was a small 
component of an already fairly conservative bill. Interestingly, despite this clear shift to 
the center under President Clinton, Republican opponents maintained that the Democrat’s 
stances had not dramatically changed (King and Smith 2011). 
 
 	  
195 
THE	  TOILET	  WARS	  CASE:	  	  
Opposition party backlash 
 The most relevant “backlash” responses made during the toilet wars were even 
less overtly racially charged than those made in the U.S. case. The most significant 
backlash, or that which is most commonly identified by the media, was put forth by the 
DA in response to the concessions made by ANC policy elites. However, this backlash 
primarily pointed towards claims against the positive responses to the pleas that were 
voiced during toilet wars, especially the responses that required action by the DA.  
 In particular, the DA made claims that the ANCYL was trying to destabilize their 
upcoming campaign and was personally attacking their official positions by propagating 
a nonissue (Phakathi 2012). Hellen Zille, the DA premier for the Western Cape region, 
claimed that the ANC protests in her region are purposefully trying to inhibit service 
delivery to Cape Town. The Western Cape, as previously noted, is the only province in 
South Africa that is ruled by the opposition party. This province also has notably deep 
class and wealth disparities that are directly associated with racial divisions. (See table) 
	  
Figure	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  Average	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 Whites lead the DA, according to Seale (2012), “it would be fair to call the DA a 
White-led party, but you would be mistaken if you called it a White party” seeing as its 
Black membership has begun to rise (although the leadership of the party, especially in 
relation to my theory is the primary determinant of policy outcomes). This political party 
was seemingly responsive to the pleas of the social movement, at the time of the 
movement but also tended to react with contention that led to hesitation and protracted 
action (especially to the requests made by national-level elite, usually members of the 
ANC). South Africa’s service delivery operations are far more defective, meaning they 
are less stable, provide fewer services, are less timely, and are overall less adequate, in 
the country’s already more vulnerable regions (especially informal townships). And 
furthermore, these regions (which are predominantly Black; see conversation on legacy 
of Apartheid mapping above) also bear the greatest costs for poor service delivery 
because they more heavily rely on this state-funded service for survival (Bond 2004).  
Racial claims 
 More racially charged backlash-laden claims also arose during the toilet wars, but 
from a broader association of people (who are not necessarily linked to a single political 
party): “South Africa is all about the Black people now” (Malala 2012). One man in 
particular stated, “This government that’s in power does not care about us White 
people… As a White person I feel alienated from the government. Politicians tell us that 
we are a ‘rainbow nation’ and yet discriminate against us with their pro-Black policies. 
How is that different from Apartheid?” (Malala 2012). These assertions against racially 
positive polices have historically been made in opposition to the types of issues focused 
on in the Reconstruction Development Programme (RDP) such as minimizing economic 
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inequities, reconciling past overtly racist education policies, and especially expanding 
social services (such as basic service delivery).120 Today, Blacks are privileged in very 
minor ways such as assisted access to government jobs rather than in more important 
ways such as basic service delivery (or even equitable service delivery). Thus, because 
these Black biases are minor and Whites have continued to maintain more major 
structural biases, they also maintain power. The White working class backlash in South 
Africa is typically in relation to their intermediary positioning whereby they are not 
receiving additional protection from the government (such that lower class people 
receive) or the corporations (such that upper class people have) (Marx 1996). This 
resentment is heightened in times that the government makes, even minor, concessions in 
favor of lower class (and typically Black) South Africans. 
 LEVEL	  OF	  CHANGE	  IN	  HIERARCHY	  	  
Summary of variable’s operationalization 
 My final variable, the variable that will be impacted by each of the 
aforementioned variables’ progression and influence, and ultimately that which I am 
aiming to assess, is the level of change in hierarchy that results from the social movement 
actions that took place. A change in the hierarchy will be assessed by both the political 
and societal measures that ultimately affect the overall inclusiveness of society—both the 
social relegation of peoples to the edges of society as well as the policies that reflect 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 The RDP takes on both socialist and neo-liberal qualities in an attempt to address the 
economic state of South Africa as a crucial component to the country’s transformation to 
democracy. It was implemented in 1994 during Nelson Mandela’s administration 
(Padayachee 20005). 
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inclusiveness. Thus, both positive policy shifts as well as an overall increase in racially 
positive social actions must be assessed in order to determine if a comprehensive 
alteration has been made to the hierarchy. I will be evaluating if Whites’ responses to 
inclusive policies have changed as well as if the contemporary issues on the national 
agenda reflect changes in contemporary problems.121 The presiding administrations’ 
ideological viewpoints may also indicate a change in hierarchy; not only in whether or 
not racially biased policies are being presented and passed, but also if racially biased 
political elites are being elected into office in the first place. Importantly, the level of 
change will vary from a complete shift in the hierarchy to more subtle shifts that may 
affect the entirety of society or just particular aspects depending on the elite’s response. 
 THE	  RODNEY	  KING	  CASE:	  
 In the Rodney King case, the legislation that was put forth in response to the LA 
Riots (and other social movement actions throughout the case) clearly addresses at least 
one of the key underlying issues related to ongoing patterns and practices of police 
misconduct. It attempts to remedy the issue within the police departments themselves by 
putting forth a national policy that all police departments theoretically must adhere to. 
This mandate strives to fix the underlying network related to the problem of police 
brutality by having created a new system of redress that threatens intervention from the 
top-down. As such, the mandate does not necessarily set standards that are disseminated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 In this regard, it will be necessary to evaluate why an issue is or is not on the national 
agenda. If the problem is being ignored, repressed, or dealt with, or if the problem has 
been dealt with and has since become a non-issue. 
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to all, but rather through the process it sets forth (investigation and redress for individual 
police departments), individualized standards are set.  
 This top-down policy prescription was the response to a bottom-up social 
movement. As I hypothesized, bottom-up social movements are more likely to lead to a 
weakening of the racial hierarchy because they are more representative of the 
community’s grievances than are top-down movements. In order to shift public 
perception, which is a primary component to the functioning of racial hierarchies, it is 
crucial to understand the predominant ideologies that are dictating public opinion and 
consequent actions. By taking heed of the affected community’s grievances, (personally 
and with regard to their public interactions) more adequate and consequently sustainable 
change may take place. 
 However, in order to create a complete shift in the hierarchy, we must address the 
issues that have also led to police brutality; the issues within the social, political, and 
economic structures of society that allow for racists’ wrongdoings to appear permissible 
in any manner. This ideal level of change likely will not materialize from a single set of 
responses to a single episode or movement. Numerous movements that all express 
varying types and degrees of grievance related to Black subjectivity must take place in 
order to affect the system in its entirety, but each single movement is still relevant to and 
necessary for larger-scale change. 
 The individual occurrences within a single social movement that will lead to some 
measure of weakening the racial hierarchy are provided by each of my aforementioned 
variables: A group’s grievances must be relayed to the political elite, oftentimes through 
social movement actions. The political elite then responds to these grievances, but are 
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heavily conditioned by the level of electoral stability during that time, which may lead to 
backlash, but will also ultimately affect the hierarchy in some capacity.122 In order to 
determine the impact that the movement associated with Rodney King had on the 
hierarchical system, we must assess the impact of Section 14141 on society, as well as 
the impact that the precipitating event had on individuals’ understanding of police 
brutality as it relates to the racial hierarchy.123 
 The pattern of excessive force against African Americans by police officers is an 
issue that must be addressed directly, but the elite response ought to also deal with the 
underscoring issues that lead to this excessive force in order to foresee changes in 
America’s racial hierarchy. For instance, in 1967, racial liberals insisted that “Americans 
best hope for preventing crime and delinquency…” means “strengthening families ‘often 
shattered by the grinding pressures of urban slums,” more resources to “slum schools” 
and “enlarging economic opportunities” for all (King and Smith 2011 221). Furthermore, 
political elites need to also address the frame of mind that police officers must operate 
under in order to willingly abuse citizens, especially at an increased rate due to racial 
biases (potentially through training). 
  In 1992, after the Rodney King incident, 34 percent of Whites surveyed by 
Siegelman et al (1997) claimed that discrimination is a cause of racial disparities, 
compared to 94 percent of Blacks. Before the incident, 36 percent of Whites thought 
discrimination was a cause of racial disparities, while 77 percent of Blacks thought so. 
Also, when asked if they approve of police striking an adult, 77 percent of Whites 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 This understanding can also be applied to the Toilet Wars case. 
123 Or if the Rodney King incident brought to light other racially biased issues outside of 
police brutality. 
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disapproved pre-incident (67 percent post-incident) and 48 percent of Blacks pre-incident 
(36 percent of Blacks post-incident). Today, there is a general pessimism amongst the 
Black community regarding the future of race relations. Following the acquittal of 
George Zimmerman after the death of Trayvon Martin, this pessimism became even more 
severe. 41 percent of Blacks and 67 percent of Whites said they were very or somewhat 
satisfied with Black treatment in the United States. (Previous to the Trayvon Martin case, 
47 percent of Blacks said that they were very or somewhat satisfied with Black treatment 
in the United States) (Gallup 2014). Thus, the catalyzing events picked up by the media 
can both help create and further instill a sense of Black subjectivity, and decrease 
optimism for the future of race relations. Also evident by this data, typically following 
media-focused events both Whites and Blacks are more likely to understand the overall 
issue of racial bias in the United States, but nonetheless the policy prescription and 
appreciation for the structural ailments faced by the Black community remain split. 
 The featured law of this case study is notably mild in comparison to the relevance 
of and copious amounts of police brutality that American citizens face. But, political 
leaders have the power to put forth laws that can dramatically impact the lives of their 
constituents, and ultimately alter the system, which would simultaneously affect 
society.124 However, these legislative decisions are greatly affected by the stability of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 For more dramatic hierarchical shifts away from racial biases, systemic changes must 
be able to influence the individual’s frame of mind and consequently their actions. For 
the U.S. case, we must rectify the issue of racial bias on an individual level, and seek 
justice for those who have been affected by the misgivings of a racist society, including 
police brutality itself. Wrongdoers must be penalized for their actions in order to ensure 
that the offenders take responsibility for their actions and to also promote reluctance 
amongst other racist acts. Innocent officers should not be penalized, but all officers 
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electorate when the decisions are being made (the moment that they are responding to the 
public’s grievances). In 1992, the electorate was in flux due to the lack of resolve within 
the growing ethnic coalition, the shifting racial alliances and the dramatic shifts in party 
power with the election of President Clinton and the Democrat’s subsequent loss of 
congressional power. Each of these factors likely impacted the scale and type of decisions 
made in response to the Rodney King case (i.e. the passage of The Police Accountability 
Act). 
 Carmines and Stimson (1986) writes, “The role of the electorate in issue evolution 
is to respond to some issues and not to others. The process is analogous to the nature 
selection of the biological world. Elites provide cues about issue definition. Many in 
number, complex, and contradictory, most are seeds on fallow ground, ignited by an 
inattentive electorate” (915). The various elite reactions to the Rodney King case 
provided minor concessions at best, with many other measures thwarted by mere 
symbolic response. However, I maintain that a level of change in the racial hierarchy 
must be sought in both the social and the political spheres of society, and that there is 
power in numerous more minor movements (and minor responses) with similar aims, as 
well as in each of these movements themselves, outside of the policy response.  
 Even though the mandate was mild and underpublicized, it is important to 
recognize the feat of nonetheless having it passed. Because it was codified into law, its 
impact can grow over time and through endless new applications (for example in 
Cincinnati, Ohio in 2002). Furthermore, the precipitating events that eventually led to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
should be subject to a system that provides adequate training and proper redress in order 
to ensure an end to police brutality. 
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social movement actions around the Rodney King incident garnered both individual and 
collective societal responses, as well as elite responses. This collective pursuit and 
heightened understanding of police brutality as consequential to society at large further 
illustrates the advantage to grassroots social movements, as opposed to top-down 
movements, because even though the elite’s response was relatively mild, the movement 
still led to public discourse around the problem, which may continue to have incremental 
impact over time. This positive action however must also be considered in conjunction 
with the also growing use of policing such as stop and frisk and broken windows acts of 
today. The conversation around racial inequities has certainly increased in prevalence, 
but police brutality does not seem to have significantly declined since Rodney King as 
explicated by the aforementioned Trayvon Martin public opinion data. In fact, according 
to “a recent report by the Youth Justice Coalition, a California-based organization 
working to reform Los Angeles’ juvenile justice system” it has actually increased. “[This 
organization] found that the percentage of homicides carried out by police in Los Angeles 
county more than doubled from 3 to 7 percent between 2000 and 2014” (Lewis 2014).125 
 However, the issues with data capture regarding police brutality continue to serve 
as impediments for fully grasping the state of police brutality today, and over time. 
Nonetheless anecdotal accounts as well as media records appear to suggest that the issue 
prevails. As such, the movement around the Rodney King incident in particular, or even 
police brutality at-large, appears to have been unable to sustain throughout the years from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 “Since 2007, when community violence began to decline significantly, law 
enforcement use of deadly force resulting in homicide as a percentage of all homicides 
has 
doubled to between 4 and 8%, averaging 6% with a total of 314 deaths” (Youth Justice 
Coalition 2014).  
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1992 to now. In fact, in the past year, since the media has once again picked up the issue, 
new social movement actions against police brutality have spurred. Without adequate 
organization however, I argue these grievances will once again face the fleeting cyclical 
routine of news coverage and consequently fail to continually bring about change. 
Incremental change brought about by a movement may lead to significant social shifts so 
long as the movement is sustained over time. 
 THE	  TOILET	  WARS	  CASE:	  
 The toilet wars clearly garnered numerous responses from political elites at 
varying levels (including municipality, province, central, and judicial). However little 
new formal legislation was enacted. For the most part, there was already fairly 
comprehensive legislation in place that addressed the grievances put forth by the 
protestors, but unfortunately there was a lack of faithful implementation of older 
legislative promises. These various mandates (especially within the constitution) helped 
to heighten the perception of grievance in townships, which further incited social 
movement actions, along with the aforementioned precipitating events. These mandates 
were also frequently referenced in the political elites’ responses to social movement 
pleas. For example, Judge Eramus’ made numerous calls for the City to act in protection 
of its citizen’s constitutionally and state-sanctioned rights. 
 The politician’s responses were also clearly conditioned by the level of electoral 
stability; the protests transpired at the onset of municipal elections, and thus garnered 
additional elite attention. Unfortunately, however, many of the promises made were not 
carried out or brought to completion, and instead were shallow attempts to maintain and 
vie for political power. Nonetheless, the movement did reach the national agenda, and 
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was able to cultivate far-reaching support that has continued to be been built upon 
since.126 
 Minor concessions and numerous symbolic responses primarily made up the elite 
reaction to the toilet wars. However, like in the Rodney King case, the potential for 
bottom-up movements to garner a broad base of public support was also capitalized on 
and the issues surrounding the toilet wars were made abundantly clear across the nation. 
Political elites were able to see their constituents’ concerns in a new light through the 
social movement actions put forth, and individual as well as collective societal support 
was captured (at least within certain communities). 
 The ruling elite plays a significant role in how racial hierarchies appear, and when 
new light is cast upon their citizen’s grievances, they should make moves that address 
these grievances (although I concede that state of electoral stability will inform these 
moves).127 A change in hierarchy may be most effected by the ruling elite’s ideologies (or 
shifts in their ideologies) as well as their subsequent promotion and proper 
implementation of existing mandates. 
 In the Toilet Wars case, the elite response was especially symbolic; it failed to 
provide any serious policy reform. Policy “reform,” considered separately as the writing 
of new policy, was less of a demand in the South African case because adequate policy 
did exist. Unlike in the U.S., this social movement aimed to engage with the problems 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Amongst those that responded to the toilet wars are, the Western Cape High Court; the 
Human Rights Commission; various political representatives; various social movement 
activists; other service delivery protestors; the mass media, and the Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation. 
127 Many of the reasons for change (and lack of change) in the level of hierarchy that I 
discussed in the Rodney King case run parallel to the toilet wars case.  
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surrounding the lack of full and proper implementation of these policies. But, nonetheless 
the largely symbolic responses proffered did not have an immediate impact on policy 
reform (in either sense). However, I still maintain that symbolic actions may eventually 
be able inspire these new social ideologies, and lead to grater change over time. 
Incremental changes over a long period of time may in fact be able to create societal 
shifts, but in order for this to happen, citizens must trust their political leaders.  
 The political system and the leaders therein can have a significant impact on 
people’s perceptions, especially in South Africa because citizens, broadly speaking, are 
inclined to put their faith in the ANC. Political leaders control policies that may help 
individuals or groups of people seize opportunities, which could potentially make society 
more economically and politically equitable. Political leaders can also promote a 
particular ideology of equality and make political decisions based on that ideology. I 
argue that if society were actually more equal, and not gradated and by class as it relates 
to race, related hostility would recede. Leaders in democratic societies must inspire and 
promote policies that are no longer reflective of racial biases. They should also subscribe 
to ideologies that will lead the public to believe that equality is best for themselves and 
their community, which would lead to improved social interactions, less backlash, more 
racially-positive policies overall, and thus greater equality.128 
 Although South Africa is still divided, the service delivery movement has 
remained resilient, and continues to promote social movement actions today. Social 
movements in South Africa are a healthy phenomenon that benefit from an overall 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 This should be the case for all democratic societies, not just South Africa. 
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dedicated sense of organization. The ANCYL and the SJC provide this underlying 
organization for the movement. 
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VIII.	  CONCLUSION	  AND	  RESULTS	  
 I entered this project assuming that the connection between social movements and 
a change in racial hierarchy would follow a certain path. Granted, I anticipated that this 
path would not be linear, hence my choice to use case studies to explore this relationship 
in greater depth, but I was surprised by which variables in my theory held more weight in 
determining the final outcome of the case (which I posited as a change in hierarchy), and 
which variables merged with or were more influential to the outcome of proceeding 
variables. For example, I did not expect that in general White backlash played a much 
smaller role in altering other variables’ processes, than elite stability, which severely 
conditioned elite response and thus was also consequential to the outcome of my 
dependent variable. I operationalized my dependent variable to be twofold: to express 
changes in both political and social actions.  
 The factors that produced a direct response from my dependent variable differed 
at various points during the accounts of the two case studies. For example, at times elite 
response proved to be the most potent means for producing a reaction from my dependent 
variable, while at other times it appeared that the social movement actions themselves had 
the greatest influence. As such, I have come to discover that a change in the hierarchy, in 
fact, will be met with the unification of each of my variables, at various times. In order to 
ultimately create social change, society writ-large as well as political elite must be willing 
to (or potentially forced to) subscribe to the shift. In this section, I intend to clarify some 
of the primary themes that emerged in my case study analysis by juxtaposing my theory 
with findings and examples to support claims for why these themes are relevant. 
Conducting a comparative case study was the most useful means for testing my theory to 
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determine if the occurrences related to social movements that led to a change in hierarchy 
in one country would also lead to a change in hierarchy for another. In this section, I aim 
to discuss how social movements can and cannot serve as positive means for weakening 
racial hierarchies based on the findings I presented in my previous analyses. 
 OVERVIEW	  OF	  PROJECT	  
 The goal of this project was ultimately to determine if social movements could 
actually be a force in weakening racial hierarchies, and if so, what conditions must be 
present for this to occur. In order to properly interrogate this question it was crucial to 
develop a comprehensive understanding around the conventions of social movements as 
well as the function of and nuances surrounding the racial hierarchies within the two 
countries that I aimed to compare. To develop an understanding of the arena in which 
social movements exist; what leads to social movements; who is impacted by social 
movements; what potential effects they may have, and the function they serve in society, 
I reviewed the theories put forth by a sample of the most influential social movement 
theorists (some of whom also focused on the role of race in particular). Then, to develop 
an understanding of the racial hierarchies in these two countries, I pursued an in-depth 
historical analysis of how the racial systems have evolved, how the function of each 
hierarchy has evolved throughout history, as well as the various influences that have 
historically gained leverage to weaken the respective hierarchies. After this it was 
necessary to delve into contemporary race relations, post-institutionalized racism, in 
order to apply my theory to modern day situations. In order to accurately depict the role 
of race in contemporary U.S. and South Africa, I chose to interrogate an aspect of each 
society that remains disproportionately racialized. 
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 For the United States, I looked at police-minority relations, and in particular the 
police brutality that occurred in the Rodney King case of 1992. For South Africa, I 
looked at service delivery, and in particular poor service delivery to the townships in the 
Western Cape, with an emphasis on the unenclosed toilets that led to protest in 2011. 
Choosing to conduct case studies as my method of analysis allowed me to pick two cases 
that were especially relevant to what I aimed to test: issues that are generating protest and 
are also racially charged. 
 PRIMARY	  LESSON	  LEARNED	  
 Broadly speaking, in South Africa the change in hierarchy that resulted from the 
Toilet Was movement was primarily restricted to one component of my dependent 
variable; an increase in social awareness around service delivery issues. In this case, the 
Toilet War’s primary social movement actions transpired prior to an upcoming nation-
wide municipal election, which created instability amongst the elite, thus conditioning 
their response to the movement’s pleas. The political component of the response 
therefore remained largely symbolic, and provided few tangible changes to policy 
implementation related to service delivery. The movement itself, as well as the elites’ 
responses were also informed by the fact that comprehensive policy related to proper 
service delivery was already enacted in South Africa, but was largely not carried out. As 
such, the development perceived grievances for this case was a much more expedient 
process than for the U.S. case because the necessary policies were already codified (and 
constitutionally-bound), which lent to individuals’ understanding that service delivery 
was owed to them by virtue of their South African citizenship. In both cases, a 
precipitating event, either the anti-dignity toilet case with the dissemination of the images 
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depicting unenclosed toilets (South Africa), or the spread of the video depicting Rodney 
King’s beating (U.S.), sparked a renewed sense of grievance in both societies, which led 
to the social movement actions. 
 The production of collective identity also varied greatly between my two cases. In 
South Africa, because the problem was public and affected entire townships in a similar 
manner, the collective identity developed out of community-held grievances. However, 
with the U.S. case, the issue of police brutality is much more private, more so pointed at 
individuals, and far less recognized by current policies, which made the process of 
developing a collective identity less straight forward. Also, unlike the South African case, 
the change in hierarchy that resulted in the Rodney King case was more politically and 
legislatively charged than socially altering. Like in the South Africa case, however, the 
elite response to the movement was deeply conditioned by instability amongst the elite 
during the time of action. The instability in the U.S. was related to changing coalitions 
and attempts at capturing both the ethnic and White-working class support. This had a 
profound effect on the elite’s willingness to respond due to the racial and ideological 
implications associated with issues of police brutality and crime. The system (especially 
influenced by President Clinton) made minor concessions in response to the social 
movement, and was able to adopt new, but mild legislation that attempted to address to 
the “patterns and practices” related to police brutality. 
 In both cases, I found that the hierarchy would only significantly alter when the 
elite response captured both the problems’ symptoms, and its underlying causes. For 
example, by enacting of Section 14141, the issue of police brutality is dealt with directly 
through the investigations and subsequent recommendations made to police departments 
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to change the patterns and practices that led to the brutality within the department in the 
first place. But, this elite response comprehensively failed to also consider more positive 
motions for addressing the underlying racial inequalities within the system that may have 
led to increased rates of crime amongst the Black community,129 or the occasionally 
negative perception of race held by police officers both of which likely compounded to 
have led to such unequal rates of abuse against the Black community as compared to the 
White community. The underlying issues that have led to disproportionate rates of 
poverty must also be dealt with. This poverty manifests as higher crime rates for Black 
Americans and poor service delivery for Black South Africans.130 As such, when these 
underlying social issues that further the cleavages within society are dealt with, race may 
become less of a distinguishing factor. Furthermore, I maintain that the that policy 
changes that manifest from social movements, or otherwise communicated public will, 
are more durable than those born out of intra-elite communication alone because the 
latter is more likely to neglect some of the important implications that such decisions may 
hold for the public.  
 COMPARABILITY	  OF	  THE	  TWO	  COUNTRIES	  AND	  CASES	  	  
History 
 Both countries underwent historical activity that led to mandated racial 
segregation that has continued to affect their modern-day social and political systems. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 This is being attributed more and more to the poverty that also jeopardizes this 
community’s chances for success. 
130 A result of the enduring aspects of Apartheid segregated townships. 
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Despite policies and efforts to move past these discriminatory systems, the political and 
social structures that articulate the culture of each of these societies are still imbued with 
racism and structural inequalities. South Africa and the United States serve as excellent 
countries for comparison within the parameters of my project because as Marx (1996) 
claims, “in South Africa and the United States, we see official racial ideology, imposed 
categories of segregation and conflict and only recent dismantling of legal 
discrimination” (181). And I argue that even the legal dismantling that appears to have 
taken place in these two states has not yet fully breached the social world; thus further 
social dismantling is necessary for the legislative dismantling to hold any credence.131 I 
am positing social movements as a positive force to help further solidify the legal 
dismantling and also promote social dismantling for these two democratic, post-
institutionally racist societies. 
Contemporary 
 Police brutality and service delivery are both localized issues that are present 
throughout their respective countries and also reflect systemic problems, which must be 
resolved on the national level. Police brutality takes place in individual cases all across 
the nation, and is generally addressed by community-level by local police departments, 
while service delivery issues also take place across South Africa and affect the individual 
(as well as the community) directly, and are addressed on the municipal level of 
governance. Because these two issues are system-wide, they both must be tackled by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 Marx argues that: Race-differences have bred conflict over time, and led to social and 
economic disparities. Race inequalities are not necessarily based on minority populations; 
deprivation may rest with the majority in a society as well (180). 
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their respective central governments—in order to make sweeping changes that will 
benefit all of those affected by the related issues. 
 These two cases are further apt for comparison because not only are police 
brutality and service delivery the two most galvanizing issues that led have to social 
movements for each of these states, but they are also both deeply entrenched in the past 
political relevancy of the racial hierarchy (in policy, mindset, and structural framework). 
 PERCEPTION	  OF	  RACE	  TODAY	  
 I maintain that social movements will be a force in prompting each of these post-
institutionally racist societies to realize the next level of inclusion for all of their people. 
At this point, without racism formally institutionalized, the institutions and structures that 
carry the legacies of the Jim Crow and Apartheid eras that perpetuate racial divisions 
today. For example geographical delineations that historically mapped South Africans 
based on race and quarantined particular groups to specific townships have continued to 
delineate the racially segregated communities of today, which has contributed to the 
racial underpinnings of contemporary service delivery issues.  
 These persisting racial conflicts also craft the basis for future inter-race relations. 
For example police brutality has alienated people by virtue of their race and has led to the 
further development of tension between some communities and bonds between others 
(Adler 2010). Individuals’ actions and thoughts, which are influenced by these 
institutions, also contribute to maintaining social divisions based on race. In order to 
weaken the hierarchy in its current state, corrective policy must be implemented; once 
political elites perceive a shift in the social sphere that indicates a demand for change, 
they will pursue more corrective policies. Furthermore, social movements are a 
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productive means for communicating this demand, as seen in both Toilet Wars case and 
the Rodney King case, and thus may be a force in weakening the current racial hierarchy.  
Social movements as intermediary got politics and public 
 Social movements operate at the point where political and social change 
converge. They may thus facilitate weakening the racial hierarchy, as it exists in both 
social and government affairs by demonstrating the public’s views (especially the 
marginalized public), and seeking to establish political attention and responses for their 
concerns. The social movement itself may also be able to increase public attention to the 
problem at hand, which will lead to an improved understanding of the problem as the 
marginalized group deals it with. For example, immediately before the Rodney King 
incident, 77 percent of surveyed Whites approved of police striking adult, but the first 
week after the incident there was a 12 percent drop in approval; 65 percent approved 
(Sigelman et al. 1997 788).132 “The percentage of White respondents taking a ‘hard’ line 
fluctuated somewhat from week to week after the incident, but never approached the 77 
percent level of the pre-incident period” (788). However, the incident itself will not 
necessarily lead to a lasting and positive social attention and response, the movement 
born out of the incident must capitalize on the shift in public perceptions that 
immediately follow such incidents, and should utilize these moments to advocate for 
positive shifts in the racial system (both through policy changes and positive 
development of society’s perception of race). Bottom-up movements in particular can 
advocate for marginalized people’s needs (which tend to be and left out of political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 The following week, two weeks after the incident, the number of Whites who 
approved of police striking adult jumped back up to 71 percent, and subsequently 64 
percent approved (Sieglman et al. 1997). 
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decision-making processes) at the junction of society and policy. Piven (1976) argues that 
grassroots movements and more chaotic or unorganized movements are the most apt for 
disrupting the system and also maintaining the movement’s integrity by representing the 
most marginalized people’s voices and steering clear of bureaucratic inefficiency or 
totalitarian management. The Rodney King incident was largely chaotic, but 
unfortunately this vary lack of underlying structure potentially led to the movement’s 
inability to endure over time, hence the once again rejuvenated motions against police 
brutality in America, starting in 2014, and the numerous examples of police brutality that 
continue to plague American society and race relations today. Fredrick Harris, a professor 
of political science at Colombia University discusses the question, “when does a moment 
become a movement?” in a Washington Post article and interrogates ideas regarding what 
needs to happen in order for these moments to be capitalized on in ways that will allow 
their message to endure over time. The article reads,  
Events such as the killing of unarmed, 18-year-old Michael Brown 
in Ferguson, Mo., can provide the moral shock that political 
movements need to build their ranks and bring attention to a 
community’s afflictions. They can be like the murder of 14-year-
old Emmett Till in 1955 or the beating death of Matthew Shepard 
in 1998 — transformative episodes that remake perceptions and 
force a society to abandon abhorrent practices. Or they can be like 
the 1991 beating of Rodney King by Los Angeles police officers: a 
horrific moment that failed to create a sustained push for broader, 
nationwide reforms of policing practices. 
 
 The uprisings in response to the Rodney King incident were certainly disruptive, 
and although the movement was not terribly long lasting, the activists were able to get 
policy elites’ attention, and instill some policy for reform (which Harris omitted from his 
discussion). This policy, although incremental, has contributed to some semblance of 
change over time. For example, in Cincinnati, Ohio, after the fatal interaction between 
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Timothy Thomas and a police officer, the city erupted in three days of protest. Following 
which,  
the Justice Department entered into an agreement with police 
officials in 2002 resulting in a litany of reforms of all facets of the 
city's use of deadly force protocol – from the wording used in the 
rule book to the training procedures to the board that reviews 
police brutality complaints. ‘Crime rates are down, trust of police 
is up, dialogue between community and the police is very high,’ 
prominent Cincinnati-based area civil rights attorney Al 
Gerhardstein said (Shaffer 2014).  
In which case, it appears that despite the movement’s expiration, its impact continues to 
be seen in some ways. I found that in both cases political elite aim to draft policy that 
embraces the actions and thoughts of their constituents in order to remain in power, thus 
it is important for the public to advocate for more egalitarian policies so that the elite will 
respond. When elites perceive a shift in the broadly held ideologies to reflect more 
integrative social ideals, their policy responses will also reflect such integrative social 
ideals.  
 The Toilet Wars movement has itself been more sustaining, but has produced less 
consequential policy activity. The Toilet Wars movement’s resilience can be attributed to 
the organizational leadership provided by both the ANCYL and the SJC. These groups 
also crafted policy goals, which were communicated to political elites through efforts like 
the march to the Mayor of Cape Town’s office to petition for a “public consultation to 
discuss the long-term delivery of basic sanitation to all those in need” (Silber 2011). 
Again, South Africa already had policies instilled in favor of service delivery for all, but 
unfortunately the political system does not provide for and properly implement these acts. 
However, the most positive response to the protestor’s pleas regarding this inadequate 
implementation was made in September 2011, when Tokyo Sexwale (the Minister for 
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Human Settlements) appointed Winnie Mandela to head a newfound national task team to 
investigate the issue of open toilets throughout South Africa (Robins 2014 484). 	  COMMON	  THEMES:	  	  
Elite instability 
 The level of elite instability at the time of elite response, conditioned all of the 
responses previously discussed, from those deemed more symbolic to the more tangible 
claims. This variable even tended to dictate the degree of concession that the elites were 
willing to put forth. For example, in both South Africa and the United States, the 
politicians’ reactions were heavily informed by the timing of the movement in relation to 
the electoral cycle; they were continually forced to (or chose to) make decisions that 
would maintain their power, which meant acting with regard for the views held by the 
coalition they were appealing to and trying to garner votes from (which was not 
necessarily in line with the movement’s pleas). This is especially typical of electoral 
relations in the U.S. in response to the Rodney King case, President Clinton conceded to 
the Black community by establishing Section 14141 because as a Democrat, he was seen 
as the Democratic Party is seen as the predominant political defender of minority 
community (especially compared to the Republican party). However, his concession also 
remained mild due to his concerted efforts to appeal to the White constituency at this 
time. Answering to constituents’ concerns primarily to help prolong one’s own political 
power also remained true in the South African case because, even though party politics 
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are strikingly different in South Africa,133 I studied the single province that is most 
affected by dueling parties. As such the DA was forced to respond to the public’s 
grievances, as well as court rulings, in order to sustain their political power and remain in 
office. Bosch (2010) writes,  
In a country with a poverty rate of more than 40 percent and an 
official unemployment rate of 24 percent, it’s easy to see why both 
the DA and the ANC would spend so much time talking about 
toilets. Sanitation is just one of the basic services – along with 
electricity, drinking water, schools, and basic housing – that have 
been promised to the nation’s poor. Pleasing those people wins 
votes; but failing that, turning them against one’s enemy can be 
also be rewarding. 
 
The government should have been promoting particular actions to provide for and uphold 
their citizens basic human rights, but these efforts were convoluted by individual and 
political party-related pursuits of power, which led to largely inadequate responses to the 
marginalized people’s concerns.  
 In both cases, had there been a more egalitarian ethos throughout society, 
politicians would have been less inclined to compromise egalitarian beliefs, or perhaps 
they would even have been able to promote egalitarian views as a mechanism for 
attracting more constituent’s votes. In this scenario it would be necessary to reach a 
consensual understanding that equality benefits the overall health of society. In order to 
get to this point, the various coalitions that make up the electorate would have to be in 
full support of disbanding racial inequality, or at the very least are not distinguishing one 
another according to race; by expanding our notions of national identity and national 
unity, we become closer to fulfilling this prophecy(see Frymer 2005). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 The ANC’s authority has remained largely uncontested since the first democratic 
elections of 1994. 
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Media 
 Social movements, if nothing else, may be able to attract far-reaching (potentially 
national) attention to societal issues that could demonstrate fragments in the current state 
of national cohesion. In both the U.S. and South African cases, the social movements that 
I examined were able to heighten the elite’s and the society’s exposure to their respective 
concerns and acquired national attention for their causes. The media played an extremely 
consequential role in shedding even more light on these causes to help broaden each the 
movements’ reach.  
 The footage and images that first attracted media attention provided less 
disputable evidence (than individual accounts would have provided) for the extraordinary 
circumstances faced by Black communities in both the U.S. and South Africa. This, in 
turn, helped to make the problems appear more blatant for a broader audience’s grasp. In 
South Africa, this was done through the dissemination of images of the unenclosed toilets 
in Khayelitsha, which exposed state violence and neglect for human dignity. In the U.S., 
this was done through the constant looping of George Holiday’s video of the Rodney 
King beating, which brought to light the heinous acts committed by some police officers 
particularly against Black citizens. The footage of these two incidents garnered far-
reaching support because they indisputably portrayed appalling circumstances and were 
more easily grasped by the broader public than statistics or reports, which tend to be 
harder to relate to. Both cases provided emblems of racial inequities for the movements 
to rally around (police brutality and unenclosed toilets).  
Progress remains to be had 
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 However, both cases also demonstrate that despite the heavy media focus, neither 
issue has seen grandiose change and ultimately racial inequities persist in the U.S. and 
South Africa—generally speaking and with regard to police brutality and service delivery 
in particular. Aubrey Matshiqi, a senior political analyst at the Center for Policy Studies 
in Johannesburg says, “The larger issue here is the constitutional right, and one of the 
most important rights, to dignity, and the way in which toilets were provided were an 
aberration of that right” (Baldauf 2010), and thus essential progress remains to be had; 
the state must start acting with regard for and in an effort to uphold the rights and dignity 
of all South African people. In order to achieve this, resources must be reallocated more 
equitably, without regard for the state mapping that literally placed particular races on the 
margins of society. 
 Likewise, in the U.S. the Rodney King movement led to subtle policy changes, 
which have important implications for police brutality and the future of police-related 
violence in America, but unfortunately sweeping change remains to be had, as is 
evidence by the more recent episodes of police brutality were revealed by the media in 
2014. The law written in response to the Rodney King episode (Section 14141) has 
celebrated some success, such as Cincinnati, Ohio’s markedly improved police relations, 
which resulted when the U.S. Attorney General initiated “structural reform litigation” as 
outlined by Section 14141 (Rushin 2014). But still police brutality and tension within 
police-minority relations remain. Furthermore, Rushin (2014) finds that “the DOJ has 
historically underenforced Section 14141, due in part to resource limitations that prevent 
the agency from aggressively pursuing all reported cases of systemic misconduct” (3189). 
It appears that when implemented, Section 14141 has been successful, but Rushin (2014) 
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suggests that in order to make the grandiose changes that I am referring to, the DOJ 
should adopt a “more transparent internal case selection process that incentivizes 
proactive reform in local police agencies” (3189). Rushin (2014) also addressed the 
media influence in the Rodney King case, he states “The Rodney King beating would 
likely never have become a national story without the amateur camera work of George 
Holliday…” the video ignited a public outcry, “observers across the country immediately 
condemned the behavior of the officers involved in the King beating” (3209) but the 
uproar has largely subsided. The aforementioned Sigelman et al. (1997) article 
demonstrates that White respondents have not departed back to the previous rates of 
approval for police brutality since the Rodney King incident, but that the numbers still 
remain strikingly high; A CBS News Poll conducted in 2014 found that only 28 percent 
of Whites “think that police are too quick to use deadly force, or do not typically only use 
deadly force when necessary,” juxtaposed to 74 percent of Blacks. DIVERGENT	  THEMES	  	  
Race 
 One of the most striking differences between my two cases is the perception of 
race in each society. In South Africa, the political system is primarily comprised of Black 
South African representatives, and thus the perception of racial bias materializes 
differently than in the U.S., where race inequities are more easily recognized in a 
disproportionately White political system. Both societies experience high rates of poverty 
within their Black communities, but South Africa largely tends to subsume racial 
inequalities with class-based grievances, whereas in the U.S. the two issues are more 
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commonly perceived to be linked.134 Still, in almost all societies, protests are seen to 
erupt when the political system fails to provide for its citizens’ needs, which remains true 
for both of my societies of inquiry. This notion also contributes to my justification for 
choosing to analyze two different types of protests (rather than studying police brutality 
in both cases or service delivery in both cases). If protests are reflective of a society’s 
predominant concerns then perhaps they also reflect the state of racial inequity in these 
two countries, such that one of the primary racial inequities is poor service delivery in 
South Africa and police brutality in the United States. These two issues also provide 
more tangible representations of the prevailing racial inequalities that lead to violence 
more broadly speaking. For example, police brutality and poor service delivery are both 
indicative of larger inequalities related to how the government treats its Black citizens in 
general, but are able to provide self-contained evidence of specific issues, which may 
galvanize a more significant response, as opposed to the more arcane problems such as 
unemployment rates.   
 The relationship between class and race in South Africa is actually statistically 
more striking than that in the U.S. and thus it would makes that the protests seen in South 
Africa are primarily in response to class related issues. This is demonstrated by the South 
African Reconciliation Barometer which shoes “White and Indian/Asian are entirely 
absent from the lower Living Standard Measure categories” and Whites from the bottom 
four categories. Whereas “there is a much higher percentage of Black South Africans 
(relative to the total Black South African population) than any other race group in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 Race is inextricably linked to class issues, and thus many theorists use similar 
justification for racial and class-based uprising (see Omi and Winant; Marx 1996). 
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most economically excluded LSM categories” (Wale 2013 15).135 Nonetheless, when 
surveyed, the Black South African community tended to rank “race” fairly low amongst 
the most impending structural issues that they continue to face post-Apartheid. I 
maintain, however, that racial bias is steeped in each of the social and political issues that 
ranked higher on this barometer: income, disease (HIV and Aids), political parties (and 
then follows race). Service delivery in particular is also clearly a racialized problem (and 
ranks high on the barometer) “ANCYL…called the DA’s provision of toilets a human 
rights violation and an act of racism by the mainly White-led DA city government” 
(Bosch 2010). Racial biases are imbued in and contributes to the primary societal 
divisions throughout South Africa, but the public’s perception of the persisting 
problems are largely informed by their daily interactions. 
Perception of grievance, race and culture 
 In order for social movement actions to transpire, I have posited perception of 
grievance to be a necessary antecedent stipulation. Perception of grievance was exposed 
in strikingly different (and unanticipated) ways between my two cases. Piven (1976) says 
there must be a perception of lost legitimacy in the system, a demand for change, and a 
resurgence of individual power where people have the sense that they can change their 
circumstances. Their actions will be informed by a newfound defiance, which is also the 
base for collective action.  
 South Africa’s post-Apartheid society is quick to blame the state for issues related 
to unfulfilled constitutionally given promises and rights such as basic services. In the case 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 35.4% of Black South Africans are in the lowest four LSM categories, 48.2% are in 
the middle categories and 16.3% are in the highest four categories. 
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of the Toilet Wars movement, individual’s perception that their circumstances were 
related to a “system failure” was informed by two primary factors. First, the movement 
was directed by pre-existing underlying leadership that promoted particular 
interpretations of problem (such as systemic failure) and also because South African 
citizens, post-Apartheid, have been inundated with political promises for upholding ideals 
for equality and service delivery to all as a means for ushering in a new South Africa; 
thus the Khayelitsha residents were given the impression that the state was falling short.  
 Developing this type of understanding is not as simple in the U.S. context. In 
South Africa, especially post-1994 there is a prevailing collectivist culture that dictates 
social relations; this notion can be ascribed to the term Ubuntu, which is related to the 
seeing interconnectedness within all of humanity (Shutte 2001).136 However, in U.S. the 
ethos is of a more individualistic nature, Omi and Winant (2014) draw out several 
conclusions for explaining for how this standard of individualism (which is fundamental 
to U.S. history and culture) may also lead to the country’s persisting racial biases. They 
posit, the “rise of the neoliberal project,” which is “rooted in possessive individualism 
and worshipful of the ‘free market’” (212); discuss the notion that “the American ‘civil 
religion’ is individualism, equality, competition, opportunity, and the accessibility of the 
‘American dream’ to all who [strive] for it” (254); and address the “‘colorblind theories 
that racial policies should be guided by principles of individualism, and oppose demands 
for equality of result” (57). The notion of individualism has also become a persuasive 
White backlash claim against proponents of positive racial agendas, especially those that 
advocate for developing programs and policies to rectify disparate rates of Black poverty. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 It is most often translated to mean, “I am because we are.” 
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This authoritative notion of individualism in America has largely undercut efforts to 
develop a sense of Black subjectivity and heightened perception of grievance in the Black 
community. Nonetheless, when one is able to recognize the subjectiveness of their 
societal positioning as it related to their socially constructed race, they may be able to 
alleviate thoughts of personal inadequacy being the cause of their societal position, which 
would then more likely fuel a social movement. 137 
 The moral code related to poverty also varies within each country. In South 
Africa, post-1994, poverty is again more likely to be seen as a result of State inadequacy, 
whereas in the U.S. it is more likely to be seen as a personal sin (as influenced by Puritan 
thought and liberal ideologies), which has made the initial eruption of social movements 
different for these two cases.138 This variation is informed by the aforementioned 
discussion of individualism versus collectivism and how it relates to perceptions of 
repression. Poverty may be understood as the consequence of individual’s actions or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 “Ann Laura writes… ‘For Foucault, racism is more than an ad hoc response to crisis: 
It is a manifestation of preserved possibilities, the expression of an underlying discourse 
of permanent social war, nurtured by the biopolitical technologies of crisis in sporadic 
cleansings. It is internal to the biopoltical state, woven into the weft of the social body, 
threaded through its fabric” (1995 via Omi and Winant 2014). 
138 However, Omi and Winant (2014) provide an interesting parallel between the 
understanding of ethnicity and repression between the U.S. and South Africa by claiming 
that the settler community in North America has contributed to the “broad cultural 
orientation” of the country, which have led identity and race to become “deeply 
intertwined,” especially due to the “English immigrants—and later European ones.” 
“This militant, authoritarian, Calvinist sect, quite closely related to the Dutch Reformed 
Church (NHK) of the Afrikaaners, set the basic ethnic pattern in North America. That 
pattern insistent upon strict doctrinal adherence, individualism, repression (especially 
sexual repression), and a sort of primitive communitarianism of the elect, generated many 
of the components of what we not call ‘American exceptionalism” (24). However, I 
would argue that this basis for Afrikaaner ideologies that relate to individualism are only 
the case for perhaps the Afrikaaner elite, and that marginalized Africans have bonded to a 
collectivist identity. 
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inadequacy, or as the state’s failure to provide for its people. These dichotomous views 
will inform the expedience of social movement actions. In the United States, not only are 
the consequences of marginalization perceived on an individual level, but the issue at 
hand, police brutality is also executed by an individual acting against another individual, 
which further inhibits the process of mobilizing a collective identity. On the contrary, 
basic service delivery issues regard a system-wide failing that affects an entire 
community at one time and in a more collectivist-minded society, which may also be 
easier to develop a collective identity and motivation of change under. 
Local leadership 
 The type of local leadership that these particular social movements’ targeted 
(aimed to change) (which is not necessarily the political elites that they sought a response 
from) had a significant effect on the outcome each movement was able to produce. The 
type of leadership targeted by either social movement correlates to the complexities and 
difficulties faced by the movement and its activists in their attempt to procure change. 
For example, improving service delivery requires coordination between the central 
government, provincial government, and municipalities and the problem is primarily 
related to inefficiencies within the process of delivery services (which is related to 
resource distribution that is determined according to racial and class categorization, hence 
the townships are the most negatively affected). Police brutality on the other hand must 
be addressed on the individual level and the police department level through civil and 
criminal cases pursued by the Department of Justice and the problem is related to a 
blatant disregard for another person.  
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 As noted by Piven (1976), those most deeply affected by a marginalized social 
positioning are not likely to address the grander social structure in their direct actions, or 
even motivations; they will most likely be attempting to attract elite attention to their 
immediate circumstances. In the Toilet Wars case, the movement sought to acquire better 
sanitation services, which were promised by way of South African citizenship, and the 
very virtue of human dignity. In the Rodney King case, the movement sought to bring 
attention to the issue of police brutality in order to garner a response that would put an 
end to such atrocities, which was to be afforded by way of American citizenship, and the 
very virtue of humanity. In order to ensure that future people do not suffer from 
unenclosed toilets and poor sanitation or police brutality, the social movement must be 
able to elicit a response that leads to changes within the two systems; service delivery and 
law enforcement. However, in order to ensure that future people do not suffer from racial 
bias that marginalize their positions in society and materialize in direct forms of abuse 
that disrespect their dignity, larger structural shifts must address both how race is 
perceived by society (the public and the elites) and the political processes for which race-
related injustices are reprimanded. Change must be sought from the central leadership 
through to the “street-level bureaucrats,” which may be the most difficult level of 
leadership to address in a democratic society, because much of these people’s actions are 
regulated by discretion, and discretion is informed by personal bias. 
 In order to make sweeping changes that instigate shifts from the central 
government through to those that are engaging with society directly there must be a 
broad-based shift in how race is perceived. By enacting mandates that punish abusive acts 
people would be less likely to act abusively. Eventually, less overtly racist acts (even if 
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the motivation was initially for fear of punishment) will lead to a less overtly racist 
society, and potentially a new, less racist ethos over time; if prejudice is removed from 
the social contract we prescribe to. 
 CONCLUDING	  REMARKS	  
 My dependent variable’s outcome varied depending on the movement’s actions, 
what each movement aimed to address, and the system that the movement was working 
within. In the U.S. the level of change in hierarchy was fairly minor, but still significant 
and satisfied my twofold criterion to an extent. Policy reform materialized in Section 
14141, and the public opinion data indicated a shift in both Black people and White 
people’s perception of the injustices faced by the Black community. In South Africa, 
preliminary structures were built around the toilets, but the ANCYL and the DA 
primarily continued to use the troubles faced by township residents as political ploys. 
However, the issue of unenclosed toilets was brought to national attention, which may 
have led to more understanding between the Blacks and Whites of South Africa,139 which 
according to “contact hypothesis” may improve social bonds between these two 
communities, over time (Gibson 2005). Also, despite the lack of new legislation drafted 
and the inadequate response from the political party-affiliated politicians, the Western 
High Court still made important judgments based on already inscribed legislation that led 
to positive outcomes for the townships; Judge Erasmus in particular provided oversight 
for the government’s responses to the township and called for more apt privacy structures 
to be constructed. He also defended the rights of township residents and criticized the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 Although I could not find satisfactory data to support this. 
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political parties for their neglectful actions. Nonetheless, in both cases the patterns of 
racism, which led to the issues raised by the social movements (anti-dignity toilets and 
police brutality), were not fully dismantled. 
 FURTHER	  RESEARCH	  AND	  LIMITATIONS	  
 
Unanticipated results 
 Throughout the process of research and analysis, elite division, organization of 
movement, data capture, politicization of information, and the very state of democracy, 
all produced especially unanticipated results. In both cases, I found that divisions 
amongst the elite bared a greater significance for the outcome of the overall social 
movement than I had initially anticipated. In South Africa, the elite division led to 
especially symbolic responses that tended to be inadequate for actually addressing the 
needs of their constituents, but rather timed the presentation of their promises to align 
with the election in order to maintain their political power. In the U.S. the division 
amongst the elite forced Congressional Democrats to make more subtle policy 
propositions in order to avoid another filibuster from Congressional Republicans, and 
President Clinton’s consideration for positive racial policy was heavily influenced by the 
White working class coalition he was attempting to capture at the time. I also found that 
these elite response in and of itself played a significant role in the outcome of a 
movement, but again that the response was rarely related to personally held ideals, or 
even party-related ideals, and far more closely related to the condition of electoral 
stability at the time of their decision-making. 
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 I hypothesized that the level of organization within a movement would positively 
affect the longevity of that movement (in line with Skrentny (2006) and opposed to Piven 
(1976)), which appears to have held true based on my two cases. The service delivery 
movement continues today, whereas the Rodney King movement did not endure and has 
since been replaced with a new anti-police brutality movement (as of 2014). However, 
based on my cases and research therein, I cannot accurately make comparative claims on 
the longevity of the movement because the Toilet Wars began less than four years ago, 
whereas the Rodney King movement erupted over 20 years ago. For this reason it would 
be useful to reassess the service delivery movement in future years, or apply my theory to 
more comparably timed movements to determine the effect that organization actually has 
on longevity. 
 Inadequate data capture of police brutality in the U.S. proved to be an inhibiting 
factor to my case study because there is no official centralized aggregate source of police 
brutality data for the U.S. This inadequacy in data capture is an artifact of police 
department’s personal crime statistic submission process, which provides no incentive to 
increase the visibility of a department’s own problems. This issue further exemplifies the 
lack of adequate response currently afforded to cases of police brutality in the U.S. This 
factor primarily inhibited my ability to make claims related to police brutality on a 
national scale, and the comparability of police brutality over time, with other races, and 
with other societies.  
 At times throughout this study, it was also difficult to sift through the politicized 
qualitative data related to electoral stability and elite response to the Toilet Wars case in 
particular. Determining the actual level of response proved challenging because many of 
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the claims were put forth by biased news sources and my search for less biased sources, 
such as peer-reviewed work, proved unfruitful. Lastly, it would also be useful to control 
for the evolution and maturity of democracy in the case two countries. Typically 
emancipations do not immediately and fully emancipate all citizens. In addressing these 
two post-liberation periods it would be useful to determine how responsive the system 
was to the Black population relative to their time of liberation. 
Limitation to my theory 
 Finally, I would also like to speak an overarching limitation to my study, which is 
the bias that I inevitably held when conducting my research. My theory in particular 
brought bias into the study because it is rooted in U.S. theorists who make claims 
primarily focused on the American system, and although it appeared to work for my 
study, there were likely important nuances lost in the South Africa case due to this 
shortfall.140 
 Although my theory largely applied to both cases, the examples in my theory’s 
operationalization failed to consider South African trends, and the very basis of my study 
was grounded in the American perspective that I (and my primary theorists) inherently 
possess. I attempted to analyze my cases based solely on the narratives that I read and 
data that I assessed, but inevitably my understanding will be informed from the frame I 
have developed as an American political science major and the biases I possess based on 
my Western, White, American, female perspective. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 Anthony Marx is an exception, he is a trained comparativist, who specifically studies 
South Africa and the U.S. 
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